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This dissertation studies the role of credit and liquidity in macroeconomic
fluctuations.
Chapter 1 analyzes the effect of endogenous unemployment risk on the dy-
namics of recovery from a liquidity trap. In a liquidity trap, an adverse demand
shock raises unemployment and produces a period of slow hiring. Slow hiring further
reduces demand, both for standard precautionary reasons and because credit con-
ditions endogenously worsen, reducing households’ ability to borrow and consume.
Multiple equilibrium paths exist, and which one the economy follows depends on
household expectations and the policy rule adopted by the central bank after the
economy exits the trap. Employment remains depressed for a substantial period af-
ter an adverse shock because high unemployment increases the dispersion of house-
hold debt holdings, slowing the recovery of demand. I find that the initial household
debt distribution significantly affects the economy’s sensitivity to a demand shock,
and study the role of central bank policy in mitigating the initial fall in employment
and promoting faster recovery.
Chapter 2 explores a novel channel through which financial shocks affect the
real economy through the supply of liquidity. I consider a model in which firms
require uncertain ongoing financing, and agency costs limit their ability to raise new
funds. To secure future financing, firms hold assets to sell if needed, and purchase
credit lines from financial intermediaries. I collectively refer to these instruments
as liquidity. Financial intermediaries’ ability to commit future funds depends on
their capital. This creates a linkage between bank balance sheets and the aggregate
supply of liquidity. Bank losses raise the liquidity premium and reduce investment.
I analyze the optimal supply of public liquidity, and find that when private liquidity
is scarce the government should issue bonds for their liquidity properties. I further
find that the optimal supply of government debt is decreasing in bank capital. This
suggests that in the wake of a financial crisis in which financial intermediaries suffer
large losses, governments should increase debt issuance.
Chapter 3 considers the distributive implications of financial regulation.1 It
develops a model in which the financial sector benefits from financial risk-taking by
earning greater expected returns. However, risk-taking also increases the incidence
of large losses that lead to credit crunches and impose negative externalities on the
real economy. A regulator has to trade off efficiency in the financial sector, which
is aided by deregulation, against efficiency in the real economy, which is aided by
tighter regulation and a more stable supply of credit.
1Chapter 3 was coauthored with Professor Anton Korinek, and was published as Korinek and
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Chapter 1: Household Debt, Unemployment, and Slow Recoveries
1.1 Introduction
In the wake of the 2007 – 2009 recession, the U.S. experienced a period of persistently
high unemployment with short-term interest rates at the zero lower bound. Several
researchers have linked the severity of the recession and the slow recovery of hiring
to weak consumer demand, possibly due to high levels of household debt entering
the recession.1 In this paper I offer an alternative hypothesis for persistent weak
demand: that slow hiring itself weakens demand, amplifying shocks and producing
self-fulfilling slow recoveries.
Slow hiring weakens demand for two reasons. First, slow hiring implies longer
spells of unemployment, which prompt greater saving by households for standard
precautionary reasons. Second, high unemployment endogenously tightens the fi-
nancial constraints of households because longer expected spells of unemployment
1Mian and Sufi (2010), and Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) argue that high household leverage
contributed to the decline in employment and consumption in 2008. Dynan (2012) and Hall (2011)
argue that high levels of household debt contributed to the slow recovery since 2008. Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009), Hall (2010), and Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2013) argue that financial crises are
often preceded by increases in leverage and followed by slow recoveries, but for a contrary finding
see Romer and Romer (2015).
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increase the incentives for households to default on their debt. When the economy
is demand-constrained, as in a liquidity trap, the increase in desired saving lowers
demand, causing employment to fall further.
To explore this mechanism, I develop a model in which households face id-
iosyncratic endogenous unemployment risk. Employed households face a constant
exogenous rate of job loss, while the rate at which unemployed households find
jobs is time-varying and endogenous. Employed households save and unemployed
households dissave in order to smooth consumption over unemployment spells. Un-
employed households face a borrowing constraint, set to prevent default. As in
a standard New Keynesian model, prices are sticky and the levels of output and
employment are determined by demand. Unlike in a standard model, the path of
output in turn determines the rate of job-finding, which affects demand through the
precautionary and credit channels described above.
I consider a persistent demand shock in this setting, which in my baseline
experiment is an exogenous worsening of commitment problems in credit markets
that reduces households’ ability to borrow. This shock reduces aggregate spending
for a given path of the interest rate and the job-finding rate, but does not affect the
hiring incentives of firms. If prices were flexible, the interest rate would fall to raise
desired consumption and maintain the rate of hiring that prevailed before the shock.
If instead prices are sticky, the central bank will try to replicate the flexible-price
equilibrium by lowering the interest rate. However, if the economy is in a liquidity
trap, the central bank will not be able to lower the interest rate sufficiently to offset
2
the demand shock, and employment falls instead.2
My first main result is that the presence of unemployment risk amplifies the
fall of employment following this shock. Since the demand shock is persistent,
employment remains low for a period of time. This implies that the hiring rate
falls, which reduces demand via the precautionary and credit channels discussed
above. This feedback mechanism amplifies the employment effect of the initial
demand shock, producing a larger fall in employment than would otherwise occur.
In my baseline experiment, a temporary shock to household credit access, I calculate
that the initial fall in demand (and thus employment) is about twice as large as in a
complete-markets model that experiences a demand shock of equivalent magnitude.3
My second main result is that unemployment risk can produce a slow recovery
of employment following a demand shock. This occurs because high unemployment
increases the dispersion of asset holdings, both by increasing saving by employed
households, and by increasing the number and length of unemployment spells. Since
unemployed households borrow, this produces more households with large debt.
Greater asset dispersion depresses demand because poor households close to the
borrowing constraint reduce their consumption by more than wealthy households
increase theirs. Thus the increase in asset dispersion keeps demand low after the
shock has dissipated, producing a slow recovery of employment.
The speed of recovery varies quite a bit depending on the persistence of the
2This result is similar to Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Werning (2011), and Eggertsson
and Krugman (2012).
3For details on this comparison, see section 1.5.3.
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initial shock. The baseline credit shock does not produce a slow recovery because its
duration is fairly short. The tighter borrowing constraint facing households causes
highly indebted households to reduce their debt holdings, a period of deleveraging
that reduces demand and causes employment to fall in the short run. However, the
reduced debt burden allows demand to recover quickly when the shock begins to
fade. Intuitively, a shock directly to household credit purges bad balance sheets, so
that after the initial deleveraging households are able to rapidly increase spending as
credit conditions recover. By contrast, a permanent credit shock induces a lengthy
period of deleveraging as the economy transitions to a new asset distribution. This
lengthy period of high unemployment causes households to accumulate debt, slowing
the deleveraging process.
In a similar manner, the initial asset distribution significantly affects the econ-
omy’s response to demand shocks. Greater dispersion in assets implies there are
more households close to the constraint, which increases the economy’s sensitivity
to shocks. This both increases amplification, since the households close to the con-
straint are forced to deleverage when the constraint tightens following a shock, and
slows the recovery of employment because the greater debt burden requires a longer
period of deleveraging.
A further result is that there are many equilibrium paths following any partic-
ular shock. If households are pessimistic about the rate of recovery of employment
following the demand shock, the initial fall in demand will be greater, and a slower
recovery will follow. Such a multiplicity of equilibria is quite common in New Key-
nesian models, particularly those with a zero lower bound on the nominal interest
4
rate.4 Typically determinacy is achieved by assuming that the central bank follows
a conditional interest rate policy that rules out undesirable equilibria. However, in
a liquidity trap the central bank cannot lower interest rates, and so may not be able
to rule out slumps generated by self-fulfilling pessimism about the rate of recovery.
Thus any demand shock that pushes the economy into a liquidity trap could bring
about a persistent slump.
Not only may pessimistic expectations alter the dynamics of the economy
following a demand shock, they may constitute a shock by themselves. If households
anticipate a period of reduced hiring, they will reduce their spending. A sufficiently
large decrease in consumption would require a negative real interest rate to offset,
causing the economy to fall into a liquidity trap and inducing a persistent slump.
The existence of multiple equilibria suggests a role for policy to offset demand
shocks. Several authors, starting with Krugman (1998), have suggested that the
central bank can reduce the fall in employment during a liquidity trap by keeping in-
terest rates low after the recovery. These low interest rates generate a post-recovery
boom in consumption, which raises demand during the slump as households smooth
their consumption.5 In my formulation, the analogous mechanism is a boom in hir-
ing, which raises demand by reducing precautionary saving. However, as emphasized
by several authors, engineering such a boom requires the central bank to commit to
4See, for example, Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001),
Clarida, Gaĺı, and Gertler (2000), and Cochrane (2011).
5Werning (2011) first clarified that this mechanism does not rely on inflation, but is purely a
consumption boom.
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following an ex post suboptimal policy once the economy exits the trap.
Literature. This paper is part of a rapidly growing literature on the dynamics of
the economy in a liquidity trap. The early papers in this literature, Krugman (1998)
and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), were the first to consider the possibility of a
binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates in a modern context, and sug-
gested the possibility of forward guidance in substituting for conventional monetary
policy in these circumstances. Werning (2011) investigates optimal policy in this
setting, and clarifies the dynamics of a liquidity trap in a simple and elegant model.
Cochrane (2011) and Aruoba and Schorfheide (2013) discuss the problem of deter-
minacy in the presence of a zero lower bound, and the possibility of deflationary
traps, which is related to my finding of multiple equilibrium paths of recovery.
A number of papers have highlighted the role of household debt and deleverag-
ing as the cause of low demand leading to a liquidity trap. Eggertsson and Krugman
(2012) first explored this deleveraging channel in the context of a simple model with
a zero lower bound. Hall (2011) develops a similar hypothesis, with particular refer-
ence to high levels of household debt producing a slow recovery of demand. Korinek
and Simsek (2014) study the role of macroprudential regulation in reducing the ef-
fects of this deleveraging channel. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) investigate the
effect of precautionary saving behavior on the evolution of the distribution of debt
holdings during a deleveraging episode. This paper contributes to this literature by
introducing endogenous time-varying unemployment risk into a model of a liquidity
trap and studying the resulting feedback from high unemployment to weak demand
6
through precautionary saving and endogenous borrowing constraints.
Several papers have empirically investigated the household debt / aggregate
demand hypothesis of the 2007 – 2009 recession. Mian and Sufi (2010) and Mian,
Rao, and Sufi (2013) use detailed county-level data to show that counties with high
household leverage and large declines in house prices before the crisis had larger
declines in employment and output during the crisis. Mian and Sufi (2014) shows
that these differential employment declines are driven by the hiring decisions of
nontradable good firms, suggesting that the mechanism operates through a demand
channel. Dynan (2012) finds that households with high leverage saw larger declines
in consumption in 2007 – 2009, despite a smaller decline in net worth, indicating the
existince of a household credit channel rather than a wealth channel. Baker (2014)
finds that households with higher levels of debt adjust their consumptiion more in
response to changes in income, suggesting a higher marginal propensity to consume
for highly indebted households.
Several authors have recently offered alternative models of aggregate demand
channels, many involving matching in product or labor markets. Kocherlakota
(2012) analyzes a so-called incomplete labor market model, in which the real in-
terest rate is set by the central bank and the labor supply condition may not hold.
This formulation is similar to a New Keynesian model with fixed prices, except
that in a standard New Keynesian model the labor demand condition is dropped
instead of labor supply. Chamley (2014) investigates the possibility of self-fulfilling
precautionary demand for savings in a model with money and bonds, in which the
economy may become stuck in a low demand saving trap, or may converge very
7
slowly towards full employment. Michaillat (2012) argues that matching frictions
are insufficient to explain unemployment and develops a model of job rationing dur-
ing recessions. Michaillat and Saez (2013) develop a model of aggregate demand
with matching frictions in both labor and goods markets, and show that tightness
in one market affects tightness in the other, generating an aggregate demand chan-
nel for employment fluctuations. I view these approaches as complementary to the
New Keynesian formulation of aggregate demand used in this paper.
Since this paper’s primary mechanism operates through precautionary saving
by households, it is related to the empirical on precautionary saving behavior. Car-
roll and Samwick (1997) and Carroll and Samwick (1998) find that households that
face greater income uncertainty hold more wealth, and estimate that precautionary
saving accounts for 39 − 46% of household asset holdings. Gourinchas and Parker
(2002) find that young households target a buffer of precautionary wealth, and es-
timate a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 0.5− 1.4. Parker and Preston (2005)
also find a significant and strongly countercyclical precautionary saving motive, that
is similar in magnitude to the interest-rate motive. Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer
(2012) find that a significant portion of the consumption decline since 2008 was
attributable to precautionary effects.
A few papers have considered the interaction of precautionary savings and
endogenous unemployment risk in the presence of incomplete markets. Challe et al.
(2014) develop a model that combines these ingredients with sticky prices, and show
that variations in precautionary saving over the business cycle amplify employment
fluctuations. Ravn and Sterk (2013) likewise study the effect of unemployment
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risk on demand, although their focus is on an exogenous increase in labor market
mismatch increasing long-term unemployment. Caggese and Perez (2013) study a
model with unemployment risk and credit constraints facing both firms and house-
holds. They show that precautionary behavior by households and firms can interact
to generate a negative demand externality that significantly increases the volatility
of employment over the business cycle. Beaudry, Galizia, and Portier (2014) study
endogenous unemployment risk in a model with decentralized markets and search
frictions. However, they consider contemporaneous employment risk only, and do
not focus on the dynamics of household asset holdings.
The papers cited above generate amplification due to precautionary saving
behavior. This paper sheds additional light on this mechanism, showing that it
operates through a depressed job-finding rate following a persistent demand shock.
It also demonstrates the critical role of the asset distribution in determining these
dynamics, which the papers cited above do not study. This paper also differs by
focusing on the liquidity trap case, by studying the role of expectations in generating
multiple equilibrium paths of recovery, and by studying the role of endogenous credit
conditions facing consumers.
1.2 Households
The model is set in continuous time with a single non-storable consumption good.
There are three types of agents: households, final-good firms, and intermediate-good
firms. I first discuss the household problem, and then turn to the rest of the model.
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where u(·) is a standard utility function, and ρ is the household subjective discount
rate. I assume throughout that u(c) exhibits constant relative risk aversion γ, i.e.
u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ for γ 6= 1 and u(c) = log(c) for γ = 1.
1.2.1 Income Process
Households receive a flow of nonlabor income e(t), which is identical across all
households, and is assumed to be constant over time. This income allows households
to carry debt while maintaining positive consumption. Household i receives a flow
of labor income w(t)hi(t), where hi(t) ∈ {0, 1} is household i’s employment status
at time t, and w(t) is the wage of employed workers.6
Since households suffer no disutility from labor, all households would like to
work, implying an inelastic labor supply at n = 1. This would imply full employ-
ment in a Walrasian labor market, but here there is a hiring cost that produces
equilibrium unemployment. Employment and unemployment shocks arrive with
hiring probability p(t) and separation (job loss) probability s(t) per unit of time.
These are flow probabilities, i.e. the job-finding rate p(t) means that the probability
that a worker who is unemployed at time t finds a job during the interval [t, t+ dt]
6It is common in models of the labor market that unemployed households receive some in-
come, which is generally interpreted as unemployment benefits. One could interpret e(t) in my
formulation as unemployment benefits, and w(t) + e(t) as the wage.
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is approximately p(t) · dt, which becomes exact as dt→ 0. Likewise, the total prob-
ability that an unemployed household will become employed at least once during





and likewise for job separation probabilities, with s(t) in place of p(t). With a
constant hiring rate p, the length of an unemployment spell has an exponential
distribution, with expected value 1/p.
Household i enters period t with net assets ai(t), and can save or borrow at
net interest rate r(t). Assuming no default, household assets evolve according to
ȧi(t) = r(t)ai(t) + e(t) + w(t)hi(t)− ci(t) (1.1)
where ȧi(t) is household i’s net saving.
Households face a time-varying borrowing constraint, which they take as ex-
ogenous. This borrowing limit takes the form of a lower bound on asset holdings
a(t), such that asset holdings of household i must satisfy
ai(t) ≥ a(t)
at every time t. The borrowing constraint satisfies a(t) < 0, so that it is always
possible for households to carry some debt.7
7Technically, employed households could face a looser borrowing constraint than unemployed
households. However, assuming a single borrowing constraint rules out default following job loss.
In any case, the borrowing constraint generally does not bind for employed households.
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1.2.2 Household Problem Under Repayment
There is no aggregate uncertainty, so that the paths of all variables are known at time
0 except for the employment status and asset holdings of individual households, hi(t)
and ai(t). Since households are identical except for asset holdings and employment
status, we need only derive household decisions at each point (h, a, t).
Let V (a, t) be the value function of an employed household in period t with
assets a, and let U(a, t) be the value function of an unemployed household. Employed
households choose current consumption to maximize the Hamiltonian
ρV (a, t) = max
c
{u(c) + Va(a, t) · ȧe + Vt(a, t) + s(t) (U(a, t)− V (a, t))} (1.2)
where ȧe = r(t)a+w(t)+e(t)−c, and where Va and Vt denote the partial derivatives
of the value function. I denote the optimal consumption decision rule by ce(a, t),
which implies the saving decision rule ȧe(a, t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t) + e(t)− ce(a, t).
Unemployed households similarly choose current consumption to maximize the
Hamiltonian
ρU(a, t) = max
c
{u(c) + Ua(a, t) · ȧu + Ut(a, t) + p(t) (V (a, t)− U(a, t))} (1.3)
where ȧu = r(t)a + e(t) − c. I again denote the optimal consumption decision rule
by cu(a, t), which implies saving decision rule ȧu(a, t) = r(t)a(t) + e(t)− cu(a, t).
The optimal consumption choices ce(a, t) and cu(a, t) satisfy
u′(ce(a, t)) = Va(a, t) (1.4)
u′(cu(a, t)) = Ua(a, t) (1.5)
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for a > a. Intuitively, the shadow value of wealth equals the marginal utility of
consumption, since under optimal consumption unconstrained households are indif-
ferent between consuming or saving the marginal unit of wealth.
When a = a, the borrowing constraint may bind. In this case, c is chosen such
that ȧ = ȧ, where ȧ 6= 0 may hold as the borrowing constraint tightens and loosens
with changing macroeconomic conditions. Then the optimality conditions satisfy
u′(ce) ≥ Va(a)
u′(cu) ≥ Ua(a)
Intuitively, when the constraint binds the household would like to borrow more,
but is prevented from doing so by the constraint. This implies that the marginal
utility from consumption is strictly greater than the marginal utility from saving,
i.e. u′(c) > Va.
The costate equations of the Hamiltonian at a > a are
(ρ+ s− r)λ = λaȧe + λt + sκ
(ρ+ p− r)κ = κaȧu + κt + pλ
where λ = Va and κ = Ua are the costate variables.
Let λ̇ = λaȧe + λt and κ̇ = κaȧu + κt, so that λ̇(a, t) and κ̇(a, t) are the
instantaneous rates of change of the costate variables of employed and unemployed
households, respectively, when these households do not change employment status.8
8This is an abuse of notation, since ċ refers to the rate of change of consumption by a particular
household, rather than the evolution of the household decision rule defined at a particular point
(a, t).
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Using these terms, we can express the costate equations as
− λ̇
λ












1.2.3 Household Euler Equation
When a > a, we can express the costate equations in terms of the consumption
decision rules. First taking the expression in terms of λ̇, and observing that −λ̇/λ =






ce(a, t) is the instantaneous rate of change of











This is a form of the continuous time consumption Euler equation. When
s = 0, there is no unemployment risk, and the expression simplifies to the familiar
consumption Euler equation under certainty:
ċ
c
= γ−1 (r − ρ) (1.7)
This implies an increasing path of consumption when r > ρ, and a decreasing
path when r < ρ. This captures the intertemporal substitution of consumption in
response to the interest rate. A low interest rate prompts households to shift con-
sumption towards the present, implying a low growth rate of consumption, whereas
a high interest rate prompts households to reduce current consumption in order to
save more, which implies a higher rate of consumption growth.
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When s > 0, households face unemployment risk. The term γ−1s (c−γu /c
−γ
e − 1)
is positive because cu < ce, implying a faster rate of consumption growth corre-
sponding to greater saving. This term does not perfectly capture the precautionary
motive, however, because ċe only contains changes in consumption for households
that remain employed, whereas we also should consider changes in consumption due
to job loss. In order to isolate the precautionary saving effect, we separate this
expression into a precautionary term related to the volatility of future consumption,
and a term corresponding to the expected level of future consumption. To do this,
we simply add the expected change in consumption due to job loss to each side of
(1.6) to obtain:
ċe + s (cu − ce)
ce︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[ċ/c]
















We may likewise express the Euler equation for unemployed households as:
ċu + p (ce − cu)
cu














Equations (1.8) and (1.9) correspond more precisely to our idea of an Euler
equation. They give expected consumption growth as a function of intertemporal
substitution and a precautionary saving term. Let




− (1− x) (1.10)
so that the the precautionary term for employed households is sT (cu/ce), and for
unemployed households is pT (ce/cu). Thus the precautionary motive is a simple
function of the percentage change in consumption due to a change of employment
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status, times the probability of this change. Since T (x) = 0 at x = 1, the pre-
cautionary motive approaches zero as cu → ce — intuitvely, households would not
be concerned about unemployment spells if they could perfectly smooth their con-
sumption. The derivative of T is T ′(x) = (xγ+1 − 1)/x2. This is strictly negative
for x ∈ (0, 1), and strictly positive for x > 1. Therefore T (x) obtains a unique
minimum at x = 1 on the interval (0,∞), so that the precautionary motive term is
always positive.
To gain a little intuition for the precautionary motive term, we can take a
second-order Taylor expansion around x = 1. Then the precautionary motive term
is approximately
T (x) ≈ 1
2
(1 + γ)× (1− x)2
This expression has a simple intuition. Taking the problem of a currently
employed household, let dc be the change in consumption of this household over a




ċe · dt with probability 1− sdt
cu − ce with probability sdt
(1.11)
We used a similar concept above when we observed that E [ċ] = [ċe + s (cu − ce)]
in equation (1.8). Since ċ = dc/dt, we can multiply by dt to obtain E [dc] =
[ċe + s (cu − ce)] dt, which gives the expectation of the random variable dc. We can
likewise compute the variance, which, again neglecting higher order terms, is:
V ar(dc) = s (cu − ce)2 dt
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or in terms of the rate of change in consumption, s(cu − ce)2 = V ar(dc/dt) · dt.9
By analogy to the Euler equation, we are interested in the variance of the
growth rate of consumption, dc/c. Thus we divide dc be c, which at time t is
a known constant. Then we see that the Taylor expansion of the precautionary














The term 1 + γ = − cu′′′(c)
u′′(c)
, and so 1 + γ is the relative prudence of the utility
function, as defined by Kimball (1990). Thus the precautionary saving term is just
(one-half) prudence times a term proportional to the variance of the consumption








(r − ρ) + 1
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1.2.4 Aggregate Euler Equation
We can aggregate the Euler equations of individual households to obtain an aggre-
gate Euler equation. The household Euler equations (1.8) and (1.9) can be written
as
E [ċ] = γ−1 (r − ρ) c+ qT (c−h/c) · c
where T (x) is the precautionary motive term (1.10), q is the probability of an em-
ployment transition, and c−h is consumption if the household switches employment
status.
9Note that this implies that as dt → 0, so that dc/dt → ċ, the variance of dc/dt approaches
infinity. This reflects the possibility of discrete jumps in consumption following employment shocks.
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There is also a mass of constrained households, who are unemployed at asset
level a. If they remain unemployed, their consumption grows at ċ = −ä, but if
they become employed, which happens with probability pdt in time interval dt, they
will increase their consumption by amount ce(a) − cu(a). Therefore their expected
consumption growth is:
E [ċa] = p (ce(a)− cu(a))− ä
The expected rate of change of aggregate consumption Ċ is just the weighted
average of the expected changes of consumption of individual households. Moreover,
because there is no aggregate risk in the economy, the actual growth of aggregate
consumption equals its expectation. Therefore, letting χ be the share of households
that are constrained, aggregate consumption growth satisfies
Ċ
C
= (1− χ) γ−1 (r − ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest-rate substitution










where ∆c(a) = ce(a) − cu(a) is the increase in consumption when a constrained




















is the consumption-weighted average of the precautionary saving terms of individual
households.10
10me(a, t) and mu(a, t) give the mass of employed and unemployed households, respectively, with
assets a at time t. The integral is taken over assets a > a, meaning that it excludes the point mass
of constrained unemployed households households with a = a. Since employed households are not
constrained, there is a negligible mass of employed households with a = a.
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We can derive a more intuitive expression for aggregate consumption growth
using the second-order Taylor approximation of T (x) given above. Let σ2e(a, t)
and σ2u(a, t) be the consumption growth volatility facing a particular employed











σ2u. Then we can write the aggregate
consumption Euler equation as:
Ċ
C


























is the consumption-weighted average variance of
the growth rate of consumption facing unconstrained households.
Observe that the interest-rate term in (1.14) and (1.16) is multiplied by the
share of unconstrained households 1− χ. This reflects that, whereas unconstrained
households balance consumption volatility and intertemporal substitution, constrained
households are restricted to simply consume their current income. The result is
that future interest rates are discounted at the rate 1− χ, and for this reason I call
(1.14) the discounted aggregate Euler equation. This discounting reflects that bind-
ing constraints on some households make the Euler equation less forward-looking,
as emphasized by McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2015). However, (1.14) makes
clear that while incomplete markets reduce the sensitivity of aggregate consumption
to future interest rates, they also introduce another forward-looking term through
precautionary responses to future consumption volatility. Thus whether incomplete
markets make the Euler equation more or less forward-looking overall depends on the
relative strength of these effects. For instance, if a relatively low fraction of house-
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holds are constrained at any point in time, but idiosyncratic consumption volatility
varies considerably with the business cycle and with monetary policy, then an in-
complete markets model may be more forward-looking than a complete markets
model.
1.2.5 Importance of the aggregate Euler equation
The aggregate Euler equation is critical to the dynamics of a New Keynesian model
of the liquidity trap. To understand the source of this model’s dynamics, it is useful
to contrast the Euler equation above to the standard Euler equation under certainty:
Ċ
C
= γ−1 (r − r∗) (1.17)
r∗ is often called the “natural rate of interest”, which under complete markets is
equal to the rate of time preference. In the simplest model, the path of output is
completely determined by the path of this gap. With no capital, the path of con-
sumption determines the paths of output and employment. Under the maintained
assumption that the economy returns to its steady state in the long run, the path
of consumption growth rates will then also determine the path of employment.
In this setting, a stylized way of capturing a demand shock is as a fall in the
natural rate of interest ρ. If the central bank succeeds in setting r = ρ, the only
effect will be a fall in the interest rate — in this case the central bank succeeds in
fully offsetting the demand shock. However, if r does not fall enough, e.g. because
of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, then r > ρ will result. This
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implies a positive growth rate of aggregate output, and under the assumption of
convergence to the steady state this likewise implies a large current fall in output.
Rearranging (1.14) slightly, we can express our aggregate Euler equation in






ρ− γT (σ2C)− γχµ
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Natural rate of interest
(1.18)
where µ = (p∆c(a)− ä) /C − γ−1 (r − ρ) is the wedge due to binding constraints.
This expression for the natural rate differs in two respects from the complete
markets benchmark. First, it contains a precautionary term arising from idiosyn-
cratic consumption volatility due to incomplete markets. If all households were
unconstrained, so that χ = 0, this would be the only difference. However, as long
as there is a non-trivial mass of households at the constraint, these households will
mechanically consume their liquid wealth every period. Thus there are two depar-
tures from the Euler equation under certainty, corresponding to the precautionary
motive of households responding to consumption volatility, and a further reduction
of spending by households who are currently constrained.
What are the consequences of these changes for the model’s dynamics? The
first consequence is to lower the steady state of interest to r < ρ. In (1.18), note
that both precautionary terms are positive, implying a higher rate of consumption
growth than under certainty. In steady state, we need Ċ = 0, and so we need r < ρ.
Further, the magnitude of ρ−r is growing in the degree of income risk in the steady
state. By analogy to the Euler equation under certainty, we can speak of the natural
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rate of interest as the path of r that achieves Ċ = 0.11
While a lower natural rate of interest might seem a mere curiosity, one impli-
cation is that the zero lower bound is potentially a greater problem. For a given rate
of time preference, the natural rate of interest is lower, and thus r ≥ 0 is a tighter
constraint. Moreover, an increase in steady state income risk or a tightening of
borrowing constraints will lower the natural rate still further, pushing the economy
closer to r = 0.
Perhaps more interesting are the consequences for the dynamic response of
consumption to shocks. Any shock that temporarily raises income risk or tightens
borrowing constraints will raise the growth rate of consumption and therefore lower
current output. Since both events typically happen during a recession, this is a
generic amplification channel as long as demand shocks cannot be fully offset by
monetary policy. Moreover, there is the potential for additional feedback effects,
since this fall in demand will typically raise income risk and tighten borrowing
constraints further. This is the amplification channel developed in this paper.
1.2.6 Household saving rules
Above we discussed household decision rules in terms of consumption decision rules.
We can equivalently represent household decision rules in terms of the rate of as-
11Since income risk and the share of constrained households are endogenous, there may not be
a unique natural rate of interest at each point in time. But we can still speak of a natural path of
interest rates, and for ease of terminology I will refer to the current rate on one such path as the
“natural rate of interest”.
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set accumulation for employed and unemployed households, denoted by ȧe and ȧu
respectively. As implied by the discussion above, the rate of asset accumulation is
decreasing in asset holdings a, because as households gain wealth, their precaution-
ary saving motive declines (in the limit as a becomes arbitrarily large, cu → ce and
the smoothing motive goes to zero).
Assuming r < ρ, which will hold in equilibrium, there is a maximum target









This is the asset level at which the precautionary motive to accumulate assets is
offset by the impatience of consumers relative to the interest rate. At any asset
level a < a, employed households accumulate assets towards the target.
Figure 1.1 represents the saving decision rules of employed and unemployed
households with different levels of asset holdings.12 Unemployed households choose
to dissave until they reach the borrowing constraint a, at which point they choose
ȧ = 0. Employed households choose to accumulate assets up to their target level of
assets ā. For both employed and unemployed households, ȧ is strictly decreasing in
asset holdings a. These are general features of the household decision rules.
An important feature of the household decision rules is that the desired rate
of asset accumulation is convex in asset holdings. This is particularly pronounced
for unemployed households, since they rapidly decrease borrowing as their total
debt approaches the borrowing constraint.This convexity implies that an increase in
12This figure depicts decision rules at the steady state defined in section 1.4, using the parameters
discussed in section 1.3.4.
23




















Figure 1.1: Household decision rules.
dispersion of asset holdings will raise aggregate desired savings, or equivalently will
decrease desired aggregate consumption. This implies that the distribution of asset
holdings is an important determinant of aggregate demand. Since the curvature of
the saving rule is greater for unemployed households close to the borrowing limit, the
share of households with very low wealth (close to being constrained) is of particular
importance. A corollary is that the determination of the borrowing constraint is also
of great importance.
The saving decision rule of households depicted in Figure 1.1 matches some
features of the data. First, it shows that highly indebted unemployed households
have a higher marginal propensity to consume out of wealth than less indebted
households. This matches the finding of Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) that highly
levered households have a higher marginal propensity to consume out of changes
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in housing wealth, and that this is governed by credit access. Also, the difference
between the saving of unemployed and employed households decreases greatly as
households become indebted, implying that high-debt households reduce their con-
sumption much more when they become unemployed. This matches the findings of
Baker (2014) that the consumption of highly indebted households is more sensitive
to changes in their income.
Nevertheless, the saving behavior implied by the model does not perfectly
match the stylized facts found in the data. In particular, the decision rule implies
that saving rates are decreasing in wealth, whereas they are increasing in the data,
as documented by Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) and others. More precisely,
Figure 1.1 shows that saving rates conditional on employment status are decreasing
in wealth. However, because employed households are on average wealthier and
have greater saving than unemployed househods, in the steady state of the baseline
calibration the correlation between wealth and saving is effectively 0. Still, there is
no positive relation as documented in the data.
1.2.7 Borrowing Constraint
I assume that indebted households make the decision to repay or default at every
point in time t. If a household defaults, it suffers a fixed utility penalty D and
is able to borrow again immediately. Thus the value function of an unemployed
household that repays at time t is U(a, t), whereas its value function under default
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is U(0, t)−D, and so an unemployed household will repay if and only if
U(a, t) ≥ U(0, t)−D
Since the value function U(a, t) is strictly increasing in a, there is a unique threshold
level of assets below which unemployed households default. I assume that lenders
set the borrowing constraint equal to this threshold level a(t), which is implicitly
defined by
U(a(t), t) = U(0, t)−D (1.19)
There is a similarly-defined default threshold for employed households defined
by V (ae, t) = V (0, t)−D. However, this default threshold will be lower than that of
unemployed households, and employed households will choose to accumulate assets
at a. Thus we need only worry about the borrowing constraint of unemployed
households, since no household will ever hold assets below this level. Moreover,
since employed households will never choose to hold assets a < a, and unemployed
households cannot choose to do so, no default will occur in equilibrium.
Since the cost of default is fixed, endogenous variation in the borrowing con-
straint is driven by changes in the benefit from defaulting. This benefit is U(a, t)−
U(0, t), which we can write as
∫ 0
a
Uada. Thus the borrowing constraint is defined by∫ 0
a(t)
κ(a, t)da = D
where κ(a, t) = Ua(a, t) is the marginal value of wealth at asset level a. We can
write this is more intuitively as |a| · κ̄ = D, where κ̄ is the average marginal value
of wealth over the interval [a, 0]. Thus the benefit of defaulting is the increase in
wealth from defaulting times the average value of wealth.
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Figure 1.2: Borrowing Constraint for various hiring probabilities.
Holding a fixed, any increase in the marginal value of wealth will raise the
benefit of defaulting. This will prompt an increase in a, i.e. a tightening of the
borrowing constraint. Intuitively, if wealth is more valuable, there is a greater ben-
efit to defaulting, and so lenders must tighten the borrowing constraint to prevent
defaults. One of the chief determinants of the marginal value of wealth for unem-
ployed households is the hiring probability in the near future. When the hiring
probability is high, households expect that they will not be unemployed for very
long, and so choose a relatively high level of consumption in anticipation of their
greater future wealth. This higher consumption implies a lower marginal value of
wealth, since κ = c−γu . This is the mechanism by which high unemployment causes
tighter borrowing constraints, since higher unemployment implies a lower rate of
job-finding.
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Figure 1.2 depicts a(p) for various levels of the job-finding rate p.13 The
figure illustrates that borrowing constraints can vary substantially with the hiring
probability. From the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2009, the quarterly job-finding
rate in the U.S. fell from about 1.9 to 0.75, which according to Figure 1.2 would
tighten the borrowing constraint by over 20%.
1.3 Production, Monetary Policy, and Equilibrium
Now that we have discussed the household problem, I describe the rest of the model
and define the equilibrium.
1.3.1 Firms











where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between inputs. Consider the problem of
a representative final good firm that purchases intermediate goods from intermediate















which yields optimality condition
yi = Y (pi/P )
−ε (1.20)
13Parameters for this case are given in section 1.3.4.
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1−ε . The level
of output is not pinned down by the price distribution, but is instead determined by
the aggregate demand for final goods. Thus the final good producer takes aggregate
demand as given, and purchases intermediate goods according to (1.20) to meet
this demand. Since in equilibrium all intermediate good prices will be identical, the
purchase of intermediate goods will satisfy yi = Y .
14
Intermediate Good Firms. There is a measure 1 of identical intermediate good
firms that face demand function (1.20). Firm i with ni employees produces output
yi(t) = z(t)ni(t)− Ci(t)
where Ci(t) is the hiring cost paid by the firm for new workers, which takes the form
of a loss in output.
Firms perceive equilibrium wage we(t) and per-worker hiring cost ϑ(t). Firms
lose workers at an exogenous hazard rate of s and the firm must pay the hiring cost
on its gross hires ṅ+ sn. Thus the total hiring cost is:
Ci(t) = ϑ(t) · [ṅi(t) + s(t)ni(t)]
I consider firm behavior under two pricing regimes: fixed prices and fully flex-
ible prices. The fixed price regime will be the baseline case and may be interpreted
as a demand-constrained environment with anchored inflation expectations. This
14All intermediate good prices will be identical because we will only consider the extremal cases
of perfectly flexible or perfectly fixed prices. If prices were partially flexible, we would have price
dispersion, with resulting aggregate productivity losses.
29
seems a good approximation to the circumstances that prevailed in the US and Eu-
rope in 2008 – 2014. The flexible price case is useful mainly as a benchmark for
optimal behavior, and will be used to define the central bank policy target. I assume
that the central bank would like to replicate the flexible price benchmark.15
Fixed Prices. Suppose that firms’ prices are fixed at p(t) = 1, which implies that
the aggregate price level is P (t) = 1. As is standard in New Keynesian models, firms
are assumed to meet the demand that they face at this price. Thus firm i chooses
a path of ni(t) that satisfies
di(t) = yi(t) (1.21)
where di(t) is demand for the firm’s output.
Thus at every point in time, I assume that firms set employment n(t) equal to
demand. This may imply an instantaneous adjustment of aggregate employment at
time t = 0, as initial employment n(0) jumps to the equilibrium path. However, I
assume that the path of demand d(t) and therefore of employment n(t) is continuous
and differentiable for t > 0, so that ṅ(t) and p(t) are defined for all t ≥ 0.16 I further
assume that firms will be able to hire sufficient workers to meet the demand they
face, which will be true in all the cases we consider.
I assume that wages are a constant markdown of labor productivity, w(t) =
15This corresponds to setting the interest rate equal to the “natural rate”. In a standard New
Keynesian model, such a policy is optimal since it produces zero inflation and a zero output gap.
In the present model this policy is suboptimal, because there are frictions in the labor and capital
markets. Nevertheless, this assumption provides a simple and intuitive policy target.
16ṅ(0) is defined as the right-derivative of n(t) at t = 0, i.e. as the limit of ṅ(t) as t→ 0.
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ϕz(t) for ϕ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that wages are unaffected by fluctuations in de-
mand, although they respond to changes in productivity.17 Under this assumption,
firm i’s flow profits are
πi(t) = (1− ϕ) z(t)ni(t)− ϑ(t) · [ṅi(t) + sni(t)] (1.22)
where ϑ(t) is the hiring cost, and total hires are ṅ(t) + sn(t) since firms must hire a
flow of s·n(t) workers to replace workers lost to exogenous separation. I assume that
households all own equal shares of firms, and that net profits are paid to households
every period, so that nonlabor income is e = ē+ π.18
Flexible Prices. Now suppose that firms may adjust their prices and choose any
(pi, yi) consistent with (1.20). Further suppose that the government provides a
production subsidy to firms, financed by a lump-sum tax, chosen to exactly offset
the incentive for underproduction due to market power. If the government sets
the production subsidy equal to τ = 1
ε−1 , then the firm problem is isomorphic to
maximizing discounted flow profits (1.22).19
17Many researchers consider sticky wages to be a promising mechanism to produce greater re-
sponses of employment to shocks (e.g., Hall (2005), Pissarides (2009), and Gaĺı (2011)). However,
in the present model sticky wages are not necessary to produce employment volatility because
under fixed prices the path of employment is determined by demand regardless of the incentives
for job creation. The main consequence of fixed wages is to simplify the central bank policy rule.
18In the baseline calibration, steady state profits amount to just 0.25% of GDP, so they make
little difference to the analysis.




ε − τPY , and the marginal
revenue product of labor is Rn =
ε−1





n . In a symmetric equilibrium (P = 1
and Y = zn), this is equivalent to R = zn and firms perceive Rn = z.
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Suppose that firms discount flow profits at the same rate as households ρ.
Firms choose the path of hiring to maximize discounted profits∫ ∞
0
e−ρtπi(t)dt
Let J(n, t) be the value function of a firm at time t with employment n. Then firms
choose hires ṅ to maximize the Hamiltonian
ρJ(n, t) = max
ṅ
{(1− ϕ) zn− ϑ (ṅ+ sn) + Jnṅ+ Jt}
The firm optimality condition is Jn = ϑ, which implies that firms hire workers
until the marginal value of an additional worker is equal to the hiring cost.20 The
costate equation of the Hamiltonian is (ρ+ s) Jn = (1− ϕ) z+ J̇n. Combining these,
we obtain the flexible price job creation condition
(ρ+ s)ϑ = (1− ϕ) z + ϑ̇ (1.23)
Equation (1.23) has a straightforward interpretation. When ϑ̇ = 0, so that the
cost of hiring workers is constant over time, it says that the cost of hiring must equal
the present discounted value of profits that the firm will receive from this worker, i.e.
ϑ = (1−ϕ)z
r+s
. Hiring behavior is altered somewhat when the cost of hiring is expected
to change over time. For example, if ϑ̇ < 0 so that hiring is becoming less expensive
over time, then firms have an incentive to defer hiring until the future when it is
less costly. They will do so until they drive down the hiring cost sufficiently that
they are indifferent between hiring the marginal worker today, or hiring the worker
in the future at a somewhat lower cost.
20By assumption, firms are small and do not internalize that their hiring decisions affect the
aggregate hiring cost.
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Under a few assumptions, (1.23) becomes quite simple. First suppose that the
discount rate of firms ρ, the separation rate s, and productivity z are constant over
time.21 Further assume that the economy will eventually reach a steady state equi-
librium with interior employment (i.e. n ∈ (0, 1)). Finally, suppose that the hiring
cost ϑ is a simple increasing function of the job-finding probability of households p.
Then (1.23) implies a constant job-finding rate p∗ that satisfies ϑ(p∗) = (1−ϕ)z
ρ+s
.









We can write (1.24) more intuitively in its implicit form as
ψ (p∗)α︸ ︷︷ ︸
hiring cost









which makes clear that p∗ corresponds to the rate of hiring at which expected dis-
counted profits from the marginal hire equal the hiring cost.
Optimal hiring is given in terms of an optimal job-finding rate instead of an
optimal hiring rate because the cost of hiring a worker is increasing in the tightness
of the labor market. The standard definition of tightness depends on the aggregate
21If the firm discount rate were not fixed, cyclical variations in firm discount rates could signif-
icantly affect hiring incentives. For an analysis of such effects, see Hall (2014). Since the present
paper is chiefly concerned with the determination of demand rather than incentives for job creation,
I avoid these complications by assuming a fixed discount rate.
22This functional form is isomorphic to a fixed vacancy-posting cost combined with a Cobb-
Douglas matching function, as in Shimer (2005). If the flow cost of maintaining a vacancy is c,






hiring rate relative to the number of unemployed workers, which is equivalent to the
job-finding rate of households. Thus when unemployment is high, the optimal rate
of hiring is higher because it is less costly to hire workers (we can interpret this as
a high rate of filling posted vacancies in a model with explicit search). This works
out to a constant job-finding rate perceived by workers.
1.3.2 Equilibrium under Fixed Prices
Since prices are fixed, there is no inflation and the real interest rate equals the
nominal interest rate. Thus the path of interest rates r(t) is set by the central
bank. Likewise the paths of non-labor income e(t), labor productivity z(t), and the
separation rate s(t) are given.
The law of motion of aggregate employment satisfies
ṅ(t) = p(t) · (1− n(t))− s(t) · n(t)
We need a market clearing condition in the asset market. By Walras’ law, if
the asset market clears, the goods market clears as well. Let me(a, t) and mu(a, t)
be the mass of employed and unemployed households with assets a at time t. Thus
me and mu are the probability density functions of the asset distribution across









In equilibrium, we need aggregate asset holdings at every time t to equal zero.
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is total assets held by unemployed households.
When the economy is not in its long-term steady state, the asset distribution
will evolve over time. The law of motion for the asset distribution is








where (1.28) and (1.29) must be consistent with the law of motion of aggregate
labor.
Equations (1.28) and (1.29) can be interpreted as flow equations. The term
mȧ is the mass of households at a point in the asset distribution times their rate of
asset accumulation. Since the rate of asset accumulation is the “velocity” of that
household along the asset dimension, we can interpret this term as the rate of “flow”
of households through a point on the asset dimension, moving from lower to higher
assets. Then the rate of change of the mass of households in the neighborhood of
a point in the asset distribution is the difference between the rate of flow into that
neighborhood minus the flow out of that neighborhood. This is equivalent to minus
the slope of the flow rate along the asset dimension. For example, if d
da
(mȧ) < 0,
so that the rate of flow is decreasing in assets in the neighborhood of a point in
the asset distribution, then the flow into that neighborhood is greater than the flow
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out of that neighborhood, and so the mass of households in that neighborhood is
increasing.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). Given a path of {z, e, r, s,D} and initial asset distribu-
tionme(a, 0) andmu(a, 0), an equilibrium is a path of {me,mu, V, U, ce, cu, ȧe, ȧu, w, e,
π, p, a, n, u} that satisfies (1.1) - (1.19), (1.22), and (1.25) - (1.29).
1.3.3 Equilibrium Determinacy and Central Bank Policy
Definition 1 specifies an equilibrium for a given path of exogenous variables and
initial conditions. However, it leaves open the question of what path of interest
rates the central bank sets, and whether a unique equilibrium exists for a given
interest rate path. Our benchmark assumption is that the central bank would like
to set interest rates in order to replicate the flexible price job-finding rate p∗ de-
fined by (1.24). We work out the implications of this assumption for equilibrium
determinacy.23
Perfectly Flexible Interest Rates. First suppose that there are no restrictions
on the path of interest rates that the central bank can select. Then the central
bank will always be able to hit its policy target, and we know that the job-finding
rate satisfies p = p∗. However, without further assumptions this does not specify
23This policy rule is equivalent to setting the interest rate equal to the Wicksellian natural rate.
This would be optimal if the only friction were sticky prices. However, in this model the flexible-
price equilibrium is not Pareto optimal because of the presence of incomplete markets. We may
interpret this policy rule as a central bank that limits itself to short-run stabilization, and does
not seek to correct inefficiencies arising from long-term structural features of the economy.
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an equilibrium: the initial level of employment n(0) can take on any value, which
together with constant job-finding rate p = p∗ will imply a particular path of em-
ployment. These together will imply a path of the interest rate r that is consistent
with this path of employment, i.e. in which the path of demand exactly equals the
path of output implied by this path of employment.
While many such equilibria exist, and each are consistent with the central
bank’s policy target, they intuitively correspond to disruptions in the rate of em-
ployment by the central bank. If we suppose that the economy starts at the steady
state level of employment n(0) = p∗/(p∗+s), then a fall in n(0) would correspond to
the central bank raising interest rates and then lowering them over time to maintain
a constant job-finding rate. Thus a reasonable equilibrium selection rule is that the
central bank will choose to keep employment at its long-run steady state level when
it can do so.
Lower Bound on Interest Rates. Now suppose that there is a lower bound on
the interest rate r, so that only policy paths that satisfy r(t) ≥ r are possible. Then
it might not be possible for the central bank to hit its target job-finding rate p = p∗.
In particular, if the flexible interest rate equilibrium requires the interest rate to fall
below r at any point, then this equilibrium violates the constraint.
We must now modify the policy rule of the central bank. Instead of assuming
a fixed job-finding rate p(t) = p∗ and a variable interest rate, suppose that at every
point in time either the central bank has successfully hit its target p(t) = p∗ and the
interest rate takes on some value r ≥ r, or the interest-rate constraint is binding
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and the central bank cannot hit its target, meaning that r = r and p(t) ≤ p∗. Note
that the central bank can always kill off an excessive boom by raising interest rates,
so we don’t need to worry about p > p∗. This yields the constrained policy rule:
r(t) ≥ r and p(t) = p∗ OR r(t) = r and p(t) ≤ p∗ (1.30)
The assumption that the central bank will not allow p(t) > p∗ implies a lack of
commitment on the part of the central bank. Situations may arise when the lower
bound on the interest rate causes a period of low employment and low job-finding,
that the central bank could reduce if it could credibly promise to allow p(t) > p∗
after the liquidity trap has concluded. In section ?? I will analyze what happens if
we allow such forward guidance.24
Under (1.30), there are again multiple equilibrium paths. This is analogous to
the multiplicity that exists when the interest rate is unconstrained, but in this case
it is less reasonable to assume that the central bank can pick any equilibrium that
it pleases since its choice of interest rates is constrained.
To fix intuitions, consider the case that the economy experiences an unan-
ticipated adverse demand shock at t = 0 that causes r < r in the flexible price
equilibrium, i.e. the lower bound on the interest rate binds. Suppose further that
the economy permanently exits the liquidity trap at some future point T ∗.25 Then
24This no commitment assumption is similar to the baseline case considered by Werning (2011),
who considers a liquidity trap that ends at a fixed time T , and assumes that the central bank
implements the no commitment equilibrium for t ≥ T .
25This formulation is similar to that used in Werning (2011) and related papers in the liquidity
trap literature, except that in my model the date of exit from the liquidity trap T ∗ is endogenous.
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from the policy rule (1.30), we know that ∀t ≤ T ∗, r(t) = r and p(t) ≤ p∗, and
∀t ≥ T ∗, r(t) ≥ r and p(t) = p∗. Clearly this implies that r(T ∗) = r and p(T ∗) = p∗.
The period t < T ∗ corresponds to the liquidity trap, when hiring is below target
and the interest rate is against the zero lower bound. The period t ≥ T ∗ is after the
liquidity trap, when the central bank can achieve its hiring target by setting r ≥ r.
If we knew the date of exit from the liquidity trap T ∗, this would pin down the
equilibrium. However, multiple T ∗ are possible. In particular, we can always assume
that households expect a later T ∗, in which case demand will be lower throughout,
and the central bank cannot offset this lower demand by lowering interest rates
because of the lower bound.
But note that not all T ∗ can be an equilibrium. For instance, suppose that a
very large adverse demand shock occurred at t = 0, and suppose that T ∗ → 0. Then
when we enter the post-liquidity trap period, we have p(t) = p∗ forever. Then no
matter what initial level of employment n(0) is chosen, employment will converge to
steady state employment fairly rapidly. If the demand shock has lasted beyond this
point (which it could), and since r(t) ≥ r and so cannot be lowered further to boost
demand, this will not be an equilibrium for a sufficiently large and persistent demand
shock. Thus for any initial demand shock there exists a continuum of equilibria,
corresponding to various dates of exit from the liquidity trap, T ∗ ∈ [T ,∞]. A later
exit corresponds to a larger initial fall in initial employment n(0), and a lower path
of recovery.
In my baseline experiments, I will assume that the economy follows the equi-
librium with the highest path of employment n(t), which in the demand shock cases
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corresponds to the smallest T ∗ that is consistent with equilibrium. In section 1.7
I consider the possibility of worse equilibria, and argue that these correspond to
pessimistic expectations about the pace of recovery.
1.3.4 Calibration
I use the following parameters in the baseline calibration:
Parameter Value Source
z 1 Normalization
e 0.5 Targets income share about 1/3
s 0.1 Shimer (2005)
ϕ 0.9843 Achieves p = 1.35 target
γ 1 Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
ρ 0.39% Achieves rss = 0.25% target
D 3.39 Achieves a = −4.16 target
ϑ(p) ψpα Blanchard and Gaĺı (2010) (isomorphic to Shimer (2005))
α 1 Blanchard and Gaĺı (2010)
ψ 0.115 Matches job-finding cost in Shimer (2005)
Table 1.1: Baseline Calibration
The quarterly separation rate of 0.1 corresponds to the 3.3% monthly separa-
tion rate reported as the average job separation rate for the US economy in 1951
– 2003 by Shimer (2005). The target steady state job-finding rate for unemployed
households is 1.35, or 0.45 on a monthly basis, which is the 1951 – 2003 average
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reported by Shimer (2005).26 The wage share of output ϕ is set to achieve this
target in the flexible price equilibrium. By way of comparison, the wage share of
output in the baseline calibration in Shimer (2005) is about 0.9825, so this number
is similar.
The coefficient of relative risk aversion γ = 1 is a standard choice in business
cycle models, i.e. in Blanchard and Gaĺı (2010). It is also the middle of the range
of estimates reported by Gourinchas and Parker (2002) based on their analysis of
household behavior in the Consumer Expenditure Survey and Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. Note that this implies a fairly low level of risk aversion compared to
many other papers, such as Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), and thus represents a
conservative estimate of the degree of risk aversion among households.
The target steady state interest rate is 0.25% on an annual basis. This target
was chosen so that the zero lower bound is effectively binding in the steady state.
While this calibration is mainly chosen for tractability, such an occurrence is not
completely unreasonable, given that Japan has experienced zero short-term policy
rates for most of the last 25 years, as have the U.S. and Europe since 2008. Some
commentators have suggested that a combination of well-anchored inflation expec-
tations, low population growth rates, and slow technological progress have lowered
the natural (flexible price) rate of interest to zero or below, a situation known as
“secular stagnation.”27 If they are right, this calibration could be literally correct.
26To interpret these numbers, a constant quarterly job-finding flow probability of 1.35 implies a
74.1% total chance of finding a job in a quarter, and a 0.1 separation probability corresponds to a
9.5% probability of losing one’s job over the course of a quarter.
27The concept of secular stagnation was first proposed by Hansen (1939). Eggertsson and Mehro-
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Nevertheless, the qualitative results of the model do not depend on this assumption.
The steady state borrowing constraint a in absolute value equals 4.16 times
quarterly labor income, as in Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011). This produces an
analogous asset distribution across households, but shifted to the left. The shift
is because I assume that assets are in zero net supply, so that the distribution
is centered at zero, whereas Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) assume positive net
aggregate asset holdings of households due to a supply of government bonds.28
The hiring cost is assumed to be of the form ϑ = ψpα. I choose α = 1, which
corresponds to b = 1
2
in the Cobb-Douglas matching function. In addition to being
tractable, this form is consistent with estimates of the matching function according
to Blanchard and Gaĺı (2010), who use the same functional form. I set ψ so that
the hiring cost in the steady state equals that in Shimer (2005).
1.4 Steady State
For given labor productivity z, nonlabor income e, and separation rate s, the equilib-
rium conditions, together with the steady state condition ṁe = 0 and ṁu = 0, define
steady state equilibrium. In the fixed price case there is a continuum of steady state
equilibria, corresponding to different pairs {r, p}. We may think of each of these as
corresponding to different targets of the steady state job-finding rate (and associ-
ated employment rate), together with the steady state interest rate that achieves
tra (2014) present a model of secular stagnation.
28However, the direct comparison is a bit tricky, because Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) have
households that differ in labor productivity.
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Figure 1.3: Household asset distribution.
this target. One of these equilibria has job-finding rate p∗, which corresponds to the
flexible price equilibrium.
For a given job-finding rate p and interest rate r, we can define household
saving rules ȧe and ȧu. Together with ṁe = 0 and ṁu = 0, and the relative mass
of employed and unemployed households given by n = p/(p + s), these define a
stationary distribution of asset holdings.
The steady state asset distribution for the baseline calibration is depicted
in Figure 1.3. The figure depicts the probability mass of households conditional
on employment status at each asset level. There is a point mass of unemployed
households at the borrowing constraint, but otherwise the asset distribution has a
smooth bell shape.
For given (r, p), we can therefore define aggregate desired steady state asset
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Figure 1.4: Steady state equilibrium.
holdings A(r, p). Since there is no storage or capital in the economy, aggregate total
asset holdings must equal zero in equilibrium. Therefore a steady state equilibrium
pair {r, p} must satisfy A(r, p) = 0.
The equilibrium for the flexible price job-finding rate p∗ is depicted in figure
1.4. For fixed p, aggregate steady state asset demand is an upward-sloping schedule
in r, which we may think of as the steady state equivalent of the supply of savings.29
A higher interest rate induces households at all wealth levels to save more, shifting
out the steady state asset distribution and raising asset demand. The supply of
assets is a vertical line at A = 0, and equilibrium is the intersection of the two
curves.
29This is not a supply curve in the traditional sense, because each point corresponds to a different
desired steady state asset distribution. A true aggregate saving curve would depict aggregate
desired savings for various interest rates for a fixed asset distribution.
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What happens to the steady state if there is an increase in the job-finding
rate p? For households at every asset level and employment status, higher p implies
greater lifetime wealth, and so households increase their consumption, or equiva-
lently decrease their savings. However, a higher steady state p also implies a higher
steady state employment rate n, which will tend to increase desired savings, because
employed households save more than unemployed households.
Which effect dominates depends on the current level of n. When n is high, an
increase in p will decrease desired savings, while the reverse holds for low n. The
reason is that if the majority of households are employed, an increase in p implies a
reduction in the aggregate income risk facing households, which will reduce desired
precautionary savings. Conversely, when n is low, and in particular when n < 0.5,
an increase in p will raise income risk facing households, leading to an increase
in desired savings.30 Since in all advanced economies the employment rate is well
above 50%, the possibility that an increase in p may raise savings is not empirically
relevant, and so I will assume for the remainder that aggregate steady state asset
demand is strictly decreasing in p.
Figure 1.5 depicts the result of an increase in the steady state job-finding rate p
on the steady state equilibrium. The asset demand curve shifts left because higher
p implies lower income risk, which depresses desired savings. This shift in asset
demand causes the equilibrium interest rate to rise, implying a positive relationship
30If this is unintuitive, consider what happens at p = 0, so that all households are unemployed
in equilibrium, and there is zero income risk. Then an increase in p will clearly raise income risk,
since it is now positive.
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High p Asset Demand
Asset Supply
Figure 1.5: Steady state equilibrium with higher p.
between steady state r and steady state n.
We can equivalently interpret this in terms of the aggregate Euler equation
(1.14). An increase in p will lower aggregate income volatility, which lowers aggre-
gate consumption volatility T (σ2C). Then Ċ will decrease, and so to achieve Ċ = 0,
which must prevail in steady state, r must rise. Under our earlier definition, this is
equivalent to saying that the natural rate of interest has risen.
Since steady state r is increasing in p, the set of steady state equilibria in the
fixed price case comprise an upward sloping schedule in (r, p) space.
1.5 Dynamics Following a Credit Shock
Suppose that the economy is in the steady state equilibrium for t < 0, and at t = 0
experiences an unanticipated shock. In particular, consider a temporary fall in the
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default penalty D. Since lower D causes borrowing constraints facing consumers to
tighten, we can interpret this as a credit shock.31
1.5.1 Fixed Price Equilibrium
Consider the dynamic path of the economy under fixed prices in a liquidity trap
scenario. The key feature of a liquidity trap is that the interest rate cannot fall
below some lower limit. The simplest way to capture this is to suppose that the
interest rate is fixed at its steady state level.
Figure 1.6 depicts the path of the economy following a temporary credit shock
under the baseline equilibrium selection rule discussed in section 1.3.2. The partic-
ular experiment is that the default penalty D falls discretely at t = 0, remains at
this lower level for 8 quarters, and then steadily recovers to its steady state level
over the next 8 quarters. This corresponds to an exogenous discrete worsening of
credit conditions for two years, followed by a recovery in credit conditions over the
following two years. The initial fall in D is about 1/3 of its steady state value, which
was chosen to produce a fall in initial employment of 5 percentage points, equal to
the rise in the unemployment rate in the U.S. between January 2008 and October
2009, i.e. from the official beginning of the recession until the trough of the labor
market.
31Because an unanticipated shock tightens the borrowing constraint instantaneously, some house-
holds will violate the constraint. I assume that these households are forced to deleverage very
quickly. In particular, I extrapolate these households’ saving rules below a, but place a minimum
on their consumption at 0.01.
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Figure 1.6: Credit shock with fixed interest rate.
Employment initially falls sharply, and then steadily returns to its steady state
level after approximately 10 quarters. These dynamics are driven by consumption
demand from households. Following the credit shock, demand falls for two reasons.
First, there are some households that are at or below the borrowing constraint,
and are thus mechanically forced to reduce their spending, what we might call a
forced deleveraging effect. Second, households throughout the asset distribution
face tighter borrowing constraints that might bind in the future. This reduces
households’ ability to smooth consumption over unemployment spells, increasing
precautionary saving.
The job-finding rate falls and rises in tandem with the employment rate. This
occurs because the shock is persistent, and so employment remains depressed for a
period of time. This implies a period of weak hiring, and so the job-finding rate
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falls and remains low during the recovery. As demand recovers, the job-finding rate
rises in tandem with employment as firms increase hiring to boost production.
This period of low hiring amplifies the initial fall in demand. This happens
both because slow hiring raises income volatility facing households, increasing pre-
cautionary savings, and because slow hiring endogenously tightens the borrowing
constraint. The latter effect can be seen in the path of the borrowing constraint
in Figure 1.6. The borrowing constraint recovers as the hiring rate increases, well
before the default penalty begins to increase. Since both of these factors lower de-
mand, they make the initial fall in employment larger than it would otherwise be,
i.e. they act to amplify the initial shock.
1.5.2 Precautionary Saving versus Deleveraging
As discussed above, demand falls both because constrained households are forced
to reduce spending, a deleveraging effect, and because tighter constraints reduce
households’ ability to smooth consumption, and so raise precautionary saving by
unconstrained households, a precautionary effect. In this section we compute the
relative contributions of these two effects to the total fall in demand and therefore
employment.
As discussed in section 1.2.4, the path of demand is governed by the aggregate
Euler equation, which can be expressed in terms of the gap between the rate of
interest set by the central bank and the natural rate. The fall in employment
following the credit shock is therefore equivalent to a fall in the natural rate of
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Figure 1.7: Decomposition of natural rate following credit shock.
interest. We can use equation (1.14) to decompose the fall in the natural rate into
a component due to deleveraging by constrained households, and a component due
to the precautionary response to higher consumption volatility.
Figure 1.7 depicts this decomposition for the baseline credit shock. The natural
rate falls sharply to about −3.5% immediately following the shock, and most of this
fall is due to a reduction of spending by constrained households. Before the shock,
there is an initial mass of households near the constraint (Figure 1.3). When the
constraint tightens these households are forced to deleverage, causing an immediate
drop in demand. After this initial deleveraging, which lasts about 2 or 3 quarters,
demand remains depressed for a time, mainly due to the precautionary effect. The
precautionary motive accounts for the majority of the reduction in the natural rate
for the remainder of the crisis.
By integrating over the contribution of each term to the fall in the natural rate,
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we can calculate the contribution of each component to the total fall in demand at
time t = 0. Doing so reveals that 54% of the initial fall in aggregate demand is
due to precautionary saving effects, whereas 46% is due to deleveraging. Thus both
deleveraging and precautionary behavior contribute to the fall in employment, but
the contribution of the precautionary motive is somewhat larger. This suggests
that analyses that focus exclusively on the deleveraging behavior of constrained
households may miss a big part of the story.
1.5.3 Measure of Amplification
We now turn to determining the magnitude of the amplification from endogenous
unemployment risk. Amplification arises from the interaction of endogenous vari-
ation in the job-finding rate with the precautionary behavior of households. Thus
a natural comparison case is the complete-markets benchmark — i.e. the base-
line model with the additional assumption that households are able to fully insure
against employment shocks. Since households are risk-averse, the result will be full
risk-pooling, so that all households enjoy the same level of consumption and zero




= γ−1(r − r∗)
and the dynamics of demand, and therefore employment, are determined by the
path of r − r∗. The model is otherwise identical.
The main obstacle we face in computing a complete markets comparison case
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is choosing the appropriate shock. The baseline financial shock will not affect the
complete markets benchmark at all — since no household wants to borrow, a tighter
borrowing constraint makes no difference. The standard way to model a demand
shock in this setting is as an exogenous change in the natural rate of interest r∗.32
Thus we would like to calculate a path of r∗ that corresponds to a reduced-form
representation of the baseline credit shock in the full incomplete markets model.
To do so, we first compute the flexible price equilibrium following the credit
shock. This implies a path of the interest rate that stabilizes output and the job-
finding rate. This path corresponds to another notion of the “natural rate” — the
interest rate that the central bank would have to set to fully offset the baseline
demand shock. We can take this path of the interest rate as r∗ in the complete
markets benchmark, i.e. as a reduced form representation of the initial demand
shock in the absence of feedback from endogenous variation in unemployment risk
to demand.
Given this path of the natural rate, we can now compute the complete markets
comparison case. The central bank is again constrained by the lower bound on r,
but the natural rate r∗ now follows the path defined above.33 The aggregate Euler
equation then implies a path of demand and output, and this path of output implies a
path of employment. Comparing this to the path of employment from the full model
gives a measure of amplification from endogenous employment risk. Further, we can
compare the path of r∗ to the “natural rate” computed in the previous section,
32For instance, this is how demand shocks are modeled in Werning (2011).























Figure 1.8: Credit shock with flexible prices (solid) vs. fixed prices (dashed).
which allows us to decompose the amplification into deleveraging and precautionary
components.
Flexible Price Benchmark. What would happen if the central bank were able
to adjust the interest rate in response to the credit shock? In this case the central
bank would set r to replicate the flexible price equilibrium. Since the credit shock
does not affect the incentives for production, the firm optimality condition (1.23)
implies a constant rate of hiring. Thus employment would remain constant at its
steady state level, and the interest rate would adjust to produce the conusmption
demand necessary to clear the market.
This equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1.8. The resulting path of the interest
rate is shown in the left panel. Since the tightening of the borrowing constraint
reduces demand, the interest rate must fall to stimulate spending and stabilize out-
put. Since output remains high, households are able to reduce their debt holdings
to a much greater degree, as depicted in the middle panel. Finally, the right panel
shows that the borrowing constraint is a little looser under flexible prices, because
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Figure 1.9: Complete markets (solid) vs. incomplete markets (dashed) models.
the improved labor market conditions reduce the endogenous tightening of the con-
straint.
Comparison to Complete Markets Model. As described above, we can use the
path of the interest rate in the flexible price case to obtain a measure of amplification.
Treating the flexible price interest rate as a reduced form shock to the natural rate
of interest in the complete markets model, we compute the reduction in demand
attributable to the exogenous credit shock by itself, with no feedback from labor
market conditions. We then compute the resulting path of demand arising from
this reduced form shock, and compare it to the path of demand from the full model
with endogenous income risk. The difference is a measure of the magnitude of
amplification from this channel.
Figure 1.9 presents this comparison. The left panel compares the path of the
natural rate of interest in each case. Overall, the natural rate falls farther and
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remains lower in the incomplete markets model. This reflects amplification arising
from endogenous employment risk: since the central bank does not stabilize output,
the job-finding rate falls and income risk increases. This lowers demand, which is
reflected in a lower natural rate of interest.
The right panel of Figure 1.9 compares the path of output implied by the
natural rate paths shown in the left panel. The initial fall in employment in the
complete markets model is 3.54 pct. points, compared to 5 pct. points in the
incomplete markets model. Thus about 30% of the initial fall in employment in the
incomplete markets model is due to the amplification mechanism from endogenous
income risk, and the rest is due to the initial exogenous shock. Equivalently, we can
say that the employment multiplier from the amplification process is 1.41.
The path of employment overshoots the steady state level somewhat in the
incomplete markets model. This is because the forced deleveraging following the
financial shock results in high demand after the shock dissipates. This corresponds
to a positive reduced form demand shock, leading employment to overshoot.
We can again use the aggregate Euler equation (1.14) to determine the de-
gree to which the amplification process operates through increased deleveraging by
constrained households versus increased precautionary saving by constrained house-
holds. We first decompose the rate of interest in the flexible price case into delever-
aging and precautionary terms, and then subtract these from the terms computed
from the whole model.
Figure 1.10 depicts the result of this exercise. It reveals that the majority
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Figure 1.10: Decomposition of amplification term.
(about 70%) of the additional fall in the natural rate due to amplification is due
to an increase in the precautionary term, rather than the deleveraging term. This
is intuitive, since the credit shock most directly affects households with low wealth
who become constrained, whereas a decrease in the job-finding rate increases the
income risk facing households throughout the distribution.
1.5.4 Dynamics of the Asset Distribution
Given the emphasis placed on household debt in the wake the 2007 – 2009 recession,
it is interesting to consider the dynamics of the asset distribution in the wake of
the financial shock. Since assets are in zero net supply in the model, there is by
construction no change in aggregate net worth. Instead, we are interested in changes
in the distribution of assets across households.
The bottom middle panel of Figure 1.6 above shows the path of the total debt
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following the baseline temporary credit shock. Here total debt means the sum of
all assets held by households with negative net worth. This statistic is therefore a
measure of the dispersion of assets held by households.
Total debt falls during the slump because the financial shock causes the bor-
rowing constraint to tighten significantly, forcing low-wealth households to delever-
age by reducing their debt holdings. Deleveraging occurs both because households
that are highly indebted and close to the constraint are mechanically forced to reduce
their debt, and because unconstrained households with low wealth become afraid
of hitting the constraint. Because there is a mass of households that become con-
strained immediately following the shock, there is an initial burst of deleveraging,
but after a few quarters the pace of deleveraging slows.
As seen in section 1.2, the saving decision rule of households is convex in
assets. Thus an increase in the dispersion of asset holdings will tend to raise desired
savings and lower demand, while a decrease in asset dispersion will have the opposite
effect. Intuitively, greater asset dispersion implies more poor households and more
wealthy households. Wealthy households do not spend much more than medium-
wealth households, whereas poor households are close to being constrained and so
reduce their consumption greatly relative to medium-wealth households. Thus the
lower asset dispersion following the credit shock raises demand and strengthens the
recovery.
This occurs because the credit shock forces households to improve their balance
sheets, so that after the initial fall in employment their improved asset position
allows them to finance a higher level of consumption during the recovery. This
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suggests that a temporary credit shock may produce a faster recovery than other
sorts of demand shocks, because it tends to purge bad balance sheets, enabling a
stronger recovery. This is similar to the old view that recessions serve a necessary
restorative role by liquidating bad investments, now applied to households rather
than firms.34
We can approximate the magnitude of the effect of asset dispersion on demand
through a partial equilibrium exercise. Let (m∗e,m
∗
u) be the asset distribution at time
t = 0 after the initial fall in employment. Then we compute the market clearing
level of employment n(t) at every point in time using the equilibrium decision rules
(ȧe(a, t), ȧu(a, t)) from our baseline experiment, but leaving the asset distribution











m∗e(a) (ȧe(a, t)− ȧu(a, t))
]
da = 0
The result is shown in Figure 1.11. The solid line is the baseline path of
recovery, identical to that shown in Figure 1.6. The dashed line uses the same
decision rules at every point in time, but holds the asset distribution unchanged at
the steady state (initial) distribution. This results in a significantly slower recovery
in demand than in the baseline case.
34This view is most often associated with Austrian writers such as Hayek and Schumpeter.
However, the liquidationist view was common before the Keynesian Revolution. See Rognlie,
Shleifer, and Simsek (2014), and references therein.
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Figure 1.11: Comparison with fixed distribution.
1.6 Recovery from High Debt State
The temporary credit shock examined in section 1.5 does not seem a good description
of what happened to the U.S. economy during the 2007 – 2009 recession. As Figure
1.6 reveals, a temporary credit shock produces a temporary decline in household
debt, followed by a rapid recovery in hiring when the shock dissipates. In contrast,
the 2007 – 2009 recession saw a long decline in household debt with a period of slow
hiring.
Many theories of the magnitude of the 2007 – 2009 recession and the duration
of the recovery have focused on the role of high levels of household debt in the run
up to the crisis. For instance, Mian and Sufi (2010) find that counties with higher
household leverage in 2006 experienced larger declines in employment. Similarly,
Dynan (2012) argues that household leverage remained high well into the recovery
and may be responsible for depressed consumption during the recovery. In light
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of such arguments, it may make more sense to model the events of 2007 – 2009
as a permanent shock to credit standards, that necessitated a transition to a new
credit regime. The present model can provide some insight into this process, since
it features a full distribution of household asset holdings, and captures the role of
endogenous employment risk during this transition.35
In this section, we will consider dynamic equilibrium paths where the economy
begins at time t = 0 with an initial asset distribution with higher total household
debt (i.e. greater wealth dispersion). Since the initial asset distribution is no longer
the steady state distribution, we can no longer interpret these experiments as an
unanticipated shock that occurs in the steady state. Instead, we can interpret
this case as depicting the result of an unmodeled shock that affects the ability of
households to carry debt. For instance, perhaps an unmodeled credit boom (such
as a housing bubble) enabled households to accumulate excessive debt. Then there
was an unanticipated correction to credit conditions (e.g. a collapse of the housing
bubble), and we are considering the transition to a new steady state.
1.6.1 Fixed Price Equilibrium
Suppose that the economy enters t = 0 with greater dispersion of assets than in
steady state. The wider asset distribution acts as a demand shock: it produces an
initial fall in employment relative to the steady state, followed by a recovery. We
can interpret these dynamics as the result of unwinding a great accumulation of
35An important caveat is that this model does not include durable goods or housing, which
represent a large fraction of household debt.
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Figure 1.12: Asset distribution with 32.4% higher debt.
debt by some households in some unmodeled past period. This is similar to the
circumstances of the U.S. economy in 2009 after the financial crisis, when many
more households were highly indebted than during normal times, and a period of
deleveraging was necessary.
Suppose the initial asset distribution is a mean-preserving spread of the steady
state distribution such that the total debt held by households, i.e. minus the sum
of assets held by households with a < 0, is 32.4% greater than in steady state. This
corresponds to the increase in the household debt to GDP ratio from 2002Q1 to
2008Q1.36 This asset distribution is depicted in figure 1.12.
We now consider the path of the economy from t = 0 onward. This path is de-
36Here household debt is taken to be the level of total liabilities held by households and non-
profits from the Federal Reserve Financial Accounts of the United States. For details of how the


































Figure 1.13: Initial high debt (solid) vs. temporary credit shock (dashed).
picted in Figure 1.13, with the baseline credit shock considered in section 1.5 shown
for comparison. The result is a 4% fall in initial employment, followed by a very slow
recovery. The recovery is much slower than the one following the credit shock. This
is because the wide asset dispersion requires a substantial period of deleveraging,
during which high levels of household debt depress demand. The sustained period of
low employment induces additional debt accumulation by unemployed households,
which decreases the rate of deleveraging, further slowing recovery. Moreover, the
period of slow hiring induces precautionary saving by employed households, which
reduces demand and further increases the variance of asset holdings. The result is
that the dispersion of assets falls only very slowly, leading to a sustained period of
low employment.
One benefit of the high-debt recovery case relative to the credit shock scenario
62




















Figure 1.14: Decomposition of natural rate during transition from high-debt state.
is that we can get a sense of the size of the endogenous tightening of borrowing
constraints without the complication of an exogenous tightening. Figure 1.13 shows
that the borrowing limit tightens by about 9% relative to the steady state. This is
a significant tightening of the borrowing constraint, though much less than what is
seen in the credit shock case.
Decomposition of Natural Rate. As in the temporary credit shock case, we
can represent the period of weak demand resulting from the initially wide asset
distribution as a reduction in the natural rate of interest. We can then decompose
the fall in the natural rate into components deriving from deleveraging of constrained
households and precautionary behavior by unconstrained households.
Figure 1.14 depicts this decomposition. It reveals that the great majority of
the reduction in the natural rate during the transition from the high debt state is
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due to the increase in the precautionary motive. The only exception is at the very
beginning of the transition, when constrained households are forced to deleverage
following the endogenous tightening of the constraint. Overall, 77% of the total
reduction in initial consumption demand is attributable to the precautionary motive.
1.6.2 Flexible Price Benchmark
The flexible price equilibrium again provides a useful point of comparison. Figure
1.15 depicts the equilibirum paths in both the flexible and fixed price models. The
left panel depicts the path of the interest rate. In the flexible price model, the interest
rate falls initially by about 60 bp to accommodate an initial burst of deleveraging by
highly indebted households. The interest rate then quickly recovers to about 10 bp
below its steady state value after 5 quarters. It remains slightly depressed for some
time, as the economy slowly transitions to its new stationary asset distribution.
This indicates that the total reduction in demand due to the necessary deleveraging
process is not so great, since it requires only a small fall in the interest rate to
accommodate.
As the center panel of Figure 1.15 makes clear, the reduction in total household
debt occurs somewhat faster under flexible prices than in the fixed price case. In
particular, after 20 quarters excess household debt has fallen by 60% in the flexible
price case compared to 47% in the fixed price case. Likewise, after 40 quarters,
excess household debt has fallen by 86% in the flexible price case compared to 74%






















Figure 1.15: Recovery from high debt state with flexible prices (solid) vs. fixed
prices (dashed).
under flexible prices, and so households are in a better position to pay down their
debts. As shown in Figure 1.13, under fixed prices employment falls and remains low
throughout the transition. Thus a higher fraction of highly indebted households are
unemployed. These households do not reduce their debts while they are unemployed,
and so high unemployment slows down the pace of deleveraging.
Finally, as the right panel indicates, borrowing constraints do not tighten in
the flexible price case. Since there is no exogenous credit shock in this case, the
tightening of the borrowing constraint in the fixed price case is entirely due to
worse labor market conditions. Since output and hiring are stabilized in the flexible
price case, there is no endogenous feedback to credit conditions, and so borrowing
constraints fail to tighten. In fact, they loosen slightly, because lower interest rates
reduce the cost of repayment.
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Figure 1.16: Reduced form shock (solid) vs. endogenous income risk (dashed).
1.6.3 Measure of Amplification
We can again take the flexible price interest rate as a reduced form representation
of the initial demand shock, absent the feedback from endogenous income risk.
The difference between the flexible interest rate path and the natural rate in the full
model with fixed prices is a measure of the amplification from this feedback. The left
panel of Figure 1.16 presents both interest rate paths, while the right panel presents
the implied paths of employment from the standard aggregate Euler equation (1.17).
Overall, the natural rate of interest as defined by equation (1.18) in the model
with endogenous income risk falls substantially more than the flexible price path of
interest. This is particularly true at t = 0, when the natural rate plungs 225 bp, but
remains true throughout the recovery. This larger fall in the natural rate implies
a similarly larger fall in employment. Initial employment falls nearly four times as
much in the model with endogenous employment risk than in the complete markets
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model with the reduced form demand shock. This implies that 70% of the intial
fall in aggregate consumption, and 69% of the initial fall in employment, is due to
amplification from endogenous income risk. This implies a “multiplier” from the
amplification mechanism of 3.38.
In the case of the temporary credit shock in section 1.5, only 30% of the fall
of consumption was due to amplification, and the multiplier was 1.41. Why is the
amplification process so much stronger in the deleveraging case than in the case
of a credit shock? The answer is that while the direct reduction in initial demand
implied by deleveraging is less than in the case of the credit shock, the persistence
of the deleveraging shock is much greater. We can see this by comparing the path of
employment implied by setting the natural rate of interest equal to the flexible price
interest rate in each case. These are the solid lines in Figures 1.16 and 1.9. While
the initial fall in employment in the temporary credit shock case is 2.2 pct. points
greater than in the deleveraging case, the cumulative loss of employment over the
entire path of recovery is nearly 5 pct. points greater in the deleveraging case. Thus
the deleveraging case implies a greater total total loss of employment, and therefore
prompts a greater precautionary saving response from forward-looking households.
One implication of this result is that it is better to have a sharp and short
demand shock, rather than a long and slow shock. Whereas the total initial exoge-
nous reduction in demand may be the same in each case, they imply very different
paths of future hiring, and therefore different income risk perceived by households.
A short and sharp demand shock implies a large initial fall in employment followed
by a rapid recovery. Households anticipate this rapid recovery, and so have limited
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Figure 1.17: Decomposition of amplification term.
desire to engage in precautionary saving, leading to limited amplification through
endogenous income risk. By contrast, a long and shallow demand shock implies
a lengthy period of slow hiring, with higher income risk facing households. This
increases precautionary saving by households, and amplifies the fall in demand.
Decomposition of Amplification. We can again use equation (1.14) to decom-
pose the amplification term into a component corresponding to forced deleveraging
by constrained households, and a component arising from the precautionary saving
behavior of unconstrained households. The result of this exercise is depicted in Fig-
ure 1.17. Unsurprisingly given the discussion above, most (76%) of the amplification
is due to precautionary saving by unconstrained households.
68
1.6.4 Credit Shock in High Debt Initial State
The analysis above modeled the events of 2007 – 2009 as a high debt initial state
that required a period of deleveraging. However, it is reasonable to think that
the financial crisis that occurred in the Fall of 2008 represented a qualitatively
different phenomenon than simply high levels of household debt. Arguably this
was an exogenous credit shock, with subsequent recovery slowed by high levels of
household debt and the lingering effects of the credit shock.
We can model this as an initial high level of household debt together with a
temporary credit shock. In particular, suppose that initial household assets are as
shown in Figure 1.12, and that the economy experiences a temporary credit shock
as analyzed in section 1.5. Then the equilibrium path reflects both the effects of
a high level of initial debt that requires a period of deleveraging, and a temporary
credit crunch facing households.
The resulting equilibrium path is shown in Figure 1.18, with the recovery
from the high debt state with no exogenous credit shock shown for comparison.
The initial fall in employment is 10.7 pct. points, compared to a fall of 4 in the
high debt case without a credit shock, and a fall of 5 in the case of a credit shock
that hits an economy already at the stationary distribution of assets. Thus the total
initial fall in employment is greater than the sum of its constituent parts, implying
an interaction between high initial levels of debt and the credit shock. One way to
interpret these results is that greater initial dispersion in asset holdings increases the
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Figure 1.18: High debt distribution with credit shock (solid) vs. no shock (dashed).
sensitivity of the economy to financial shocks.37 This suggests that higher moments
of the asset distribution are important variables for central banks to monitor, and
that policies that aim to reduce excessive levels of debt held by households can be
welfare-improving. Such policies are an example of macroprudential policies.38
This interaction occurs because the high debt initial asset distribution has
many more households close to the borrowing constraint than the stationary distri-
bution, as can be seen in Figure 1.11. Thus when the borrowing constraint tightens
substantially following the shock, the initial fall in demand is much greater than
37Heathcote and Perri (2014) obtain a similar result by showing how a low level of household
wealth can produce greater volatility by allowing low-employment equilibria to become feasible.
38For an analysis of macroprudential policies in a model with a demand externality from house-
hold debt, see Korinek and Simsek (2014). For a general analysis of macroprudential policies in
the presence of nominal rigidities, see Farhi and Werning (2013).
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with the stationary distribution. This can be illustrated by a decomposition of the
natural rate using equation (1.14), which reveals that 56% of the cumulative fall
of the natural rate in the credit shock case is due to deleveraging by constrained
households, compared to 23% in the high debt path with no credit shock.
Although the initial fall in employment is much greater with the credit shock
than without, the persistence of the fall in employment is much less. The reason
is that deleveraging happens much faster in the credit shock case, as can be seen
directly from the bottom middle panel of Figure 1.11. After 20 quarters, excess
household debt has been reduced by 76% in the financial shock case, compared with
47% in the no shock case. Likewise, after 40 quarters 90% of deleveraging has been
accomplished in the financial shock case, compared with 74% in the no shock case.
The faster pace of deleveraging implies a much faster recovery in employment,
as can be seen from the first panel in Figure 1.11. Although initial employment
falls more than twice as far following the financial shock than in its absence, the
employment path following the financial shock surpasses the no shock employment
path after just 5 quarters, and is nearly fully recovered after 10. This leads to the
surprising result that the cumulative loss of employment and therefore output is
nearly twice as large in the absence of the credit shock! Cumulative employment
loss in the credit shock case comes to 37.8 pct. points of employment, compared
with 63.5 points in the no shock case. Thus the total decline in output is less in
an economy with an additional adverse demand shock, if that shock speeds up the
pace of deleveraging.
This is particularly surprising given that the initial demand shock is so much
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greater in the credit shock case. Taking the magnitude of the initial demand shock
to be the initial fall in employment implied by the flexible price path of the interest
rate, the credit shock generates a 6 times greater fall in initial employment than that
due to the high debt distribution alone. Yet despite a six-fold greater initial shock,
the faster recovery in the financial shock case produces significantly less cumulative
employment loss. Part of the reason for this is that the faster employment recovery
produces less amplification compared with the no financial shock case: 42% of the
initial fall in aggregate consumption is due to amplification in the financial shock
case, compared with 70% in the no shock case. This implies an initial demand
multiplier of 1.73 instead of 3.38.
1.7 Expectations and Recovery
Thus far we have assumed that the economy follows the path with the highest
initial level of employment subject to the central bank’s no-commitment policy
rule. However, there are many other equilibrium paths that are consistent with the
equilibrium conditions of the model. Which one the economy follows depends on
the expectations of households, which may be influenced by the policy rule adopted
by the central bank.
1.7.1 Forward Guidance
The analysis in sections 1.5 and 1.6 assumed that the central bank followed the
no commitment policy rule after the economy exits the liquidity trap. However, if
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the central bank can credibly commit to allowing p > p∗ after the recovery, then
an equilibrium path with higher employment is possible. If the central bank has
a loss function that penalizes deviations from the target job-finding rate in both
directions, then it would like to commit to producing such a hiring boom. In this
case, the central bank commits to allowing excessive hiring after the trap without
raising interest rates.
This is a form of forward guidance, analogous to committing to keeping interest
rates low despite high inflation in a standard New Keynesian model. Here the
cost of this policy is not excessive inflation, but an inefficiently high rate of hiring,
which is costly due to the hiring cost ϑ.The mechanism for raising demand is also
somewhat different: in the standard New Keynesian model, the expectation of a
future consumption boom raises current demand due to consumption smoothing,
whereas in this paper an expected hiring boom also raises demand by reducing
unemployment risk, which reduces precautionary saving.
Figure 1.19 shows the dynamics of the economy in response to the credit shock
analyzed in section 1.5. The solid line shows the path of recovery when the central
bank lacks commitment (identical to Figure 1.6), whereas the dashed line shows the
recovery path under forward guidance. The forward guidance equilibrium allows
a hiring boom with the job-finding rate topping out at 1.55, 15% higher than the











































Figure 1.19: Hiring boom (dashed) vs. no commitment (solid).
where n∗ is the steady state level of employment. That is, the central bank seeks to
minimize the discounted quadratic output gap.39
The equilibrium path under forward guidance sees an initial fall of employment
of just over 3 percentage points, about 40% smaller than in the no-commitment case.
Employment recovers to its steady state level after just 5 quarters (well before the
shock begins to dissipate) and then overshoots the steady state, reaching a maximum
level of 0.8 percentage points above steady state after 10 quarters. Overall, the
average level of employment over the entire period is about equal to steady state
39A discounted quadratic loss function in the output gap and inflation is common in the New
Keynesian literature because this is the linear approximation to the optimal policy rule around the
efficient zero-inflation steady state. This rule is not optimal in the present model because of the
presence of incomplete markets, but offers a simple benchmark to illustrate the power of forward
guidance in this setting.
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employment (0.14 percentage points higher).
The initial fall in the job-finding rate is likewise about half of what it is in
the baseline case (a fall of 0.27 instead of 0.56), and the job-finding rate likewise
overshoots the steady state rate by about 0.20. This higher job-finding rate both me-
chanically produces the higher growth path of employment, and creates the demand
that enables it by reducing precautionary saving and by relaxing the borrowing
constraint relative to the no-commitment path.
1.7.2 Pessimistic Expectations Following Credit Shock
The discussion above assumes that the economy always follows the highest path of
employment consistent with the central bank’s policy rule. However, there is no
reason that this must be true. While the central bank has the means to rule out
any path with excessive hiring by threatening to raise the interest rate, it cannot
rule out paths with lower hiring because it is constrained by the lower bound on the
interest rate.
Figure 1.20 shows a pessimistic path of recovery in response to the credit
shock analyzed in section 1.5. This produces an initial fall in employment that is
2 percentage points greater than the highest no-commitment path. The resulting
path of employment remains about 1 percentage point below the steady state for a
significant period after the credit shock has dissipated.
Simultaneous to the slow recovery in employment is a period of slow hiring,
which lowers demand and tightens the borrowing constraint. The job-finding rate
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Figure 1.20: Pessimistic recovery from credit shock (solid) vs. baseline (dashed).
remains well below the steady state level for the entire period shown, whereas in
the baseline case it returns to the steady state level after 12 quarters and remains
close to this level thereafter. The larger initial fall in the job-finding rate is by
construction — this is exactly what it means in this model for households to be
pessimistic about the rate of recovery, and this is the proximate cause of the larger
initial fall in employment. However, a further effect arises from the dynamics of the
asset distribution. The lower rate of job-finding raises precautionary savings, while
the lower employment rate increases the number of borrowers in the economy. This
increases the dispersion of asset holdings relative to the baseline case, raising the
total debt held by net borrowers as seen in the bottom middle panel of Figure 1.20.




































Figure 1.21: Recovery following expectational shock.
1.7.3 Pure Expectational Shock
Given the significant effects of pessimistic expectations following a shock to credit
market fundamentals found above, a natural question is what effect a pure expec-
tational shock can produce. Suppose that the economy is at the steady state for
t < 0, and at time 0 households come to expect a period of slow hiring. This will
lead them to reduce their desired spending, decreasing demand and causing n(0)
to fall. The central bank cannot rule out this equilibrium because it cannot lower
interest rates, and so it is powerless to prevent this equilibrium.
Under our maintained assumption that the economy converges to the steady
state in the long-run, there is a unique path corresponding to each level of n(0) < n∗,
with lower n(0) corresponding to a larger shock to expectations. Figure 1.21 shows
the path corresponding to a 5 percentage point drop in initial employment relative
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to the steady state. The first thing to note is how persistent the fall in employment
is. The time horizon shown in Figure 1.21 extends to 50 quarters, 12.5 years after
the initial shock. By the end of this time, employment has still not fully recovered
to its steady state level.
This persistence is driven by the increase in asset dispersion during the recov-
ery. As discussed above, a low job-finding rate increases asset dispersion because it
stimulates greater saving from employed households while also increasing the total
number of households that are borrowers (i.e. unemployed). This effect is sufficiently
great that it offsets the narrowing of the asset distribution due to the tightening of
the borrowing constraint, and significantly raises total debt held by borrowers over
the course of the recovery, as shown in the bottom middle panel of Figure 1.21.
This greater asset dispersion generates persistence of low employment by lowering
demand. Intuitively, high unemployment worsens household balance sheets, which
lowers demand and perpetuates high unemployment. Since the asset distribution
is a relatively slow-moving variable (excepting initial deleveraging), this generates
substantial persistence.
1.8 Conclusion
Unemployment risk has significant implications for the dynamics of recovery from
a liquidity trap. Unemployment risk both amplifies and increases the persistence of
demand shocks. Amplification occurs due to the feedback from slow hiring to weak
demand, through precautionary savings and endogenous borrowing constraints. Per-
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sistence arises from the dynamics of the asset distribution, since a period of high
unemployment raises the burden of debt, reducing demand during the recovery.
One important conclusion of this paper is that the distribution of debt is a
critical variable in determining the dynamics of the economy in response to demand
shocks. From a positive perspective, I find that persistence of demand shocks is
driven in part by the evolution of the asset distribution, and that high initial asset
dispersion increases the sensitivity of the economy to shocks. From a normative
perspective, these results suggest that central banks should monitor the distribu-
tion of debt, and take steps to reduce high household leverage. These results are
particularly relevant given recent trends toward increased credit access and greater
wealth inequality in the developed world.
This paper also highlights the significant role of expectations in determining
the path of recovery. These results suggest that if the central bank can credibly
manage expectations about future policy, i.e. engage in forward guidance, it can
significantly mitigate negative shocks. More ominously, these results also suggest the
possibility of self-fulfilling negative expectations about the pace of recovery. Given
the zero lower bound on interest rates, the central bank may find itself powerless
to prevent such outcomes. In light of slowing growth and demographic transitions
around the world that depress the natural rate of interest, these possibilities are
highly relevant to policymakers today.
I leave many questions to future research. This paper does not explicitly model
durable goods and housing, although these constitute a large fraction of household
credit use. Particularly given the centrality of mortgage debt and house prices
79
in the 2007 – 2009 recession, explicitly considering such forms of debt could be
a fruitful avenue of further research. In addition, this paper assumes that prices
are fixed, which eliminates the role of inflation in equilibrium dynamics. Allowing
for partially flexible prices could generate interesting interactions between inflation,
unemployment risk, and the asset distribution.
Overall, my results suggest that a precautionary saving channel in response
to high unemployment may have played a role in the 2007 – 2009 recession and the
subsequent recovery. Such a channel could help explain the size of the initial fall in
demand, as increased precautionary saving led households to decrease spending in
the Fall of 2008. Further, this channel could also explain the slow recovery, as high
unemployment increased the burden of debt and slowed the process of deleveraging.
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Chapter 2: Financial Intermediaries and the Supply of Liquidity
2.1 Introduction
An important function of the financial system is liquidity provision, i.e. the creation
of financial instruments for firms and households to store wealth while maintaining
access to these funds to meet unpredictable financing needs. Though liquidity short-
ages played a prominent role in the 2008 financial crisis, relatively little macroeco-
nomic analysis has focused on the role of the financial sector in providing liquidity
to the productive sector. Such analysis is particularly relevant to policy, since gov-
ernment liabilities comprise a significant fraction of the economy’s aggregate supply
of liquidity. This paper analyzes the role of financial intermediaries in liquidity
provision. I investigate two questions: What effect do fluctuations in the value of
intermediaries’ balance sheets have on the supply of liquidity to the real sector?
What is the role of public liquidity provision in response to such fluctuations?
My analysis builds on the model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), in which
productive projects are subject to ongoing uncertain financing needs. Agency costs
may prevent firms’ raising these funds by new borrowing. Thus firms purchase and
hold liquid assets to cover these expenses. When liquid assets are in short supply,
financial intermediaries can offer financial instruments such as lines of credit that
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substitute for liquid assets.
I depart from Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) by assuming that financial inter-
mediaries are also subject to agency costs. I further assume that these agency costs
worsen when intermediaries’ balance sheets deteriorate, so that aggregate frictions in
bank liquidity supply are decreasing in the level of bank equity. Under this assump-
tion, variations in financial sector equity affect the aggregate supply of liquidity.
I find that the aggregate scarcity of liquidity can be summarized by the liquidity
premium: the difference between the price of liquid assets and their fundamental
value based on their expected return if held to maturity. When bank equity falls
below a certain threshold, there is a positive equilibrium liquidity premium, and
investment and production fall below their constrained optimum quantities. In such
liquidity-constrained states, it is optimal for the government to increase issuance of
debt for its liquidity properties, even if funds can only be raised by costly taxation.
As this paper is concerned with the supply of liquidity, we should begin by
precisely defining the term. By liquidity (or equivalently, liquid assets), I mean assets
held by firms and households that serve as a store of value, and that can be sold
(liquidated) for their full value at any time before maturity. Examples of liquidity
include government bonds, some corporate bonds, commercial paper, money market
funds, and demand deposits issued by banks. The key feature of liquid assets is
information insensitivity — since all agents know these assets’ worth, they can be
sold for their full price without discounts due to adverse selection.1
1The importance of adverse selection in generating market illiquidity was first pointed out
by Akerlof (1970). The importance of information insensitivity was emphasized by Gorton and
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Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), I model the demand for liquidity from
the business sector by supposing that investment projects are subject to stochastic
needs for funds. Firms can raise these funds by new borrowing, but due to agency
costs are unable to pledge the full value of their projects. If required funds exceed
the pledgeable amount, the firm will be borrowing constrained. Anticipating this
possibility, firms undertaking a new project can borrow more than required for the
initial investment, and hold the excess as liquid assets. Should a need for additional
funds arise, firms use these assets as collateral to enable additional borrowing. If
liquid assets yield a return equal to the firm’s cost of borrowing, firms can hold
the optimal amount of liquid assets given their initial borrowing capacity. However,
when liquidity is scarce liquid assets command a premium over illiquid assets. Then
firms must use some of their limited pledgeable funds to pay this premium, and
reduce investment below the constrained efficient level.
Firms obtain these funds in two ways. First, firms may borrow funds when
they are not borrowing constrained and purchase assets that can be liquidated in
the event of a liquidity shock. If these assets are not liquidated, their proceeds
can be returned to the firm’s investors. This arrangement is equivalent to a sort of
insurance contract between firms and original investors, in which investors agree to
provide additional financing to firms that require it, even when the firm is unable
to raise new financing on private markets. The liquid assets held by firms serve as
collateral on this promise, since otherwise investors might not want to provide these
Pennacchi (1990), and more recently by DeMarzo and Duffie (1999). For a summary of the various
sources of illiquidity, see Tirole (2011) and Holmstrom and Tirole (2011).
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funds. Such assets include corporate and government bonds and shares of money
market funds. Since it doesn’t matter whether the firm liquidates the asset or uses it
as collateral to obtain a loan, this category also includes repos and other securitized
borrowing.
The second way firms obtain liquid funds is by locking in financing at conve-
nient terms by purchasing a credit line from a financial intermediary. Typically the
firm pays a premium to an intermediary to provide financing at specified terms up
to some limit, even if such financing becomes unprofitable in expectation. This cat-
egory primarily consists of credit lines issued by banks. Note that this is analogous
to the arrangement above, except that banks are presumed to be able to credibly
provide the promised financing without requiring collateral. Thus in equilibrium
the premium paid on bank credit lines will equal the liquidity premium on liquid
assets.
I refer to assets that can be easily sold to meet liquidity shocks as liquid assets;
I refer to the market for liquid assets as the market for liquidity; and I refer to the
availability of liquidity on good terms as the supply of liquidity.
I depart from Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) by supposing that intermediaries
are also subject to agency costs. When lending is subject to agency costs, the supply
of liquidity provided by intermediaries depends on their net worth.2 When banks
2Several papers use agency costs in models of banks. One notable example is Mattesini, Monnet,
and Wright (2009), which argues that agents with large stakes in the continuation of the economy
are better suited to serve as banks. This is analogous to my model, in which bank agency costs
depend on their asset holdings.
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have low net worth, they have less collateral to be seized in the event of bankruptcy
and therefore have more incentive to engage in fraud, for instance by failing to exert
effort in screening loan applicants, or by taking on excessively risky loans since they
do not bear downside risk. When these agency constraints are binding, the economy
will not be able to achieve perfect risk pooling of idiosyncratic liquidity risk even in
the presence of intermediaries. Moreover, if the average agency cost is increasing in
the quantity of funds intermediated, then the liquidity premium will be increasing
in the quantity of bank financing and decreasing in bank net worth.
Why might liquidity be scarce? Why can’t firms simply buy assets that pay at
the prevailing interest rate, sell them to raise funds in the event of a liquidity shock,
and if no shock is realized hold them to maturity? If there were a sufficient quantity
of such assets then this would indeed be possible. However, such assets may be in
limited supply. This is somewhat removed from everyday experience: we are used
to being able to save (buy assets) easily, while borrowing (issuing liabilities) may
be difficult. But while we can always buy assets to save, if we want to buy a liquid
asset we must pay a premium in the form of a lower expected return relative to
illiquid assets. This indicates that liquid assets are not in unlimited supply.
Why is this? It derives from asymmetric information. If pricing an asset
requires some specialized knowledge, then sellers may not be able to obtain the fun-
damental price of the asset in a sale — the very act of selling signals to potential
buyers that the asset is not as valuable as the owner knows it to be. This phe-
nomenon affects all assets to some degree, but is especially acute for assets that
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require specialized knowledge to price correctly. By contrast, safe government debt
and money are much less sensitive to information from selling decisions, and thus
are highly liquid.
If the price q of any asset is higher than its fundamental value based on its
expected return, q̂, then that asset has a positive liquidity premium, q− q̂. 3 There
is ample evidence of positive liquidity premia in reality. The simplest example is
money, which commands a positive liquidity premium relative to safe government
bonds. This is intuitive because money has some utility in transactions. Likewise,
the interest rate on safe government debt is lower than the expected returns on other
assets in the economy. This suggests a positive liquidity premium on government
debt.
During times of crisis, interest rates on many forms of safe assets fall, a phe-
nomenon often called a flight to quality. This may reflect falling returns to capital
due to productivity shocks, but since interest rate spreads rise, it plausibly indicates
an increase in the liquidity premium due to a decrease in the supply of liquidity,
which makes liquid government bonds more desirable than longer-term investments
that cannot be easily liquidated. In general, a positive liquidity premium indicates
that liquid assets are scarce, i.e. if liquid assets yielded a return equal to their fun-
damental value, demand for these assets would exceed supply. Thus a decrease in
the supply of liquid assets will imply a rise in the liquidity premium in order to clear
3Since the price of a bond with face value one and interest rate r is q = 1/(1 + r), a positive
liquidity premium on an asset implies a lower interest rate on this asset than the long-run expected
return of the asset when held to maturity, i.e. r < r∗, where r∗ is the return on illiquid assets.
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the market for liquidity.
Why might an economic downturn cause a fall in the supply of liquidity? I
consider two mechanisms. First, a recession leads to losses on projects that underlie
liquid assets in the economy. For instance, the 2008 financial crisis was preceded by
a drop in housing prices, which led to an increase in mortgage delinquencies. Since
mortgage-backed securities made up a significant fraction of asset-backed commercial
paper in 2008,4 this rise in mortgage delinquencies represented the destruction of a
fraction of the economy’s stock of liquid assets. In a world with scarce liquidity, this
should raise the cost of investment and raise the prices of liquid assets, for instance
by reducing interest rates on government bonds. I label this mechanism the asset
destruction channel.
In addition to the direct destruction of assets held by agents to meet liquidity
shocks, a recession will generally involve falling asset prices and losses on bank loans.
These reduce bank net worth, causing banks to reduce credit supply, including liquid
instruments such as lines of credit held by firms. This mechanism is stronger if the
financial system is poorly capitalized. Leading up to the 2008 crisis, banks were
highly leveraged, and so intermediaries suffered large losses due to the housing crash.
This was a major source of worsening credit conditions and falling investment. I
refer to this second mechanism as the bank channel.
I can distinguish between these channels in my model. The asset destruction
channel corresponds to a fall in outside liquidity in my model. The bank channel
4As documented by Brunnermeier (2009).
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is modeled as a fall in bank net worth, which decreases the supply of liquidity
by banks. These two channels produce similar macroeconomic results, but imply
different policy responses.
If the economy is initially in a region with a positive liquidity premium, then
a fall in outside liquidity reduces investment and increases the liquidity premium. I
find that if the economy is initially in an equilibrium with positive bank financing,
then a decrease in bank net worth will tighten the supply of liquidity, also leading
to a fall in investment and an increase in the liquidity premium. So the results in
each case are analogous.
The final step is to consider optimal government liquidity provision. As de-
scribed above, when there is a positive liquidity premium in equilibrium, the gov-
ernment can improve the allocation by issuing liquid liabilities such as government
debt. If issuing bonds were costless, then the optimal policy would always be for the
government to issue bonds until liquidity is no longer scarce. However, realistically
there are some costs of government debt. One cost is that debt must be repaid, and
the government must levy distortionary taxes to do so. Thus the liquidity benefits of
issuing additional debt must be weighed against the costs from repaying this debt.
I analyze optimal government policy within the context of this model. I find
that when there is a positive liquidity premium at an interior equilibrium, it will
always be optimal for the government to provide some public liquidity. This result
is quite interesting by itself. It implies that in an economy with a positive liquidity
premium there is positive value of issuing government debt. If total government
debt is sufficiently low, the issuance of additional debt will crowd in investment,
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and these benefits will outweigh the costs of higher debt.
I also analyze how the optimal supply of government debt changes when the
economy’s initial stock of liquid assets changes. I find that when the stock of bank
capital falls, the optimal supply of public liquidity increases. This result can be
interpreted in several ways. One interpretation is simply that the government should
issue more debt when the banking sector is poorly capitalized. Since this is likely
true during recessions, this result can be taken as a justification for procyclical
budget deficits. The result can also be interpreted as a need for public liquidity
provision more broadly. The government can provide liquidity by lending directly to
firms or financial intermediaries in distress. Thus during the 2008 crisis, the Federal
Reserve established a number of liquidity facilities to provide funds to intermediaries
responsible for a large portion of the economy’s supply of liquidity.
By contrast, when the economy’s stock of private outside liquidity falls, op-
timal public liquidity provision decreases. This result is driven by the elasticity of
private liquidity supply. An increase in government bonds crowds out private liquid-
ity, meaning that government bonds raise total liquidity less than one-for-one. The
degree of crowding out depends on the elasticity of private liquidity supply. A fall in
(inelastic) outside liquidity implies that (elastic) bank liquidity is a larger share of
total liquidity. Thus the elasticity of private liquidity supply is higher, and crowding
out is greater. This decreases the effectiveness of public liquidity provision, leading
the government to reduce liquidity supply.
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Related Literature. This paper is part of the literature exploring the role of
public liabilities in providing liquidity by serving as stores of value. Samuelson
(1958) shows that a government bond can enable intergenerational trades that would
not otherwise occur. Woodford (1990) shows that when income and investment
opportunities are not synchronized, investment and liquid assets are complements,
so that under some conditions the issuance of government debt will “crowd in”
investment. Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) consider both public and private liquidity
in a similar framework, and Farhi and Tirole (2012) introduce bubbles as a store of
value to explore the interplay between public, private, and bubble liquidity. In all
of these models, agents would like to transfer funds forward in time, but are unable
to do so due to a market incompleteness. I build on these models by introducing
financial intermediaries that supply liquidity.
Several papers have examined the role of banks in creating liquid assets. In
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), banks offer liquidity insurance by pooling claims to
investment projects and selling demand deposits to households. Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998) model liquidity in a framework identical to my own, and show that
banks can perfectly insure against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks but not aggregate
liquidity shocks. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010) introduce intermediaries to a
model similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), and show that a fall in bank capital
will decrease the supply of inside liquidity.5 I depart from these models by making
bank lending subject to an agency cost that depends on bank capital.
5Other papers that discuss liquid asset creation by banks in comparison to government liabilities
include Stein (2012) and Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010).
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The idea that bank lending is subject to agency costs has several precedents in
the banking literature. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argue that demandable debt is a
mechanism to ensure the cooperation of banks. They argue that agency problems are
paramount in banking, writing “...studies of banking failures give fraud a prominent
place in the list of causes. Studies of 19th- and 20th-century banking indicate that
fraud and conflicts of interest characterize the vast majority of bank failures for state
and nationally chartered banks.” Likewise, Diamond and Rajan (2001) theorize that
banks adopt fragile asset structures as a commitment device. Mattesini, Monnet,
and Wright (2009) examine which agents will serve as banks in a mechanism design
framework, and find that agents who have a larger stake in the system serve as banks,
since exclusion from future trades is more costly for such agents. Such arguments
provide a microfoundation for my assumption that agency costs are decreasing in
bank capital, since bank capital serves as collateral and well-capitalized banks have
more to lose if their reputations are damaged.
This paper is also related to the recent literature exploring the connection
between the 2008 financial crisis and the market for liquidity. Pozsar et al. (2010)
analyzes the 2008 financial crisis as a run on the “shadow banking” system, and
discusses Fed policy in response to these events. Pozsar (2011) argues that the rise
of shadow banking was driven by high demand for safe and liquid secured assets
similar to Treasury debt, primarily driven by institutional cash pools. In the years
immediately preceding the crisis, the demand for safe liquid assets exceeded the
supply of government liabilities by at least $1.5 trillion, and the shadow banking
sector developed to fill this need. Pozsar (2011) recommends that policy makers
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consider issuing a greater volume of Treasury bills to fill this demand for liquidity.6
There have been several empirical studies of the role of government liquidity.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) find that government bonds hold a
liquidity premium over corporate bonds, with about half of the 100 bps average
spread explained by the superior liquidity of Treasury bonds. Kashyap and Stein
(2000) find evidence of a credit channel of monetary policy.
Finally, there is a large literature exploring the linkages between the financial
sector and the real economy.7 Most of this literature focuses on the role of banks in
lending funds to firms for investment. I depart from this literature by considering
the role of the financial sector in providing liquid assets as means of saving, not
providing loans. Banks provide both loan services to borrowers and liqudity services
to depositors, and I focus on the latter in this paper.
2.2 Model Without Banks
I first consider the model without banks. This case is a simplified version of Holm-
strom and Tirole (1998). I give the derivation in detail because it will serve as the
basis for the model with banks that follows.
6Bernanke et al. (2011), Caballero (2010), and Acharya and Schnabl (2010) also discuss the
role of high demand for safe assets in the run-up to the 2008 crisis.
7Prominent examples include Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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2.2.1 Preferences, Endowment, and Technology
I consider an economy containing three periods, labeled t = 0, 1, 2. The economy is
populated by a unit measure of two types of agents: households and firms. There
is a single good used for both consumption and investment, which is not storable
between periods. All agents have linear utility over consumption across all three
periods, i.e. they have utility functions u(c0, c1, c2) = c0 + c1 + c2.
Households have an endowment of the good in each period that is sufficiently
large that their ability to lend to firms is never limited in the constrained case. I
denote their period t endowment by Ht.
8 Households also enter period 0 holding
a stock ¯̀ of trees that yield a unit return of the good in period 2. These trees are
the economy’s stock of liquid assets, which I will refer to as outside liquidity. Firms
have an initial endowment of A units of the good in period 0, and no endowment in
any other period.
Firms operate a linear production technology which yields a gross return of
ρ1 > 1 between period 0 and period 2. Thus if a firm invests I units of the good
in period 0, the project will produce ρ1I in period 2 if the project is completed.
During period 1, each firm receives an idiosyncratic shock ρ. A firm that suffers
shock ρ must supply an additional ρI units of the good to the project to continue
8At the unconstrained optimum defined below, this endowment will limit investment. The
assumption here is that Ht is sufficiently large relative to firm assets that for a non-trivial leverage
constraint, firm borrowing will not be limited by available funds, but only by the firm’s ability to
commit to repaying their investors.
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its operation. If these funds are not provided, the project will produce nothing. ρ is
drawn from {ρL, ρH}, with ρL < ρH < ρ1, and takes on the value ρL with probability
p, and ρH with probability 1 − p. Therefore in period 1 a measure p of firms will
suffer the low shock ρL, and a measure 1− p will suffer the high shock ρH .
We can summarize the production plan of a firm by the initial investment I
and a continuation policy rule λs ∈ {0, 1} for s ∈ {H,L}, where λs = 1 means that
the project continues given liquidity shock s.
2.2.2 Unconstrained Optimum
I now characterize the unconstrained optimum. Consider a consumption plan {C1, C2, C3},
where Ct is total consumption of firms and households in period t. The optimal
production plan maximizes total consumption subject to the economy’s resource
constraints, which are
C0 + I ≤ A+H0 (2.1)
C1 + pλLρLI + (1− p)λHρHI ≤ H1 (2.2)
H2 + pλLρ1I + (1− p)λHρ1I + ¯̀≥ C2 (2.3)
In period 0, households have endowment H0 and firms have endowment A. These
funds are spent on consumption C0 ≥ 0 and investment I ≥ 0. In period 1, house-
holds have endowment H1. Funds C1 ≥ 0 are used for consumption, funds pλLρLI
are used to meet low liquidity shocks, and funds (1 − p)λHρHI are used to meet
high liquidity shocks. In period 2, households have endowment H2 and earn return
¯̀ from their holdings of outside liquidity, and firms produce pλLρ1I + (1− p)λHρ1I.
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These funds are spent on consumption C2 ≥ 0.
The unconstrained optimal production plan is the solution to
max
λ,I
{C0 + C1 + C2} (2.4)
s.t. (2.1) - (2.3)
Ci ≥ 0, I ≥ 0, λL ∈ {0, 1}, λH ∈ {0, 1}
Proposition 1 (Optimal Production Plan). The unconstrained optimal production
plan is λH = 1, λL = 1, and
I =

A+H0 R1 ≥ 0
0 R1 < 0
(2.5)
where R1 = p (ρ1 − ρL) + (1− p) (ρ1 − ρH)− 1.
Proof. See appendix B.1.9
Since utility is linear with no discounting, any distribution of consumption
between agents is Pareto efficient as long as total consumption is maximized. Here
R1 is the net expected return on investment. Since agents are indifferent between
consuming in periods 0, 1, or 2, as long as there is a positive expected return to
investment, the optimal production plan is to invest all available resources in period
0. Since both liquidity shocks are smaller than the final output of the project ρ1,
if the project has been undertaken it is profitable to meet any liquidity shock that
occurs and bring the project to completion.
9This proposition assumes that H1 is sufficiently large relative to H0 that the limiting factor
on investment is the supply of funds in period 0, not funds available to meet the liquidity shocks
in period 1. This is equivalent to the condition H1 ≥ [pρL + (1− p)ρH ] (A+H0).
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I assume for the rest of the paper that the project is profitable even if only
the low shock triggers continuation, meaning
p (ρ1 − ρL) > 1 (2.6)
Condition (2.6) together with ρ1 > ρH implies R1 > 0, so investment yields a
positive return in expectation. Thus the unconstrained optimal production plan is
to invest all available resources as defined in (2.5).
2.2.3 Limited Pledgeability
I assume that firm borrowing is subject to a limited pledgeability constraint that
makes it impossible to implement the first-best production plan. This constraint
arises from moral hazard. At the end of period 1, each firm with a functioning
project is presented with an alternative opportunity. If a firm shirks by pursuing
this opportunity, the firm’s project fails and the firm earns private benefit BI, where
B > 0. There is no legal recourse for investors to seize any portion of this private
benefit. Therefore in every state in which a firm’s project is successful, the firm
must receive at least a share BI of the output in order to cooperate.10
Let ρ0 = ρ1−B be the return on investment net the firm’s outside opportunity.
Since a successful project produces ρ1I output in period 2, and since the firm must
receive BI in order to operate the project, external investors may receive no more
than ρ1I −BI = ρ0I.11 Therefore ρ0I is the portion of a project’s final output that
10There are many alternate motivations for limited pledgeability. This description corresponds
to the microfoundation provided in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).
11It is also possible to make firms’ other asset holdings subject to an agency cost. Then firms
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a firm can credibly promise to repay investors. I refer to ρ0 as firm pledgeability,
and assume it satisfies
ρ0 < ρH (2.7)
ρ0 < 1 + pρL + (1− p)ρH (2.8)
pρ0 < 1 + pρL (2.9)
ρ0 > pρL + (1− p) ρH (2.10)
Condition (2.7) says that pledgeable funds are insufficient to meet some liquidity
shocks. Condition (2.8) and (2.9) say that expected funds required per unit of
investment exceed the pledgeable portion of the return, no matter which shocks are
met, so that projects cannot be financed solely with external funds. Thus limited
pledgeability is sufficiently severe that it implies a “skin in the game” constraint
that requires firms to put up some of their own capital. If either of these conditions
failed to hold, the scale of investment would not be limited by pledgeability. Finally,
condition (2.10) says that pledgeable funds are sufficient to meet the expected size
of the liquidity shock, so that there are enough pledgeable funds owned by firms in
the aggregate to meet all liquidity shocks in period 1. Thus liquidity will only be
scarce when there is imperfect pooling of these funds. Note that (2.10) and (2.7)
together imply that ρ0 > ρL.
would have to keep some of the return on these assets, and only a fraction could be used to repay
the original investors. This is analogous to a tax on liquid assets purchased by firms, since firms
would have to buy (1 + τ) ` assets in order to increase their pledgeable funds by `. From the
perspective of the firm, this is analogous to an increase in the liquidity premium.
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Households cannot borrow at all. Since they cannot offer any collateral, they
will renege on any promise they make.12
2.2.4 Households
Households supply funds by purchasing state-contingent assets from firms. Given
linear utility and no discounting, households are willing to purchase any asset that
promises an expected return of at least 1. Therefore the supply of loanable funds in
the economy is perfectly elastic at r = 1. Households consume all of their income
that is not used to purchase assets.
Let q be the price of trees in period 0. Since trees yield a unit return, house-
holds will demand an infinite quantity of trees if q < 1 and no trees if q > 1. If
q = 1 households are indifferent between any quantity of trees. Therefore household
asset demand is perfectly elastic at q = 1.
2.2.5 Firms
Firms raise funds from households in period 0 by selling a contract offering a state-
contingent return in period 2. The contract specifies payments to initial investors of
RIs ≥ 0 in the case of shock s ∈ {L,H}. These payments must be positive because
households cannot commit to providing future funds. Firms also purchase ` trees
from households at a price of q. In period 1, firms experience liquidity shocks. Firms
raise funds to meet these shocks by selling new claims to households to be paid in
period 2. Since households know the shock experienced by a firm, they will require
12We can interpret household’s holdings of outside liquidity ¯̀ as their pledgeable funds.
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exact compensation for funds provided. I denote by R1s the funds repaid in period
2 to period 1 investors by a firm that experiences shock s ∈ {L,H}.
Any equilibrium contract must satisfy a number of constraints arising from
incentive compatibility. First, the initial investors must be compensated in expecta-
tion for the funds they provide. The firm requires I funds in period 0 for its initial
investment, plus q` funds to purchase trees. Firms have initial assets A, and the
rest must be raised from outside investors. In order for initial investors to buy this
contract, their expected payments pRIL + (1− p)RIH must satisfy
pRIL + (1− p)RIH ≥ I + q`− A (2.11)
In period 1, firms receive liquidity shocks, and those that continue production
meet these shocks by issuing new liabilities to investors. I denote by R1s the repay-
ment in period 2 of a firm that experiences liquidity shock s ∈ {L,H} to its period
1 investors. These funds must be sufficient to cover liquidity shocks, which implies
constraints
λHρHI ≤ R1H (2.12)
λLρLI ≤ R1L (2.13)
Firms need a sufficient share of profits to cooperate. They repay outside
investors from the pledgeable portion of their output and from the return on their
asset holdings `. Total repayments to outside investors may not exceed
RIL +R
1
L ≤ λLρ0I + ` (2.14)
RIH +R
1
H ≤ λHρ0I + ` (2.15)
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Note that firms do not use outside assets ` to pay for liquidity shocks directly.
Rather, buying assets in period 0 allows firms to increase their pledgeability by the
amount `, and therefore borrow more from period 1 investors. These two specifi-
cations are analogous, but writing the constraints in this manner will simplify the
exposition.
How can liquid assets improve the allocation? We can think of the fundamental
problem as a lack of commitment on the part of households. Since projects that
experience a high shock are profitable to continue (ρ1 > ρH), it is optimal for
households to provide funds to firms to meet high liquidity shocks. However, once
a high liquidity shock is realized firms do not have sufficient pledgeable funds to
meet them, since they can only promise a fraction ρ0 < ρH of their output. Ex
ante, original investors would like to promise to provide funds at a loss in this event,
because this would allow higher investment and therefore higher payments in good
states. Since ρ0 > pρL + (1− p)ρH , the higher payments in good states can be large
enough to compensate households for the negative returns in bad states so that
households come out ahead on average. However, by assumption households are not
able to commit to providing funds at a loss once the liquidity shock is realized.
Liquid assets provide a mechanism for circumventing this commitment prob-
lem. Rather than promising to provide funds in the future, households can provide
the funds up front, and the firm can use them to purchase assets `. These assets can
then be used by the firm as collateral to raise additional funds in the event of a high
liquidity shock. Effectively, households are providing collateral for their promise to
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and λ = {λL, λH}. Non-negativity constraints on
payments to investors arise from the assumption of limited commitment by house-
holds.
Lemma 1. Under the equilibrium contract, the firm always meets the low shock
(λL = 1), and constraints (2.11) - (2.14) hold with equality.
Proof. See appendix B.1.
Intuitively, since our assumptions on parameters imply a positive return to
investment, firms will invest until the pledgeability constraint is binding. Moreover,
since there are sufficient funds available to finance all desired investment at a unit
return, firms will exactly compensate all investors.
Lemma 1 greatly simplifies the statement of the problem. Since constraints
(2.12) - (2.13) and (2.14) - (2.15) hold with equality, we can substitute them directly
into the various expressions in the problem. Substituting constraints (2.14) and
(2.15) into the objective function, we find that firm payoffs are p (ρ1 − ρ0) I if the
firm does not meet the high shock, and (ρ1 − ρ0) I if the firm does. Since the
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pledgeability constraint binds, firms receive exactly the amount (ρ1 − ρ0) I necessary
for them to cooperate in equilibrium. Also, these equations allow us to derive exact





RIL = (ρ0 − ρL) I + `
RIH = λH (ρ0 − ρH) I + `
Together with (2.11), these imply leverage constraint
I ≤ A− (q − 1) `
1− p (ρ0 − ρL)− λH(1− p) (ρ0 − ρH)
(2.16)
which will hold with equality at the optimum. Intuitively, the pledgeability con-
straint is sufficiently severe that firms must supply a fraction of the capital for
investment (a skin-in-the-game constraint). This implies that investment is lim-
ited by firms’ initial assets, which can be expressed as a limit on leverage, as given
in (2.16). When q > 1, firms must put up some of their own funds to purchase
additional liquidity, reducing available funds and thus equilibrium investment.




L are trivially satisfied. The
non-negativity constraint on RIH can be expressed as ` ≥ λH (ρH − ρ0) I, which
implies that holdings of outside liquidity ` must be sufficient to finance the high
liquidity shock.
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We can now express the optimal contracting problem of the firm as
max
λH ,I,`
{(ρ1 − ρ0) [p+ (1− p)λH ] I}
s.t. (2.16), λH (ρH − ρ0) I ≤ `
plus non-negativity constraints on I and `. The following proposition characterizes
the solution:
Proposition 2. The optimal production plan of firms is to meet the high shock
(λH = 1) if and only if
q − 1 ≤ (1− p) [1− p (ρH − ρL)]
p (ρH − ρ0)
(2.17)
If (2.17) holds with equality, the firm is indifferent between λH = 1 and λH = 0.
The optimal choice of I is
I =
A
1− p (ρ0 − ρL)− λH (q − p) (ρ0 − ρH)
and the optimal choice of ` is ` = λH (ρH − ρ0) I.
Proof. See appendix B.1.
Since q − 1 is always non-negative, (2.17) will never hold if the parameters
satisfy p (ρH − ρL) > 1. This condition is a simplification of
pA
1− p (p0 − ρL)
>
A
1− p (ρ0 − ρL)− (1− p) (ρ0 − ρH)
where the left-hand side is output when firms meet only the low shock, and the
right-hand side is output when firms meet both shocks. When p (ρH − ρL) ≤ 1,
(2.17) defines a cutoff level of q above which it is optimal to meet only the low
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shock. Intuitively, firms allocate limited pledgeable funds between financing the
initial investment and meeting liquidity shocks. If liquidity is sufficiently expensive,
firms substitute away from the more expensive input to the production process by
increasing the scale of the initial investment, and reducing the fraction of liquidity
shocks they meet.
2.2.7 Equilibrium
Proposition 2 defines a demand for liquid assets `, which is a decreasing function of
q and drops to zero at the cutoff defined by (2.17). To determine equilibrium q, we
impose clearing in the liquidity market. Since households will only hold assets that
yield a unit return or better, if q > 1 aggregate liquidity demand is exactly equal
to demand from firms. Equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2.1 and characterized in
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Let I0 = A/χ0 and I1(q − 1) = A/(χ1 + (q − 1)(ρH − ρ0)), where
χ0 = 1− p (ρ0 − ρL) and χ1 = 1− ρ0 + pρL + (1− p) ρH . Then,
(i) If p (ρH − ρL) > 1, equilibrium q − 1 = 0 and all firms choose λH = 0, ` = 0,
and I = I0.
(ii) If p (ρH − ρL) ≤ 1 and ¯̀≥ (ρH − ρ0) I1(0), equilibrium q − 1 = 0 and firms
choose I = I1(0), ` = (ρH − ρ0) I1(0), and λH = 1.
(iii) If p (ρH − ρL) ≤ 1 and p (ρH − ρ0) I0 ≤ ¯̀≤ (ρH − ρ0) I1(0), equilibrium q − 1
is




and firms choose λH = 1, ` = ¯̀, and I = I1(q − 1) = ¯̀/ (ρH − ρ0).
(iv) If p (ρH − ρL) ≤ 1 and ¯̀< p (ρH − ρ0) I0, equilibrium q is
q − 1 = χ0 − pχ1
p (ρH − ρ0)
and firms are indifferent between λH = 0 and λH = 1. A fraction ζ of firms
choose λH = 1, I = I1(q − 1) = pI0, and ` = (ρH − ρ0) pI0, where ζ =
¯̀/ [(ρH − ρ0) pI0]. The remaining fraction 1 − ζ choose λH = 0, ` = 0, and
I = I0.





ℓ (ρH − ρ0)I1(0)
Liquidity Supply
Liquidity Demand
Figure 2.1: Equilibrium without banks.
Assuming p (ρH − ρL) ≤ 1 so that it is potentially optimal to meet the high
shock, Proposition 3 defines two cutoff levels of ¯̀.13 If outside liquidity ¯̀ is above
13Note that p (ρH − ρ0) I0 ≤ (ρH − ρ0) I1(0) if and only if p (ρH − ρL) ≤ 1, and so the cutoffs
satisfy the assumed ordering.
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the higher cutoff, then all firms meet both liquidity shocks and there is no liquidity
premium (q−1 = 0). In this case, the economy still fails to achieve the unconstrained
optimum due to the usual effect of credit constraints restricting initial investment,
but there are no additional effects due to limited liquidity.
I0 is the optimal level of investment when λH = 0, and I1(q−1) is the optimal
level of investment when λH = 1, which is strictly decreasing in q − 1. I refer to
the equilibrium allocation with q = 1 as the constrained optimum. The constrained
optimum achieves the highest level of investment that respects the aggregate limited
pledgeability constraint. When both shocks are met, this level of investment is
I1(0) = A/χ1, meaning that firms must provide χ1 of their own funds for every
unit of investment, and so 1/χ1 is the leverage ratio in the economy. χ1 = 1 +
pρL + (1 − p)ρH − ρ0 is the amount by which expected required funds per unit of
investment exceed pledgeable funds. Our assumptions on ρ0 imply χ1 ∈ (0, 1), and
so I ∈ (A,∞). When ρ0 is large relative to 1 + pρL + (1 − p)ρH , most investment
is financed using external funds and leverage is high. When ρ0 is small relative to
1 + pρL + (1− p)ρH , external financing is limited and leverage is low.
If ¯̀ lies below the higher cutoff, then the economy is liquidity constrained, in
the sense that there is insufficient liquidity for all firms to meet the high shock at
the constrained optimal level of investment. Therefore equilibrium q must rise until
the quantity of liquidity demanded by firms equals available liquidity ¯̀. Liquidity
demand is downward sloping because firms’ pledgeable funds are used to pay the
higher price of liquidity, and so funds available to finance initial investment fall,
tightening the leverage constraint.
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If ¯̀lies below the lower cutoff, then there is insufficient liquidity available for all
firms to meet the high shock. Intuitively, firms are indifferent between meeting and
not meeting the high shock when I1 = pI0. Thus the lower cutoff is the level of ¯̀that
is just sufficient for all firms to meet the high liquidity shock given investment I1 =
pI0. The corresponding liquidity premium q−1 is implicitly defined by I(q−1) = pI0.
For ¯̀ below this level, some firms will meet the high shock and some will not, with
the fraction determined by available ¯̀.
I refer to an equilibrium that lies strictly between these two cutoffs as an
interior equilibrium. This is the most interesting case, because here a marginal
change in available liquidity will change both the equilibrium investment and the
equilibrium liquidity premium q. Such a shift is depicted in Figure 2.2, which shows
that a fall in outside liquidity ¯̀will increase the equilibrium liquidity premium q−1
and decrease equilibrium investment I.
In the remainder of the paper, I assume that p(ρH − ρL) < 1, so that firms
strictly prefer to meet the high shock if there is no liquidity premium.
2.3 Model With Banks
In the previous section, I showed that there may be insufficient liquidity in the
economy, resulting in lower investment and, in some cases, a lower share of firms
meeting high liquidity shocks. But by assumption, there are sufficient pledgeable
funds in the aggregate to meet all liquidity shocks, since firms that experience a










Figure 2.2: Fall in outside liquidity without banks.
experience a high shock are short pledgeable funds. Thus firms can achieve the
constrained optimum if they are able to pool their pledgeable funds by arranging
for transfers from firms with excess funds to firms that receive a high shock and
need additional funds.
To implement this liquidity pooling, I introduce financial intermediaries (banks)
into the model.14 Banks sell financial contracts in period 0 to firms in exchange for
shares in the firm. These contracts obligate banks to provide M funds in period 1
to firms that experience a high liquidity shock. Banks obtain these period 1 funds
from households by borrowing against the future returns on their portfolio. Since
firms that experience a high liquidity shock will dilute their period 0 shares with
new borrowing, banks take losses on these credit lines. To make up for this, banks
14I assume that firms cannot implement liquidity pooling by themselves.
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Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
• Firms buy credit lines
from banks with maxi-
mum M .
• Banks receive firm shares
worth (1 − p)M + π.
• Measure 1−p of firms re-
ceive high shock, receive
M each from banks.
• Banks raise (1 − p)M
from households, pay to
firms.
• Households receive bank
claims worth (1 − p)M .
• Measure 1−p of firms pay
RBH = 0 each to banks.
• Measure p of firms pay
RBL = ((1 − p)M + π)/p
each to banks.
• Banks pay (1 − p)M to
households, keep π.
Figure 2.3: Timeline of bank credit lines.
require higher payments from firms that experience the low shock. The resulting
pattern of payments between banks, firms, and households is shown in Figure 2.3.
I call these arrangements credit lines, since they are analogous to the credit
lines in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Their key feature is that they pool pledgeable
funds via effective transfers from firms that experience low liquidity shocks to firms
that experience high shocks, intermediated by banks. The most straightforward
implementation of this arrangement is a system of direct contingent transfers, as
described above. This arrangement can be interpreted as an insurance contract.
Alternatively, the same set of net payments can be implemented using demand
deposits, as discussed in more detail in section 2.3.5. In this case, firms raise addi-
tional initial funds and deposit them with banks, and banks invest these funds by
purchasing shares in firms. In period 1, firms withdraw funds from their accounts to
meet liquidity shocks, and banks raise new funds from households to finance these
withdrawals. Another implementation is a contract that resembles a corporate credit
line. Under this arrangement, firms pay an upfront fee in exchange for access to a
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line of credit at a specified rate, together with a fee on unused credit.15 In period 1,
firms draw on their lines of credit to meet liquidity shocks, and firms that experience
a high shock default in period 2. The upfront fee covers the losses on defaulting
credit lines. In effect, firms pay a premium to lock in future credit at good terms,
with this premium compensating banks for the commitment to provide credit at an
expected loss to some firms. Thus the described contract is equivalent to several
forms of liquidity services actually provided to firms by financial intermediaries.
If banks are not subject to any commitment frictions, they will be able to
perfectly insure against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, and the economy will achieve
the constrained optimal level of investment, even when there is no outside liquidity
(¯̀ = 0). However, it is reasonable to think that banks are subject to agency costs
of a similar nature to firms. Banks act as agents that invest on behalf of their
depositors, in this case households that provide them with funds in period 1. In the
process of lending, banks may need to exert effort in screening firms, verifying the
liquidity shock, and collecting funds. Banks also have opportunities to defraud their
depositors by withholding funds. If banks do not receive sufficient profits relative
to the size of their portfolios, they will not exert full effort screening or collecting
loans, and may have an incentive for fraud.
Let bank agency costs be represented by the function C (ϕM,K), where M is
the payment in period 1 to firms that experience the high liquidity shock, ϕ is the
measure of credit lines sold by the bank, and K is bank equity at the start of period
2. I assume that K is exogenous and known to all agents at the beginning of period
15This is a common arrangement for corporate credit lines, as described by Sufi (2009).
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0. In order to commit to properly intermediating a measure ϕ of credit lines of size
M , a bank with equity K must receive at least C(ϕM,K) in profits, i.e.
ϕπ ≥ C (ϕM,K)
where π is profits received per credit line sold. This is the bank’s incentive compat-
ibility constraint.
Letting D = ϕM denote total funds intermediated, I assume that the agency
cost function C(·) is twice continuously differentiable at all points (D,K), with
D ≥ 0 and K > 0. I assume that agency costs are increasing and convex in funds
intermediated, C1(·) > 0 and C11(·) > 0, and decreasing in bank equity, C2(·) < 0.
Finally, I assume that limD→0C1 (D,K) = 0, limD→∞C1 (D,K) =∞, C (0, K) = 0
for K ≥ 0, and C(D, 0) =∞ for D > 0.
2.3.1 Preferences, Endowment, and Technology
Preferences, endowments, and technology are the same as in section 2.2, except
for the inclusion of banks. Like firms and households, there is a unit measure of
banks, and banks have linear utility over consumption across all three periods, i.e.
u(c0, c1, c2) = c0 + c1 + c2. As described above, banks have equity K entering period
2.
2.3.2 Households
As before, households supply funds perfectly elastically at an expected return of 1.
Therefore every asset will be priced at its expected return, or households will not
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hold that asset. Households are willing to sell their supply of trees at a price q ≥ 1,
and will not buy any trees if q > 1.
2.3.3 Firms
In period 0, firms choose production plan {I, λ}, with I ≥ 0 investment in period
0, and project continuation policy rule λs for state s ∈ {L,H}. Firms raise funds in
period 0 by selling shares offering a state-contingent return in period 2. The contract
specifies payments to initial investors of RIs in the case of shock s ∈ {L,H}. Firms
also purchase ` trees from households at a price of q.
Altogether, the firm requires total funds I + q` in period 0. It has its own
funds A, and raises the remainder from outside investors. Since there is a unit cost
to external funds, expected payments to initial investors must satisfy
pRIL + (1− p)RIH ≥ I + q`− A (2.18)
In period 0, firms also choose whether to purchase credit lines from banks. I
represent this decision by λB ∈ {0, 1}. The equilibrium credit line consists of a pair
(π,M), where M is the maximum amount that can be drawn on in period 1, and π
is the expected profits received by the bank. The firm pays for the credit line with
shares that yield net payments of RBs in period 2 in the event of shock s. These
payoffs must satisfy
pRBL + (1− p)RBH ≥ π + (1− p)M (2.19)
In period 1, firms experience liquidity shocks. Firms raise funds to meet these
shocks by issuing new shares offering a return in period 2. I denote by R1s the funds
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repaid in period 2 to period 1 investors by a firm that experiences shock s. Firms
that experience a low shock raise funds ρL, whereas firms that experience a high
shock raise new funds ρH − λBM and draw on their credit lines for the remainder.
Since there is a unit cost of funds in period 1, these repayments must satisfy
R1L ≥ λLρLI (2.20)
R1H ≥ λHρHI − λBM (2.21)
Firms repay their outside investors from the pledgeable portion of their income
and from the return on their asset holdings `. Thus total repayments in each state










H ≤ λHρ0I + ` (2.23)










λHρ1I −RIH −R1H − λBRBH + `
)}















. Non-negativity constraints on payments to
households arise from the assumption of limited commitment by households.
Lemma 2. Under optimal firm behavior, λL = 1 and constraints (2.18) - (2.23)
hold with equality.
Proof. See appendix B.2.
113
The intuition for this result is similar to Lemma 1. Since investment yields
a positive return, firms will borrow until the pledgeability constraints are binding.
The other constraints bind because this minimizes payments to creditors.
Lemma 2 greatly simplifies the statement of the problem. Since (2.22) - (2.23)
hold with equality, we can substitute them into the objective function to find that
firm payoffs are p (ρ1 − ρ0) I if λH = 0, and (ρ1 − ρ0) I if λH = 1. Since the pledge-
ability constraint binds, firms receive exactly the amount (ρ1 − ρ0) I necessary for
them to cooperate in equilibrium.

















= p (ρ0I + `)+(1−p) (λHρ0I + `)
Substituting in (2.18) - (2.21), we obtain the leverage constraint
I =
A− (q − 1) `− λBπ
1− p (ρ0 − ρL)− λH(1− p) (ρ0 − ρH)
(2.24)
Intuitively, the pledgeability constraint is sufficiently severe that firms must supply
a fraction of the capital for investment (a skin-in-the-game constraint). This implies
that investment is limited by firms’ initial assets, which can be expressed as a
constraint on leverage.
We can now rewrite the other constraints in the problem. The non-negativity






L are trivially satisfied, given M ≥ 0. The non-
negativity constraints on RIH and R
B
H imply
λH(ρH − ρ0)I ≤ λBM + ` (2.25)
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Thus the firm problem reduces to
max
λH ,λB ,I,`
{(ρ1 − ρ0) [p+ (1− p)λH ] I}
s.t. (2.24) and (2.25)
Optimal firm behavior is characterized by Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Let q ≥ 1 and (M,π) ≥ 0 with Mχ1 ≤ (ρH−ρ0)(A−π) be given.16
Let χ1 = 1− ρ0 + pρL + (1− p) ρH and χ0 = 1− p(ρ0 − ρL). Then,
(i) Firms will choose λB = 1 if and only if
π
M
≤ q − 1 (2.26)
and will be indifferent between λB = 0 and λB = 1 if (2.26) holds with equality.
(ii) Firms will choose λH = 1 if and only if
A− λB(π − (q − 1)M)




and will be indifferent between λH = 0 and λH = 1 if (2.27) holds with equality.
(iii) Firms will invest
I =
A− λHλB [π − (q − 1)M ]
1− p(ρ0 − ρL)− λH(q − p)(ρ0 − ρH)
and will purchase outside liquidity
` = λH ((ρH − ρ0)I − λBM)
16The condition Mχ1 ≤ (ρH − ρ0)(A− π) rules out cases where M is larger than the amount of
liquidity any firm seeks to hold.
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Proof. See appendix B.2.
Since by Lemma 2 all constraints bind and firms always meet the low liquidity
shock, the only decisions that remain are whether to meet the high liquidity shock,
and whether to purchase a credit line from banks. Proposition 4 says that firms
hold credit lines as long as they are cheaper than outside liquidity. Since the unit
cost of outside liquidity is q, whereas the unit cost of credit lines is 1 + π/M , this
implies condition (2.26).
Optimal investment when firms do not meet the high shock is I0 = A/χ0, and
when firms meet the high shock is
I1(q − 1) =
A− λB[π − (q − 1)M ]
χ1 + (q − 1)(ρH − ρ0)
Firm profits are proportional to (p + λH(1 − p))I, and so firms will meet the
high shock as long as I1 > pI0, which is condition (2.27). Since ρH > ρ0, meeting
the high shock means there are less pledgeable funds available per unit invested,
and so the leverage constraint (2.24) implies I1 < I0. Moreover, a higher price of
liquidity will raise the costs of meeting the high shock, further reducing I1.
2.3.4 Banks
There is a unit measure of banks that sell credit lines to firms. I assume that bank
issuance of credit lines is perfectly diversified across firms. Thus although there is
a unit measure of each agent, in a sense there are “more” firms than banks.17
17We can formalize this notion by supposing there are N banks of measure 1/N , and N2 firms
of measure 1/N2, so that each bank has N firms as customers, and letting N →∞.
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M is the credit maximum, which are the funds the firm may draw on in period 1
to meet a high liquidity shock. RBL and R
B
H are net payments from the firm to the
bank in period 2 in case of a low shock and high shock respectively.
If all firms purchase credit lines and both shocks are met, then in period 1
a total of (1 − p)M funds will be supplied by banks to firms that received a high
shock. Banks obtain these funds by selling claims to households, which they repay
in period 2. Each bank receives payments pRBL + (1− p)RBH from firms in period
2, and it must compensate its depositors by repaying the (1− p)M funds raised in
period 1. For notational convenience, I suppose that firms that did not draw on
their credit lines in period 1 receive the funds M from the bank in period 2. Since
RBH was defined as the net payments to banks, bank expected profits for each credit
line are
π = p(RBL −M) + (1− p)RBH −M
As described in the beginning of this section, banks must be sufficiently com-
pensated to cooperate. For each credit line issued, banks repay funds M and receive
profits π, which must satisfy
ϕπ ≥ C (ϕM,K) (2.28)
where ϕ is the measure of firms to which a particular bank issues credit lines.
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2.3.5 Credit Lines and Demand Deposits
Throughout this paper, I refer to the financing arrangement offered by banks as
a credit line. This terminology is consistent with Holmstrom and Tirole (1998),
but the arrangement described can also be thought of as a demand deposit account.
Under this interpretation, we suppose that banks offer firms an account that requires
the deposit of M+π funds in period 0. In return, the firm receives a demand account
in the amount of M , that can be drawn in either period 1 or 2. The bank then uses
the π +M deposits to buy shares in firms as an initial investor. Firms that receive
a high liquidity shock draw on their accounts in period 1, and firms that receive a
low liquidity shock wait until period 2. In either case, banks raise the requisite M
funds from households to meet these withdrawals. Then in period 2, banks receive
a return of M + π from the shares they hold, and repay M to the households from
whom they raised the funds to meet the firm’s withdrawals.
It is clear that the described arrangement is isomorphic to the credit lines
derived above. The only difference is that in our description of credit lines banks
accepted as payment a stake in the firm they were lending to, whereas in the de-
scription above banks receive funds, and then use these funds to purchase shares in
firms. However, given our assumption of complete diversification in each instance,
these amount to the same thing.
Note that in each case, banks are offering an insurance contract. Banks take
a loss on firms that experience a high liquidity shock, which is compensated by
profits on firms that experience a low shock. This is consistent with the notion of
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a committed credit line, which can be interpreted as insurance against the loss of
credit access. The demand deposit interpretation shows that such arrangements are
substitutes for liquid assets that can be sold to meet stochastic financing needs.
2.3.6 The Equilibrium Credit Line
What will be the equilibrium credit line? Suppose that rather than selling credit
lines of a particular price and size (π,M), banks set a unit price ϑ, and sell any
credit line with (ϑM,M). Thus ϑ = π/M is equal to profits received by banks per
unit of liquidity provided. Let D = ϕM be total funds intermediated by the bank,
and let Π = ϕπ = ϑD be profits from selling this quantity of credit lines.
From Proposition 4 we know that firms will never purchase a credit line at
price π/M = ϑ > q − 1. If credit lines are offered at different prices, firms will
naturally prefer to purchase the one with the lowest price ϑ. However, firms will not
purchase a credit line from a bank whose agency constraint is violated, since such a
bank would not honor its obligations. This implies that a bank’s total sale of credit
lines D must satisfy ϑD ≥ C(D,K).
Let D̃(ϑ) denote the largest value of D for which ϑD ≥ C(D,K). Given
our assumptions C11 > 0, C(0, K) = 0, and C(D,K) → ∞ as t → ∞, ϑD̃(ϑ) =
C(D̃(ϑ), K) will hold with equality, and D̃(·) satisfies D̃(0) = 0 and D̃′(ϑ) > 0.
Then we may write the constraint ϑD ≥ C(D,K) as D ≤ D̃(ϑ).
Even if banks set a price for credit lines ϑ < q− 1, firms may not purchase all
the way up to D̃(ϑ). This is because there is a maximum amount of liquidity firms
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desire to hold. When the price of liquidity is such that all firms meet both liquidity
shocks, maximum desired liquidity satisfies
D̄(ϑ) =
A(ρH − ρ0)
χ1 + ϑ(ρH − ρ0)
Now we can define the demand for credit lines facing a particular bank i, which
we denote by Dd(ϑi). Suppose that the price of outside credit is q and the price of
credit lines set by other banks is ϑ. Then demand for credit lines satisfies
Definition 2 (Demand for Credit Lines). Demand for credit lines Dd(ϑi) satisfies
(i) Dd(ϑi) = 0 if ϑ > q − 1, or ϑi > ϑ and D̃(ϑ) ≥ D̄(ϑ).
(ii) Dd(ϑi) = D̃(ϑi) if ϑ ≤ q − 1 and either ϑi < ϑ, or ϑi ≥ ϑ and D̃(ϑ) < D̄(ϑ).
(iii) Dd(ϑi) = D̄(ϑi) if ϑi ≤ q − 1 and ϑi = ϑ and D̃(ϑ) = D̄(ϑ).
Clearly no firm will purchase a credit line with a cost above q−1. If ϑi ≤ q−1
we may distinguish three cases. First if ϑi < ϑ, then the bank underprices its
competition and sells up to its agency costs Dd(ϑi) = D̃(ϑ
i). Second, if ϑi = ϑ,
then a bank will sell up to its agency costs if there is enough total demand to
go around, but if not it will receive an equal share of firm’s desired credit lines,




. Finally, if a bank chooses ϑi > ϑ, then it will
receive any residual demand after firms have purchased from all other banks. Thus
if D̄(ϑ) > D̃(ϑ), then Dd(ϑi) = D̃(ϑ), and if not then D
d(ϑi) = 0.





Proposition 5 describes the equilibrium credit line.
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Proposition 5 (Equilibrium Credit Line). Given price of outside liquidity q, the
equilibrium credit line satisfies
(i) If D̃(q−1) ≤ D̄(q−1), then ϑ = q−1 and firms purchase D = D̃(q−1) credit
lines.
(ii) If D̃(q − 1) > D̄(q − 1), then ϑ satisfies D̃(ϑ) = D̄(ϑ), and firms purchase
D = D̄(ϑ) credit lines.
Proof. See appendix B.2.
2.3.7 Equilibrium
We are now able to define equilibrium. Given price of outside liquidity q, Proposition
5 defines the optimal credit line (π,M), and Proposition 4 defines optimal firm
behavior, including holdings of outside liquidity `(q).
To define equilibrium, we need one further condition to determine q, for which
we use the outside liquidity market clearing condition. Let ζ be the fraction of firms
that meet the high shock, and suppose that each of these firms purchase credit lines
(π,M) and hold liquidity `. Since they have no need of liquidity, households only
desire to hold outside liquidity when q = 1. Therefore either q = 1 and firms may
hold any ` such that ζ` ≤ ¯̀, or else q > 1 and firms must hold ζ` = ¯̀. We can






This equilibrium is described in Proposition 6.
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Proposition 6. Let K > 0 and ¯̀≥ 0 be given, and let χ1 = 1−ρ0+pρL+(1− p) ρH
and χ0 = 1− p(ρ0− ρL). Let I0 = A/χ0 and I1(q− 1) = A/(χ1 + (q− 1)(ρH − ρ0)).




) = pI0. Then,
(i) If ¯̀ ≥ (ρH − ρ0)I1(0), then ζ = 1, I = I1(0), q = 1, M = π = 0, and
` = (ρH − ρ0)I1(0).
(ii) If ¯̀< (ρH − ρ0)I1(0), then M1 and M2 are uniquely defined, and if M1 ≤M2,
equilibrium satisfies M = M1, q − 1 = C(M,K)M , ` = ¯̀, ζ = 1, π = (q − 1)M ,
and I = I1(0).
(iii) If ¯̀< (ρH − ρ0)I1(0) and M1 > M2, then equilibrium satisfies q− 1 = C(M2,K)M2 ,
I = I1(q − 1) = pI0, ζ = M2+¯̀(ρH−ρ0)I , ` = ¯̀/ζ, M = M2/ζ, and π = (q − 1)M .
Proof. See appendix B.2.
Once again, I0 is optimal investment when λH = 0, and I1(q − 1) is optimal
investment when λH = 1, which is decreasing in q − 1.
If there is sufficient outside liquidity to meet all liquidity needs at the con-
strained optimal level of investment I1(0) = A/χ1, then there is no need for banks
to supply credit lines and there is no liquidity premium.
If there is insufficient outside liquidity to finance all shocks, then banks sell
credit lines. Banks will require some profits to cooperate, and arbitrage between
bank lines of credit and outside liquidity will set q−1 equal to average bank agency












Figure 2.4: Equilibrium with banks.
outside liquidity for its liquidity properties, they are unwilling to hold it if there is
a positive liquidity premium, and so all outside liquidity will be held by firms.
When there is a positive liquidity premium, it may be the case that all firms
meet the high liqudity shock, or that only a fraction of firms meet it. To distinguish
these cases, we compute two levels of M . M1 corresponds to the equilibrium credit
line that would prevail if all firms met the high liquidity shock. Firms will choose to
meet the high liquidity shock as long as investment I1(q−1) ≥ pI0. M2 corresponds
to the highest level of M for which this expression holds when all firms meet the
high shock.
We can illustrate equilibrium by means of a supply and demand diagram in
the market for liquidity, as depicted in Figure 2.4. Total liquidity is M + ¯̀. Since
households are willing to sell their liquidity holdings at any price q ≥ 1, the supply
of liquidity is horizontal at q = 1 up to ¯̀. Liquidity above this level is provided by
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banks, who issue credit lines that provide total liquidity D(q), which is implicitly
defined by q − 1 = C(D,K)/D.
Demand for liquidity equals ζ(q)(ρH−ρ0)I1(q). This is downward sloping with
x-intercept at (ρH − ρ0)I1(0) up to the value of q at which I1(q) = pI0. At this q
firms are indifferent with respect to meeting the high liquidity shock, and so demand
for liquidity is horizontal.
Proposition 6 shows that if there is insufficient outside liquidity ¯̀, there will
be a positive liquidity premium and lower investment in equilibrium compared to
the constrained optimum. Thus in the presence of bank agency costs, the addition
of banks to the model does not make outside liquidity unnecessary. This is worth
emphasizing because it is the point of departure from Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) do not have bank agency costs, and thus the intro-
duction of banks allows the economy to achieve the constrained optimum. In order
to allow for a non-trivial discussion of liquidity and optimal policy in the presence
of banks, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) introduce an aggregate liquidity shock. By
including bank agency costs, I find that liquidity can be scarce in the presence of
banks even when there is no aggregate liquidity shock.
Moreover, equilibrium investment is determined by the liquidity premium,
which in equilibrium equals the average agency costs of banks. Since firms can
meet liquidity shocks either using outside liquidity or credit lines, these assets must
have the same price by arbitrage. Intuitively, we can think of banks as a sector of
the economy that produces liquid assets, and agency costs define the production
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function of this sector. The precise nature of agency costs in the banking sector
determines the liquidity premium, which is a component of the overall cost of the
asset, along with its riskiness and return. Thus anything that affects agency costs in
the banking sector will affect the capacity of the economy to commit funds, which
will in turn affect investment and output.
Note that when K = 0, the equilibrium is as in section 2.2 without banks.
Thus the specification with banks nests the specification without banks. In this
case the supply of liquidity would be vertical at ¯̀, so that M(q) = 0 for all q.
2.4 Comparative Statics
I now explore the properties of the equilibrium defined in Proposition 6. Given our
discussion of the role of liquidity, we are interested in how changes in the supply of
liquidity affect equilibrium values, notably investment I and the liquidity premium
q − 1. I explore these questions by deriving and discussing the comparative statics
of the equilibrium with respect to changes in outside liquidity ¯̀ and bank capital
K, which are the two determinants of private liquidity.
As it is the most interesting case, we restrict the following discussion to the
case with ¯̀< (ρH−ρ0)A
χ1
and M1 > M2, so that liquidity is scarce in equilibrium and all
firms meet the high liquidity shock. I refer to such a point as an interior equilibrium.
Then all firms meet the high liquidity shock, ζ = 1, and the liquidity premium sat-
isfies q − 1 = C(M1, K)/M1. Thus investment satisfies I(M1) = I1(C(M1, K)/M1).
Since we have simple expressions for q(M) and I(q), the key determinant of
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= M1 + ¯̀
which allows us to implicitly define a function M1(K, ¯̀).
There is no analytic expression for M1(·) for general agency costs, so we use
the implicit function theorem to derive expressions for the marginal change in equi-
librium M1 from a change in outside liquidity ¯̀ or bank capital K. Once we have
the derivatives of M with respect to exogenous variables, we can easily compute
changes in I and q using q(M,K) = C(M,K)/K and I(q).
2.4.1 Variation in Outside Liquidity
We first consider the effect of variations in outside liquidity ¯̀. Following the ap-
proach described in the previous section, we compute the following changes in equi-
librium variables in response to a marginal change in ¯̀.












(1 + ε/η)−1 < 0
dI
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is the elasticity of liquidity demand.












Figure 2.5: Fall in outside liquidity with banks.
The signs given follow from our assumptions that CM−C/M > 0 so that η > 0.
Naturally an increase in the supply of outside liquidity will reduce its equilibrium
price, so that dq/d¯̀< 0. This is just the typical result that an increase in supply
for a good lowers its price. It is equally intuitive that the lower price of liquidity
leads to higher investment dI/d¯̀> 0, since liquidity is an input into production.
The result dM/d¯̀ ∈ (−1, 0) is also quite intuitive. M and ¯̀ are both forms
of liquidity, and so are substitutes. An increase in the supply of one reduces the
demand for the other. But the reduction in credit lines must be less than one-
for-one, because lower q induces higher investment from firms. Total demand for
liquidity M + ` is proportional to investment, and so must rise also. This implies
dM/d¯̀> −1.





, which is just an application of the chain rule. Also note that dI/d¯̀
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is equal to (ρH − ρ0)−1(1 + dMd¯̀ ), as we would expect given (ρH − ρ0)I = M + ¯̀ in
equilibrium.
A fall in outside liquidity is depicted in figure 2.5. This corresponds to a
leftward translation of the liquidity supply curve, which raises the liquidity premium
and lowers investment.
2.4.2 Variation in Bank Capital
We next consider the effect of a change in bank capital K. We can compute changes
in equilibrium variables using the same approach as above. The results are given in
Proposition 8.






































is the elasticity of liquidity demand.
Proof. See appendix B.3.
The given signs follow from the assumptions CM > C/M and CK < 0. In-












Figure 2.6: Fall in bank capital.
cooperation, which raises the effective supply of liquidity. Bank creation of credit
lines M increases, the liquidity premium q − 1 falls, and investment rises.
Comparing these expressions to those for changes in ¯̀, we see that the ex-
pression for dq/dK is the same as the expression for dq/d¯̀ times the term CK/M .
The latter is the first-order change in q due to the change in bank capital, and thus
corresponds to the upward shift in the liquidity supply curve. The reason these
expressions are otherwise identical is because the change in quantity due to a right-
ward shift of a curve is the same as the change in price due to a downward shift of
the same curve, as can be easily verified geometrically.
Figure 2.6 depicts a fall in bank capital. This again shifts the liquidity supply
curve to the left. However, rather than being a translation in the curve, it rotates
the curve about the point ¯̀. The larger the initial M , the larger is the rotation in
the supply curve, since larger bank financing implies a larger effect from a fall in
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bank capital.
2.4.3 Ratio of Elasticities
The ratio of the elasticities of liquidity supply and demand η/ε is a key term in
the expressions derived above. In each case, changes in investment are proportional
to (1 + η/ε)−1, although in the case of changes in K there is the additional term
(∂q/∂M)−1(∂q/∂K). Since η/ε appears in the denominator, higher η/ε implies that
investment is less responsive to changes in liquidity.
Intuitively, if liquidity supply is very inelastic (η small), a change in the econ-
omy’s stock of liquidity will result in a large price response. This will produce a
large change in equilibrium liquidity and investment, unless liquidity demand is also
very inelastic (ε small). Conversely, if liquidity supply is very elastic, a change in
the stock of liquidity will produce a relatively small price response, because other
sources of liquidity adjust. This results in relatively small movements in equilibrium
liquidity and investment, unless liquidity demand is very inelastic.











where ηB = ∂M/∂q · (q − 1)/M is the supply elasticity of bank liquidity. If we
assume that ηB is close to constant, i.e. an isoelastic supply of bank liquidity, then
the relative elasticity is driven primarily by the ratio M/(M + ¯̀). Intuitively, the
supply of liquidity is composed of two parts — elastically supplied bank liquidity, and
















Figure 2.7: Fall in outside liquidity with high (left) and low (right) elasticity ratios.
the higher is the overall elasticity of liquidity supply, and therefore the smaller is
the sensitivity of investment due to changes in the economy’s stock of liquidity.
This difference is depicted in Figure 2.7. The left panel depicts a case with low
¯̀ and high K, so that a relatively high share of equilibrium liquidity is provided by
banks. The right panel depicts a case with high ¯̀and low K, so that little liquidity is
provided by banks. In each case, initial equilibrium liquidity and investment are the
same. Both panels depict an identical absolute fall in ¯̀, which produces a leftward
translation of each liquidity supply curve by the same amount. This results in a
signficantly larger fall in investment in the right panel, reflecting the lower elasticity
ratio η/ε in an economy with lower bank liquidity.
2.5 Welfare
We now turn to the welfare properties of the equilibrium described in section 2.3.
Clearly equilibrium will fail to attain the unconstrained optimal level of investment
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described in Proposition 1, and so the equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. A more
interesting question is whether the equilibrium corresponds to the choice of a con-
strained planner, i.e. a planner with access to a limited set of policy instruments.
Since this notion of optimality is contingent on the instruments available to
the constrained planner, the analysis of welfare and policy are closely related. I
proceed by first defining a notion of welfare, and comparing it to the equilibrium
allocation. I then consider what instruments would enable a planner to implement
this allocation. I show that when liquidity is scarce, the equilibrium allocation is
generally suboptimal relative to the choices of a constrained planner.
Since utility is linear with no discounting, total welfare is the sum of all agents’










H) is the production plan of firm i.
In the following analysis, I assume that the constrained planner maximizes
total welfare W . The result may not be a Pareto-improvement relative to equilib-
rium as the distribution of consumption across agents may change. However, if the
planner has access to lump-sum taxes and transfers at the end of period 2, any pol-
icy that increases W can be made Pareto improving through suitable uncontingent




First consider the unconstrained optimal allocation described in Proposition 1. This
allocation involves investing all available period 0 resources I = A+H0, and meet-
ing the high liquidity shock λH = 1. Since the maximum level of investment in
equilibrium with λH = 1 is I = A/χ1 < A + H0, the equilibrium is not Pareto
optimal.
A planner that has access to lump-sum taxes and transfers in all periods
can implement the unconstrained optimum by transferring sufficient funds from
households to firms in periods 0 and 1, as described in Proposition 9.
Proposition 9 (Planner’s Problem with Unlimited Transfers). A planner that has
access to unlimited lump-sum taxes and transfers can achieve the allocation de-
scribed in Proposition 1 by transferring H0 from households to firms in period 0,
and transferring (ρH − ρ0)(A+H0) from households to firms that experience a high
liquidity shock in period 1.
Proof. See appendix B.4.
Since the only constraint on investing all available period 0 funds is limited
access to financing in periods 0 and 1 arising from limited pledgeability, a planner can
achieve the optimal production plan by simply transferring the necessary funds to
firms. Intuitively, if a planner can identify investment opportunities that cannot be
financed by the private sector via credit markets, and has access to nondistortionary
tax instruments, then the planner can improve welfare by transferring funds directly
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to those agents with investment opportunities. Thus the planner wholly supplants
private credit markets. However, such policies are rarely observed in practice since
it is rare that governments hold the necessary informational advantage over the
private sector.
2.5.2 Liquidity-Constrained Optimum
In Sections 2.2 and 2.3 I defined the constrained optimum as the equilibrium when
liquidity is abundant, i.e. when ¯̀ is sufficiently large that q = 1. For the discussion
of welfare, another notion of constrained optimality is useful: the optimal alloca-
tion given fixed liquidity supply ¯̀ and K, and subject to agents’ participation and
incentive compatability constraints. To distinguish this from the previously defined
notion of constrained optimum, I refer to this as the liquidity-constrained optimum.
Here I define an allocation as {Ii, `i, πi,Mi}i for firms i ∈ [0, 1], together with
price of liquidity q. The participation constraint for suppliers of outside liquidity
is q ≥ 1. Investors receive compensation out of the pledgeable funds of firms, so
investment satisfies
Ii ≤
A− πi − (q − 1)`i
1− p(ρ0 − ρL)− λiH(1− p)(ρ0 − ρH)
(2.31)
Each firm that meets the high shock must have sufficient liquidity to meet the
shock
λiHIi(ρH − ρ0) ≤Mi + `i (2.32)









Finally, firms will not pay for liquidity if they are not using it, so πi = 0 if










p(ρ1 − ρL) + λiH(1− p)(ρ1 − ρH)− 1
]
Ii
s.t. (2.31), (2.32), (2.33),
∫
i
`i ≤ ¯̀, q ≥ 1
Proposition 10 (Liquidity Constrained Optimum). Let χ1 = 1−ρ0+pρL+(1−p)ρH
and χ0 = 1 − p(ρ0 − ρL). Let ζ designate the fraction of firms that meet the high
liquidity shock. Let R1 = ρ1 − pρL − (1 − p)ρH − 1 and R0 = p(ρ1 − ρL) − 1.
Let I(ζ) be defined by χ1I = A − C
(
max(ζ(ρH − ρ0)I − ¯̀, 0), K
)
/ζ, and let ˆ̀
be defined by R1χ0 = R0
[
χ1 + (ρH − ρ0)C1
(
(ρH − ρ0)I(1)− ˆ̀, K
)]
. Then the
liquidity constrained optimum is defined as follows:
(i) If ¯̀≥ (ρH − ρ0) Aχ1 , then all firms choose λH = 1, I =
A
χ1
, ` = (ρH − ρ0) Aχ1 , and
Mi = πi = 0.
(ii) If ˆ̀ ≤ ¯̀ < (ρH − ρ0) Aχ1 , then all firms choose λH = 1, I = I(1), ` = ¯̀,
M = (ρH − ρ0)I − ¯̀, and π = C(M,K).




χ1 + (ρH − ρ0)C1
(
ζ(ρH − ρ0)I(ζ)− ¯̀, K
)]
These firms choose I = I(ζ), ` = ¯̀/ζ, M = (ρH − ρ0)I(ζ) − `, and π =
C(ζM,K)/ζ. The remaining fraction 1 − ζ choose λH = 0, I = A/χ0, ` =
M = π = 0.
135
q = 1 in all cases.
Proof. See appendix B.4.
The differences between the equilibrium and the liquidity constrained optimum
arise because firms do not consider the effects of their demand for liquidity on the
prices of liquidity q and π, whereas the planner internalizes these pecuniary effects.
Since payments for liquidity reduce pledgeable funds, a higher price of liquidity
reduces possible investment.
When liquidity is scarce in equilibrium, firms bid up the price of outside liquid-
ity to some q > 1. Since higher q transfers period 0 funds from firms to households
who hold outside liquidity, it inefficiently decreases investment. Since the supply
of outside liquidity is inelastic, there is no gain from increasing its price. Thus
the constrained planner sets the price of ` as low as possible, resulting in higher
investment.
We can see this by comparing the expressions for I in the cases of equilibrium
and the liquidity constrained optimum. For simplicity consider the case that ζ = 1,











where again M = I/(ρH − ρ0)− ¯̀.
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The difference is that in equilibrium, pledgeable funds are reduced by a further
amount C/M · ¯̀. This occurs because arbitrage pushes up the price of outside
liquidity to equal the cost of credit lines provided by banks. Since outside liquidity
is in fixed supply, this increase in price does not raise the supply of outside liquidity.
Instead, owners of outside liquidity enjoy an excess return that comes at a steep
social cost, since it reduces pledgeable funds and therefore investment. A planner
would prefer to push down the price of liquid assets in order to increase investment,
which implies a wedge between the price of outside liquidity and the premium paid
to financial intermediaries. The former fulfills no social purpose, while the latter is
necessary to overcome the agency costs of banks.
Implementation. Given the analysis above, a constrained planner should try to
lower the price of outside liquidity in order to increase welfare. The simplest way
to do this is to put a price ceiling on the price of outside liquidity at q = 1. Then
firms would first buy outside liquidity until it was sold out, and then substitute to
the (more expensive) bank credit lines.
2.6 Public Liquidity Provision
The previous sections assumed that the supply of liquid assets in the economy
is fixed. However, many government policies directly affect this supply. When
central banks engage in conventional monetary policy, they do so by buying and
selling assets of varying liquidity. Likewise, when governments issue new bonds,
they increase the economy’s store of liquid assets. We can capture these activities
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in our model as the issuance of government bonds that are perfect substitutes for
outside liquidity.
Throughout this section, we will focus on the interior equilibrium where both
liquidity shocks are met and the liquidity premium is strictly positive.
2.6.1 Public Bond Issuance
Suppose that the government issues x bonds with a face value of 1 in period 0.
The funds from the sale of these bonds are returned to households via a lump sum
transfer and consumed immediately. In period 2, the government levies a tax on the
households in order to raise funds that it uses to repay the bonds.
Since government bonds are perfect substitutes for outside liquid assets ¯̀,
government bonds will sell at the same equilibrium price q. From the perspective
of firms and households, it is as though the stock of outside liquidity had increased
from ¯̀to ¯̀+x, and so equilibrium will be exactly the same as given in Proposition 6,
except that ¯̀ is replaced by ¯̀+x. Likewise the comparative statics of real variables
with respect to changes in government debt x will be as given in Proposition 7, with
¯̀ replaced by ¯̀+ x, and d¯̀ replaced by dx.
By assumption, the government has perfect credibility, and therefore is able to
commit to repaying its debt. Since the government can raise taxes, it can promise a
sufficiently large quantity of pledgeable funds in period 1 to cover any potential liq-
uidity shock. By Proposition 6, there is a level of outside liquidity that achieves the
constrained optimum, and so the government can issue bonds in order to achieve
138
the constrained optimum level of investment. If there were no costs to taxation,
then this would be the optimal policy, and the government could achieve the con-
strained optimum. However, I assume that the government can only raise funds
using a distortionary tax, although it can disburse funds to households in a lump-
sum transfer. Suppose that the deadweight loss from raising x funds is given by the
function D(x), which I assume is increasing and convex in x, and satisfies D′ (0) = 0
and D′ (x)→∞ as x→∞.18
2.6.2 Results with General Agency Costs
The total social surplus if both shocks are met is
RI −D(x)
where R = ρ1−pρL−(1−p)ρH−1, since all other aspects of the allocation represent





which will imply a unique optimum if d
2I
dx2
< 0 for all x. However, given the expression
for dI
d¯̀
derived previously in Proposition 7, the sign of d
2I
dx2
will depend on how the
ratio of elasticities η/ε vary as outside liquidity is changed. Thus the sign will be
ambiguous, and without further assumptions we cannot say whether dI
dx
is increasing
18I assume here that the government must raise funds by taxing activity in some unmodeled
market.
19This is with the no-production case normalized to 0. Additional liquidity has no value unless
both shocks are met, so we will restrict attention to this case.
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or decreasing in x, and we cannot give an expression that uniquely defines optimal
policy. We can, however, say a few things about optimal policy in general.
Proposition 11. Suppose that in the absence of government policy the economy
is initially at an interior equilibrium. Then
(i) The optimal supply of government liquid assets x∗ will be positive.
(ii) If optimal x∗ implies that the economy is still at an interior equilibrium, and if
the current choice of x∗ is unique, then a marginal change in ¯̀ or K will shift























(iv) We have dx
d¯̀
> 0 ⇐⇒ ∂2I
∂x2
> 0 and dx
dK
> 0 ⇐⇒ ∂2I
∂x∂K
> 0.
Proof. See appendix B.5.
The first result in Proposition 11 is that if the economy is at an interior
equilibrium in the absence of any policy, it will always be optimal to choose x∗ > 0.
Thus when liquidity is scarce it will in general be optimal for the government to
issue bonds solely for their value in providing liquidity, even though taxation is
distortionary. The intuition for this result is that at an interior solution with a
positive liquidity premium there is a positive marginal value of issuing bonds because
they serve as liquid assets. Since the marginal cost of taxation is zero at x = 0,
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the marginal value of issuing bonds at x = 0 is greater than the marginal cost, and
therefore it will be always be optimal to issue some positive quantity of bonds.20
This intuition is depicted in Figure 2.8. The line that passes through the
origin is the marginal cost of raising x in funds via taxation, and the other line is
the marginal value of increasing the supply of liquid assets R dI
dx
. Moreover, there is
a point x̄ = A(ρH−ρ0)
χ1
− ¯̀, such that if the government chooses x ≥ x̄ the economy
achieves the constrained optimum, and the marginal value of increasing x above x̄
drops to zero. Therefore there will be some point at which the two curves intersect,















Figure 2.8: Optimal policy.
Results (ii) - (iv) in Proposition 11 have a similarly straightforward intuition.
20This assumes that the cost of the first dollar raised is zero. If D′(0) > 0, as will be the case if
there are distortionary taxes already in place, optimal public debt issuance may be zero.
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Suppose that there is an interior unique solution at the point x∗. Then at x∗ the
marginal cost and marginal benefit curves intersect, as depicted in Figure 2.8. Since
x∗ is a local maximum, the marginal benefit curve crosses the marginal cost curve
from above, as claimed in statement (iii). A change in ¯̀ or K will not shift the
marginal cost curve. Since the equation for the marginal benefit curve is R dI
dx
, an
increase in ¯̀ will shift the marginal benefit curve upwards if ∂
2I
∂x2
> 0, which will
increase the point of intersection x∗. Similarly if ∂
2I
∂x∂K
> 0, an increase in K will
shift the marginal benefit curve upwards, which will again increase the point of




















Figure 2.9: Optimal policy after increase in outside liquidity.
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2.6.3 Optimal Policy and the Elasticity of Bank Liquidity Supply
The previous section made no assumptions about the bank agency cost functions
beyond what we have already assumed, and so was not able to say very much about
either the level of optimal bond supply x∗, or how x∗ varies with private outside
liquidity or bank capital. However, under a few reasonable assumptions about the
agency cost function, we can say a lot more.
For this section I change the terminology slightly for ease of exposition. We
continue to only consider the case that firms meet both liquidity shocks. Let the
total liquidity used be L, so that L = M + x + ¯̀; let the liquidity premium be
ϑ = q − 1; let total outside liquidity, including both government bonds and private
outside liquidity, be z = x + ¯̀; let ϑ(M,K) = C(M,K)/M be the average agency
cost function; finally, let φ = (ρH − ρ0)−1 be the liquidity multiplier, so that I = φL.



















is the elasticity of the supply of bank credit lines. This decompo-
sition reflects that the economy’s liquidity is the sum of two components: outside
liquidity that is supplied inelastically, and bank liquidity that is supplied with elasti-
icty ηM . Thus total elasticity of liquidity supply is a function of ηM , and the fraction
of total liquidity that is supplied by banks.
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Using these expressions, we can prove the following about the optimal supply
of government bonds x∗:
Proposition 12. Suppose that under optimal government bond issuance x∗ the
economy is at an interior equilibrium. Then
(i) x∗ is decreasing in the ratio of the elasticity of liquidity supply to the elasticity
of liquidity demand η/ε.









(iii) A sufficient condition for (ii) to hold is that the supply of credit lines by bank
be isoelastic with elasticity ηM ≥ 1.













Proof. See appendix B.5.
These results suggest that for a reasonable parameterization of the bank agency
cost, the optimal supply of government bonds is increasing in private outside liq-
uidity ¯̀, and decreasing in bank equity K. In other words, the government should
provide additional public liquidity when private liquidity from banks decreases, but
should provide less liquidity when private outside liquidity decreases. I discuss the
intuition for each of these results below. The key mechanism is the response of
bank liquidity supply to government liquidity provision, since government liquidity
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crowds out (elastically supplied) bank liquidity, but does not crowd out (inelastically
supplied) private outside liquidity.
Result (i) is immediate from the expression for Lx:
Lx = 1 +Mx =
ε/η
1 + ε/η
together with the optimality expression for government debt (2.34). Intuitively, the
ratio η/ε tells us to what extent an increase in outside liquidity will be offset by a
reduction in bank liquidity. η tells us how much bank liquidity will fall for a given
fall in the price of liquidity ϑ, and 1/ε tells us how much the price of liquidity will
fall to absorb a given increase in liquidity. If η is large, issuance of government
liquidity will cause a large reduction in bank liquidity, and so the benefits of public
liquidity provision are attenuated. Likewise, if ε is small, demand for liquidity is
very inelastic, which suggests a large price swing from public liquidity provision,
which will prompt a greater crowding out of bank liquidity. Figure 2.10 depicts the
optimal supply of government liquidity x∗ for high and low η/ε.
Result (ii) and (iii) give conditions under which x∗ decreases given a decrease
in private outside liquidity ¯̀. This will hold as long as bank liquidity is reasonably
elastic, and its elasticity is not falling too rapidly in the price of liquidity. In par-
ticular, this will hold if bank liquidity is isoelastic, with an elasticity of at least 1.
This result might seem somewhat surprising — one might intuitively expect that
the government should provide outside liquidity when it is scarce. However, the
normal intuition rests on the idea of decreasing marginal returns on investment,













Figure 2.10: Optimal policy for high and low elasticity ratios.
fixed. Instead, an increase in private outside liquidity ¯̀ makes the overall supply of
liquidity more inelastic, which decreases crowding out from government supply of
liquidity. This is what drives the sign.
Result (iv) gives a condition under which x∗ increases given a decrease in bank
capital K. This is close to what we would expect intuitively, but in this case it is
again driven by changes in the elasticity of liquidity supply. The condition that
establishes this result requires that the cross elasticity of the agency cost function
not be too great. If this failed, the increase in K might end up decreasing the
elasticity of liquidity supply: although it would increase the share of (elastic) bank
liquidity in the total, it would simultaneously reduce the elasticity of bank liquidity
supply enough that the net result would be to decrease the elasticity of liquidity
supply overall.
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It is worth emphasizing that these results do not assume any sort of aggregate
liquidity shock as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Here the provision of public
liquidity acts as a substitute to bank financing, and therefore decreases the cost of
liquidity in the economy, which is positive because of bank agency costs. Thus while
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) discusses countercyclical policy, the cycle in question
is variation in an aggregate liquidity shock. By contrast, my discussion applies to
variations in bank assets and the stock of liquid assets in the economy. My model
exhibits cyclical variation in the economy’s capacity to meet liquidity shocks, rather
than cyclical variation in liquidity shocks themselves.
The benefit of my approach is that variations in bank net worth can be ob-
served and are procyclical in nature. Thus my model provides both a mechanism
for the propagation of shocks and a justification for countercyclical public liquidity
provision.
2.7 Conclusion
I analyze the supply and demand for liquidity in the economy using a simple model
of investment and liquidity provision. I find that if there is insufficient liquidity,
equilibrium investment will be below the constrained optimum. This effect can be
reduced by introducing intermediaries that pool liquidity and insure against shocks.
When banks are subject to agency costs that are convex in funds intermediated
and decreasing in bank assets, firms will face a tradeoff between financing their
liquidity shocks by holding scarce liquidity, and financing by holding credit lines
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issued by banks. At an interior equilibrium, the liquidity premium will equal the
average agency costs of banks, liquid assets will sell at a premium over their expected
return because of their scarcity, and investment will be lower than when liquidity is
abundant.
The government can provide liquidity by issuing public liabilities such as
bonds. If public liabilities were costless to issue, the government could achieve the
constrained optimum. However, if funds can only be raised through distortionary
taxation, the government may choose an optimal supply of liquidity that does not
fully eliminate the liquidity premium. Nevertheless, if the economy is initially at an
interior equilibrium with scarce liquidity, the government will find it optimal to issue
a strictly positive quantity of bonds. Moreover, the optimal issuance of government
debt is higher when the elasticity of private liquidity supply is low, because then
public liquidity crowds out less private liquidity, or when the elasticity of liquidity
demand is high.
I consider two comparative static exercises: a fall in bank assets, and a fall in
outside liquidity. We can think of these as two channels by which shocks propagate
through the financial system via the supply of liquidity. A fall in bank assets could
represent losses to the economy’s productive factors, or simply accounting losses due
to a credit bust. A fall in outside liquidity could represent asset destruction (such
as a credit freeze) or a sharp drop in liquid assets due to capital flight or a decision
by the government to decrease its supply of liquidity.
I find that a fall in bank assets will worsen agency costs and reduce the sup-
ply of liquidity from financial intermediaries. This raises the equilibrium liquidity
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premium, making investment more costly, and thus reduces equilibrium investment.
The absolute reduction in investment will depend only on the sensitivity of average
agency costs to bank equity, but the percentage effects will depend on the share
of bank liquidity in the economy’s total supply of liquidity. The optimal policy
response is to increase provision of public liquidity, because the decrease in bank
liquidity provision reduces the elasticity of private liquidity supply, and thus makes
public liquidity issuance more effective at the margin, since it crowds out less private
liquidity.
I find that a fall in private outside liquidity will decrease investment and raise
the liquidity premium. The optimal policy response is to decrease provision of public
liquidity, because the reduction in private outside liquidity shifts the economy’s total
stock of liquidity away from inelastically supplied outside liquidity and towards
elastically supplied bank liquidity. This implies higher overall elasticity of liquidity
supply, and therefore greater crowding out from public liquidity issuance.
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Chapter 3: The Redistributive Effects of Financial Deregulation1
3.1 Introduction
Financial regulation is often framed as a question of economic efficiency. However,
the intense political debate on the topic suggests that redistributive questions are
front and center in setting financial regulation. In the aftermath of the financial
crisis of 2008/09, for example, consumer organizations, labor unions and political
parties championing worker interests have strongly advocated a tightening of finan-
cial regulation, whereas financial institutions and their representatives have argued
the opposite case and have issued dire warnings of the dangers and costs of tighter
regulation.
This paper makes the case that there is a distributive conflict over the level of
risk-taking in the financial sector, and by extension over the tightness of financial
regulation. Financial institutions prefer more risk-taking than what is optimal for
the rest of society because risk-taking delivers higher expected returns. However, it
also comes with a greater incidence of large losses that lead to credit crunches and
negative externalities on the real economy. This link between financial regulation
1The work appearing in this chapter was coauthored with Professor Anton Korinek, and was
published as Korinek and Kreamer (2014)
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and volatility in the real economy has been documented e.g. by Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009).
We develop a formal model to analyze the distributive conflict inherent in
regulating risk-taking in the financial sector. The financial sector plays a special
role in the economy as the only sector that can engage in financial intermediation
and channel capital into productive investments. This assumption applies to the
financial sector in a broad sense, including broker-dealers, the shadow financial
system and all other actors that engage in financial intermediation. For simplicity,
we will refer to all actors in the financial sector broadly defined as “bankers.”
There are two types of financial imperfections. First, bankers suffer from a
commitment problem and need to have sufficient capital in order to engage in finan-
cial intermediation. This captures the standard notion that bankers need to have
“skin in the game” to ensure proper incentives. Secondly, insurance markets between
bankers and the rest of society are incomplete, and bank equity is concentrated in
the hands of bankers.
Because of the “skin in the game”-constraint, a well-capitalized financial sector
is essential for the rest of the economy. In particular, the financial sector needs to
hold a certain minimum level of capital to intermediate the first-best level of credit
and achieve the optimal level of output. If aggregate bank capital declines below this
threshold, binding financial constraints force bankers to cut back on credit to the
rest of the economy. The resulting credit crunch causes output to contract, wages to
decline and lending spreads to increase. At a technical level, these price movements
constitute pecuniary externalities that hurt the real economy but benefit bankers.
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When financial institutions decide how much risk to take on, they trade off the
benefits of risk-taking in terms of higher expected return with the risk of becoming
constrained. They always find it optimal to choose a positive level of risk-taking.
By contrast, workers are averse to fluctuations in bank capital. They prefer less fi-
nancial risk-taking and a stable supply of credit to the real economy. This generates
a Pareto frontier along which higher levels of risk-taking correspond to higher levels
of welfare for bankers and lower levels of welfare for workers. Financial regulation
imposes constraints on risk-taking, which move the economy along this Pareto fron-
tier. Financial regulators have to trade off greater efficiency in the financial sector,
which relies on risk-taking, against greater efficiency in the real economy, which
requires a stable supply of credit.2
The distributive conflict over risk-taking and regulation is the result of both
financial imperfections in our model. If bankers weren’t financially constrained,
then Fisherian separation would hold: they could always intermediate the optimal
amount of capital, and their risk-taking would not affect the real economy. Similarly,
2Our findings are consistent with the experience of a large number of countries in recent decades:
deregulation allowed for record profits in the financial sector, which benefited largely the financial
elite (see e.g. Philippon and Reshef (2013)). Simultaneously, most countries also experienced a
decline in their labor share (Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)). When crisis struck, e.g. during
the financial crisis of 2008/09, economies experienced a sharp decline in financial intermediation
and real capital investment, with substantial negative externalities on workers and the rest of the
economy. Such occasionally binding financial constraints are generally viewed as the main driving
force behind financial crises in the quantitative macro literature (see e.g. Korinek and Mendoza
(2014)).
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if risk markets were complete, then bankers and the rest of the economy would share
not only the downside but also the benefits of financial risk-taking. In both cases,
the distributive conflict would disappear.
Drawing an analogy to more traditional forms of externalities, financial dereg-
ulation is similar to relaxing safety rules on nuclear power plants: such a relaxation
will reduce costs, which increases the profits of the nuclear industry and may even
benefit the rest of society via reduced electricity rates in good states of nature.
However, it comes at a heightened risk of nuclear meltdowns that impose massive
negative externalities on the rest of society. In expectation, relaxing safety rules
below their optimum level increases the profits of the nuclear sector at the expense
of the rest of society.
We analyze a number of extensions to study how risk-taking in the financial
sector interacts with the distribution of resources in our model economy. When bank
managers receive asymmetric compensation packages — for instance, that grant
high bonuses following good performance, but do not reduce earnings an equiva-
lent amount following losses — managers will take on greater risk and expose the
economy to larger negative externalities. If bankers have market power, their pre-
cautionary incentives are reduced and they take on more risk which hurts workers,
highlighting a new dimension of welfare losses from concentrated banking systems.
Financial innovation that expands the set of available assets allows the financial sec-
tor to take on more risk, and in some cases can make workers unambiguously worse
off. Finally, greater risk-taking induced by bailouts likely leads to a significantly
larger redistribution of surplus than the explicit transfers that financial institutions
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receive during bailouts. These extensions suggest that the externalities from credit
crunches may easily represent the most significant social cost of distortions in the
financial sector.
Our analytic findings suggest a number of policy interventions in the real world
that regulators could implement if their main concern is a stable supply of credit to
the real economy: they could (i) separate risky activities, such as proprietary trad-
ing, from traditional financial intermediation, (ii) impose higher capital requirements
on risky activities, in particular on those that do not directly contribute to lending
to the real economy, (iii) limit payouts if they endanger a sufficient level of capi-
talization in the financial sector, (iv) use structural policies that reduce incentives
for risk-taking, and (v) force recapitalizations when necessary, even if they impose
private costs on bankers.
A Pareto-improvement could only be achieved if deregulation was coupled with
measures that increase risk-sharing between bankers and the rest of the economy
so that the upside of risk-taking also benefits workers. Even if formal risk-sharing
markets are absent, redistributive policies such as higher taxes on financial sector
profits that are used to strengthen the social safety net for the rest of the economy
would constitute such a mechanism.
Literature. This paper is related to a growing literature on the effects of financial
imperfections in macroeconomics (see e.g. Gertler, Kiyotaki et al. (2010) for an
overview). Most of this literature describes how binding financial constraints may
amplify and propagate shocks (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Kiyotaki and
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Moore (1997)) and lead to significant macroeconomic fluctuations that affect output,
employment and interest rates (see e.g. Gertler and Karadi (2011)). The main
contribution of our paper is to focus on the redistributive effects of such fluctuations.
Our paper is also related to a growing literature on financial regulation (see
e.g. Freixas and Rochet (2008) for a comprehensive review), but puts the distributive
implications of such financial policies center stage. One recent strand of this liter-
ature argues that financial regulation should be designed to internalize pecuniary
externalities in the presence of incomplete markets.3 Our paper is based on pecu-
niary externalities from bank capital to wage earners and studies the redistributive
implications.
In the discussion of optimal capital standards for financial institutions, Admati
et al. (2013) and Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2013) have argued that society
at large would benefit from imposing higher capital standards. They focus on the
direct social cost of risk-shifting by banks on governments, whereas this paper high-
lights an additional indirect social cost from the increased incidence of costly credit
crunches. Estimates for the financial crisis of 2008/09 suggest that in most coun-
3See e.g. Lorenzoni (2008), Jeanne and Korinek (2010a), Jeanne and Korinek (2010b), Jeanne
and Korinek (2013), Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Korinek (2011), Benigno et al. (2012) and Gers-
bach and Rochet (2012) for papers on financial regulation motivated from asset price externalities,
or Caballero and Lorenzoni (2014) for a paper on currency intervention based on wage external-
ities in an emerging economy. Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) study pecuniary externalities on
the interest rate that arise in the transition from an equilibrium with low household debt to an
equilibrium with high household debt. Kreamer (2014) studies the effect of household debt on the
speed of recovery following a period of high unemployment.
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tries, including the US, the indirect social cost of the credit crunch far outweighed
the direct monetary costs of crisis-related bailouts (see e.g. Haldane (2010)).
In the empirical literature, Kaplan and Rauh (2010) and Philippon and Reshef
(2012) provide evidence that the surplus created during booms accrued in large part
to insiders in the financial sector, i.e. bankers in our framework. Larrain (2013)
provides evidence on adverse effects of financial liberalization on wage inequality.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: The ensuing section develops an
analytical model in which bankers intermediate capital to the real economy. Sec-
tion 3.3 analyzes the determination of equilibrium and how changes in bank capital
differentially affect the banking sector and the real economy. Section 3.4 describes
the redistributive conflict over risk-taking between bankers and the real economy.
Section 3.5 analyzes the impact of factors such as market power, agency problems,
financial innovation, and bailouts on this conflict. All proofs are collected in Ap-
pendix C.
3.2 Model of Bank Capital and Workers
Consider an economy with three time periods, t = 0, 1, 2, and a unit mass each of
two types of agents: bankers and workers. Furthermore, there is a single good that
serves both as consumption good and capital.
Bankers. In period 0, bankers are born with one unit e0 = 1 of the consumption
good. They invest a fraction x ∈ [0, 1] of it in a project that delivers a risky payoff
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Ã in period 1 with a continuously differentiable distribution function G(Ã) over
the domain [0,∞), a density function g(Ã) and an expected value E[Ã] > 1. The
realization of Ã is common across all bankers.4 Bankers hold the remainder (1− x)
in a storage technology with gross return 1.
After the realization of the risky payoff Ã in period 1, the resulting equity level
of bankers is
e = xÃ+ (1− x) (3.1)
Consistent with the banking literature, we use the term “bank capital” to refer to
bank equity e in the following. However, this is a pure naming convention; bank
capital is distinct from physical capital.
In period 1, bankers raise d deposits at a gross deposit rate of r and lend
k ≤ d + e to the productive sector of the economy at a gross interest rate R. In
period 2, bankers are repaid and value total profits in period 2 according to a linear
utility function π = Rk − rd.
Workers. Workers are born in period 1 with a large endowment m of consumption
goods. They lend an amount d of deposits to bankers at a deposit rate of r and hold
the remainder in a storage technology with gross return 1. No arbitrage implies that
the deposit rate satisfies r = 1.5
4This structure implies that banks are able to perfectly diversify their investment portfolios
in order to eliminate idiosyncratic risk across projects. Then the only way to increase expected
return is to increase exposure to aggregate risk, which is captured by the choice of x.
5Workers’ endowments m are assumed to be sufficiently large to rule out cases where deposits
are scarce and banks compete for funds by raising deposit rates above r = 1.
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In period 2, workers inelastically supply one unit of labor ` = 1 at the pre-
vailing market wage w. Worker utility depends only on their total consumption,
which for notational simplicity is normalized by subtracting the constant m so that
u = w`.
In the described framework, risk markets between bankers and workers are
incomplete since workers are born in period 1 after the technology shock Ã is realized
and cannot enter into risk-sharing contracts with bankers in period 0. All the risk xÃ
from investing in the risky technology therefore needs to be borne by bankers. An
alternative microfoundation for this market incompleteness would be that obtaining
the distribution function G(Ã) requires that bankers exert an unobservable private
effort, and insuring against fluctuations in Ã would destroy their incentives to exert
this effort. In practice, bank capital is subject to significant fluctuations, and a large
fraction of this risk is not shared with the rest of society.6 Section 3.4.1 investigates
the implications of reducing this market incompleteness.
Firms. Workers collectively own firms, which are neoclassical and competitive.
Firms borrow k units of good from bankers at interest rate R at the end of period 1,
6For example, Wall Street banks routinely pay out up to half of their revenue as employee
compensation in the form of largely performance-dependent bonuses, constituting an implicit equity
stake by insiders in their firms. A considerable fraction of remaining explicit bank equity is also
held by insiders. Furthermore, only 17.9% of US households hold direct stock investments, and
another 33.2% hold equity investments indirectly, e.g. via retirement funds or other mutual funds.
And this equity ownership is heavily skewed towards the high end of the income distribution (see
e.g. Table A2a in Kennickell (2009)).
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Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
• Banks enter with initial
endowment 1
• Banks choose risky in-
vestment x ∈ [0, 1]
• Shock Ã realized
• Bank equity
e = (1− x) + Ãx
• Households enter and de-
posit d at rate r in banks
• Bankers supply capital
k ≤ d + e to firms
• Households supply labor
` = 1
• Firms produce F (k, `)
• Banks receive return Rk,
households obtain w`
• Banks pay households rd
Figure 3.1: Timeline
which they invest as physical capital. They hire labor ` from workers at wage w in
period 2. They combine the two factors to produce output in period 2 according to
the production function F (k, `) = Akα`1−α with α ∈ (0, 1). There is no uncertainty
in firms’ production. Firms maximize profits F (k, `)−w`−Rk and find it optimal
to equate the marginal product of each factor to its price, Fk = R and F` = w. In
equilibrium they earn zero profits.
A timeline that summarizes our setup is presented in Figure 3.1.
Remark 1: In the described setup, the risk-taking decision x of bankers is separate
from the financial intermediation function k, since they occur in separate time pe-
riods. This simplifies the analysis and sharpens our focus on the asymmetric costs
of credit crunches, but implies that there is no direct contemporaneous benefit to
workers if bankers invest more in the risky payoff with higher expected return. Ap-
pendix D.2 shows that our results continue to hold if the risk-taking and financial
intermediation functions of bankers are intertwined. It considers an aggregate pro-
159
duction function in periods 1 and 2 of [Ãtxt+1−xt]F (kt, `t), so that workers benefit
immediately from risk-taking xt through higher wages in period t.
7
Remark 2: The model setup assumes for simplicity that the endowments of labor
and savings as well as the firms are owned by workers. The results would be un-
changed if these ownership claims were assigned to separate types of agents, since
savers earn zero net returns and firms earn zero profits in equilibrium. For example,
there could be an additional type of agent called capital owners who own all the
savings and firms of the economy. Furthermore, our main insights are unchanged if
labor supply is elastic.
3.2.1 First-Best Allocation




E [F (k, `) + e+m− k] s.t. e = xÃ+ (1− x) (3.2)
where x ∈ [0, 1] and ` ∈ [0, 1]. In period 2, the optimal labor input is `∗ = 1, and the
optimal level of capital investment satisfies k∗ = (αA)
1
1−α , i.e. it equates the marginal
return to investment to the return on the storage technology, R∗ = Fk (k
∗, 1) = 1.
As discussed earlier, m is large enough that the resource constraint k ≤ e + m can
be omitted, i.e. there are always sufficient funds available in the economy to invest
k∗ in the absence of market frictions. The marginal product of labor at the first-best
level of capital is w∗ = F` (k
∗, 1).
7In a similar vein, it can be argued that risky borrowers (e.g. in the subprime segment) benefited
from greater bank risk-taking because they obtained more and cheaper loans.
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In period 0, the first-best planner chooses the portfolio allocation that maxi-
mizes expected bank capital E [e]. Since E[Ã] > 1, she will pick the corner solution
x = 1. Since a fraction αF (k∗, 1) of production is spent on investment, the net
social surplus generated in the first-best is S∗ = (1− α)F (k∗, 1) + E[Ã].
3.2.2 Financial Constraint
We assume that bankers are subject to a commitment problem to capture the no-
tion that bank capital matters. Specifically, bankers have access to a technology
that allows them to divert a fraction (1− φ) of their gross revenue in period 2,
where φ ∈ [0, 1]. By implication depositors can receive repayments on their deposits
that constitute at most a fraction φ of the gross revenue of bankers. Anticipating
this commitment problem, depositors restrict their supply of deposits to satisfy the
constraint
rd ≤ φRk (3.3)
An alternative interpretation of this financial constraint follows the spirit of
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998): Suppose that bankers in period 1 can shirk in their
monitoring effort, which yields a private benefit of B per unit of period 2 revenue
but creates the risk of a bank failure that may occur with probability ∆ and that
results in a complete loss. Bankers will refrain from shirking as long as the benefits
are less than the costs, or BRk ≤ ∆ [Rk − rd]. If depositors impose the constraint
above for φ = 1− B
∆
, they can ensure that bankers avoid shirking and the associated
risk of bankruptcy.8
8If the equilibrium interest rate is sufficiently large that R > 11−∆+B , banks would prefer to offer
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Remark: Our model assumes that all borrowing is used to finance capital in-
vestment, so that binding constraints directly reduce supply in the economy. An
alternative and complementary assumption would be that credit is required to fi-
nance (durable) consumption so that binding constraints reduce demand. In both
setups, binding financial constraints hurt the real economy, with similar redistribu-
tive implications.9
3.3 Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
The laissez-faire equilibrium of the economy is defined as the set of prices {r, R,w}
and allocation {x, e, d, k}, with all variables except x contingent on Ã, such that the
decisions of bankers, workers, and firms are optimal given their constraints, and the
markets for capital, labor and deposits clear.
We solve for the laissez-faire equilibrium in the economy with the financial
constraint using backward induction, i.e. we first solve for the optimal period 1
equilibrium of bankers, firms and workers as a function of a given level of bank
capital e. Then we analyze the optimal portfolio choice of bankers in period 0,
depositors a rate r = 11−∆ and shirk in their monitoring, incurring the default risk ∆. However,
this outcome is unlikely to occur in practice because such high interest rates would likely prompt
a bailout, as discussed in Section 3.5.4
9Note that the benchmark model does not account for the procyclicality of financial leverage,
which is documented e.g. in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). However, this could easily be




3.3.1 Period 1 Equilibrium
Employment is always at its optimum level ` = 1, since wages are flexible. The
financial constraint is loose if bank capital is sufficiently high that bankers can
intermediate the first-best amount of capital, e ≥ e∗ = (1 − φ)k∗. In this case,
the deposit and lending rates satisfy r = R = 1 and bankers earn zero returns on
lending. The wage level is w∗ = (1− α)F (k∗, 1). This situation corresponds to
“normal times.”
If bank capital is below the threshold e < e∗ then the financial constraint binds
and the financial sector cannot intermediate the first-best level of physical capital.
This corresponds to a “credit crunch ” or “financial crisis” since the binding financial
constraints reduce output below its first-best level. Workers provide deposits up
to the constraint d = φRk/r, the deposit rate is r = 1, and the lending rate is
R = Fk (k, 1). Equilibrium capital investment in the constrained region, denoted by
k̂ (e), is implicitly defined by the equation
k = e+ φkFk (k, 1) (3.4)
which has a unique positive solution for any e ≥ 0. Overall, capital investment is
given by the expression
k (e) = min
{
k̂ (e) , k∗
}
(3.5)
Equilibrium k(e) is strictly positive, strictly increasing in e over the domain e ∈
[0, e∗) and constant at k∗ for e ≥ e∗. The equilibrium lending rate is then R (e) =
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αF (k(e), 1) /k(e). Equilibrium profits of the banking sector and worker utility are
π (e) = e+ αF (k (e) , 1)− k (e) (3.6)
w (e) = (1− α)F (k(e), 1) (3.7)
and total utilitarian surplus in the economy is s (e) = w (e) + π (e).
Focusing on the decisions of an individual banker i, it is useful to distinguish
individual bank capital ei, which is a choice variable, from aggregate bank capital
e, which is exogenous from an individual perspective. Then the level of physical





















In equilibrium, ei = e will hold.
Panel 1 of Figure 3.2 depicts the payoffs of bankers and workers as a function
of aggregate bank capital e. As long as e < e∗, physical capital investment falls
short of the first best level. In this region, the welfare of workers and of bankers
are strictly increasing concave functions of bank capital. Once bank capital reaches
the threshold e∗, the economy achieves the first-best level of investment. Any bank
capital beyond this point just reduces the amount of deposits that bankers need to
raise, which increases their final payoff in period 2 but does not benefit workers.
10Technically, when financial intermediation is unconstrained at the aggregate level (e > e∗),
there is a continuum of equilibrium allocations of ki since the lending spread is zero and individual
bankers are indifferent between intermediating or not. The equation gives the symmetric level of

















Figure 3.2: Welfare and marginal value of bank capital e: Social welfare s(e), banker
welfare π(e), and worker welfare w(e) are increasing and strictly concave in bank
equity e below the critical level e∗. Above e∗, bankers benefit from additional equity,
while workers do not. The right panel depicts marginal welfare, with π1 depicting
the marginal value to bankers of individual rather than aggregate bank equity. We
generated this figure using parameters A = 10, α = 1/3, and φ = 0.5.
Beyond the threshold e∗, worker utility therefore remains constant and bank profits
increase linearly in e. This generates a non-convexity in the function π (e) at the
threshold e∗. Our analytical findings on the value of bank capital are consistent
with the empirical regularities of financial crises documented in e.g. Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009).
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3.3.2 Marginal Value of Bank Capital
How do changes in bank capital affect output and the distribution of surplus in the
economy? If bankers are financially constrained in aggregate, i.e. if e < e∗, then a
marginal increase in bank capital e allows bankers to raise more deposits and leads
to a greater than one-for-one increase in capital investment k. Applying the implicit




> 1 for e < e∗ (3.10)
If bankers are unconstrained, e ≥ e∗, then additional bank capital e leaves physical
capital investment unaffected at the first-best level k∗; therefore k′ (e) = 0.
The effects of changes in bank capital for the two sectors differ dramatically
depending on whether the financial constraint is loose or binding. In the uncon-
strained region e ≥ e∗, the consumption value for bankers π′ (e) = 1 is the only
benefit of additional bank capital since k′ (e) = w′ (e) = 0. Bank capital is irrele-
vant for workers and the benefits of additional capital accrue entirely to bankers.
By contrast, in the constrained region e < e∗, additional bank capital increases
physical capital intermediation k and output F (k, 1). A fraction (1− α) of the
additional output Fk accrues to workers via increased wages, and a fraction α of
the output net of the additional physical capital input accrues to bankers.11 These
11Technically, these effects of bank capital on wages w (e) and the return on capital R (e) con-
stitute pecuniary externalities. When atomistic bankers choose their optimal equity allocations,
they take all prices as given and do not internalize that their collective actions will have general
equilibrium effects that move wages and the lending rate.
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effects are illustrated in Panel 2 of Figure 3.2.
When e < e∗, wages decline because labor is a production factor that is com-
plementary to capital in the economy’s production technology. Lending rates rise
because the financial constraint creates scarcity, which drives up the return to cap-
ital investment. The difference between the lending rate and the deposit rate r = 1
allows bankers to earn a spread R (e)−1 > 0. Observe that this spread plays a useful
social role in allocating risk because it signals scarcity to bankers: there are extra
returns available for carrying capital into constrained states of nature. However, the
scarcity rents also redistribute from workers to bankers.
Equity Shortages and Redistribution. It is instructive to observe that small
shortages of financial sector capital have first order redistributive effects but only
second order efficiency effects. In particular, consider an economy in which bank
capital is e∗ so that the unconstrained equilibrium can just be implemented. Con-
sider a wealth-neutral reallocation of the wealth of bankers across periods 1 and 2:
bankers lose an infinitesimal amount ε of bank capital in period 1 so as to tighten
their financial constraint, and regain it in period 2. The resulting payoffs for bankers
and workers are π (e∗ − ε) + ε and w (e∗ − ε).
Lemma 3 (Redistributive Effects of Equity Shortages). A marginal tightening of
the financial constraint around the threshold e∗ has first-order redistributive effects
but only second-order efficiency costs.
Proof. See Appendix C for a proof of all lemmas and propositions.
167
Intuitively, a marginal tightening of the constraint imposes losses on workers
from lower wages that precisely equal the gains to bankers from higher lending
spreads, i.e. the redistribution between workers and bankers occurs at a rate of
one-to-one. Conceptually, this is because pecuniary externalities are by their nature
redistributions driven by changes in prices. In our model, when financial constraints
reduce the amount of capital intermediated and push down wages, the losses of
workers equal the gains to firms. Similarly, when the lending rate rises, the losses
to firms equal the gains to bankers. Since firms make zero profits, the losses to
workers have to equal the gains to bankers. Put differently, since bankers are the
bottleneck in the economy when the financial constraint binds, they extract surplus
from workers in the form of scarcity rents.
3.3.3 Determination of Period 0 Risk Allocation
An individual banker i takes the lending rate R as given and perceives the constraint
on deposits d ≤ φRk as a simple leverage limit. When a banker is constrained,
she perceives the effect of a marginal increase in bank capital ei as increasing her
intermediation activity by k1 (e
i, e) = 1











In period 0, bankers decide what fraction x of their endowment to allocate to the
risky project. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, banker i takes the aggregate levels of
x and e as given and chooses xi ∈ [0, 1] to maximize Πi (xi;x) = E [π (ei, e)]. At an
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i.e. the risk-adjusted return on the stochastic payoff Ã equals the return of the safe
storage technology.
The choice of x is determined by two opposing forces. Since E[Ã] > 1, the
risky asset yields a higher expected return than the safe asset. Opposing this is a
precautionary motive: following low realizations of Ã, aggregate bank capital is in
short supply and bankers earn scarcity rents. As a result, bankers optimally trade
off the opportunity to earn excess profits from the risky asset in period 0 versus
excess profits from lending in period 1 when bank capital is scarce.
The stochastic discount factor π1 in this expression is given by equation (3.11)
and is strictly declining in e as long as e < e∗ and constant at 1 otherwise. Observe
that each banker i perceives his stochastic discount factor as independent of his
choices of ei and xi. However, in a symmetric equilibrium, ei = e as well as xi = x
have to hold, and equilibrium is given by the level of x and the resulting realizations
e = Ãx + (1− x) such that the optimality condition (3.12) is satisfied. As long
as E[Ã] > 1, the optimal allocation to the risky project satisfies x > 0. If the
expected return is sufficiently high, equilibrium is given by the corner solution x = 1.
Otherwise it is uniquely pinned down by the optimality condition (3.12).
Denote by xLF the fraction of their initial assets that bankers allocate to the
risky project in the laissez-faire equilibrium. The resulting levels of welfare for












1− xLF + ÃxLF
)]
. For a given risky portfolio allocation x, let A∗ (x)
be the threshold of Ã above which bank capital e is sufficiently high to support the
first-best level of production. A∗(x) satisfies




Well-Capitalized Banking System. If e∗ ≤ 1 (which can equivalently be read
as e0 ≥ e∗ since e0 = 1), then the safe return is sufficient to avoid the financial
constraint and the first-best level of capital intermediation k∗ would be reached for
sure with a perfectly safe portfolio x = 0. This case corresponds to an economy
in which the financial sector is sufficiently capitalized to intermediate the first-best
amount of capital without any extra risk-taking. In this case, the risky project Ã is
a diversion from the main intermediation business of banks.12
For this case, bankers find it optimal to choose xLF > 1− e∗ (or, equivalently,
xLF > e0 − e∗), i.e. they take on sufficient risk so that the financial constraint
is binding for sufficiently low realizations of the risky return so that A∗ (x) > 0.
This is because the expected return on the risky project dominates the safe return,
and bankers perceive the cost of being marginally constrained as second-order. Also
observe that for e∗ < 1, the function A∗ (x) is strictly increasing from A∗ (1− e∗) = 0
to A∗ (1) = e∗, i.e. more risk-taking makes it more likely that the financial sector
becomes constrained.
12Examples include a diversification from retail banking into investment banking, or loans by
US banks to Latin American governments that offer extra returns at extra risk.
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Under-Capitalized Banking System. If e∗ > 1 (or, equivalently, e0 < e
∗), the
economy would be constrained if bankers invested all their endowment in the safe
return. This corresponds to an economy in which banks are systematically under-
capitalized and risk-taking helps mitigate these constraints. In that case, the func-
tion A∗ (x) is strictly decreasing from limx→0A
∗ (x) = ∞ to A∗ (1) = e∗, i.e. more
risk-taking makes it more likely that the financial sector becomes unconstrained.
3.4 Pareto Frontier
We describe the redistributive effects of financial deregulation by characterizing the
Pareto frontier of the economy, which maps different levels of financial risk-taking
to different levels of welfare for the financial sector and the real economy. Financial
regulation/deregulation moves the economy along this Pareto frontier.
Denote the period 0 allocation to the risky project that is collectively preferred
by bankers by







Similarly, let xW be the level of risk-taking collectively preferred by workers, which
maximizes E [w (e)].
In a well-capitalized banking system, i.e. for e∗ ≤ 1 (equivalently, e0 ≥ e∗),
workers prefer that risk-taking in the financial sector is limited to the point where
financial constraints will be loose in all states of nature so that the first-best level of
capital investment k∗ can be implemented. This is guaranteed for any x ∈ [0, 1− e∗].
Since workers are indifferent between all x within this interval but bankers benefit
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from risk-taking, the only point from this interval that is on the Pareto-frontier is
xW = 1 − e∗. In an under-capitalized banking system, i.e. for e∗ > 1 (equivalently,
e0 < e
∗), the optimal risk allocation for workers involves a positive level of risk-
taking xW > 0 – workers benefit from a little bit of risk because the safe return
produces insufficient bank capital to intermediate the first-best amount of capital
k∗, and risk-taking in period 0 increases the expected availability of finance in period
1.
Definition 4 (Pareto Frontier). The Pareto frontier of the economy consists of all





To ensure that the Pareto frontier is non-degenerate, we assume that the
optimal levels of risk-taking for workers and in the decentralized equilibrium are
interior and satisfy xW < 1 and xLF < 1. This is a weak assumption that holds
whenever the risk-reward trade-off associated with Ã is sufficiently steep.
Proposition 13 (Characterization of Pareto Frontier). (i) The risk allocations that
are collectively preferred by workers and bankers, respectively, satisfy xW < xB.




, the expected utility of workers W (x) is strictly
decreasing in x, and the expected utility of bankers Π (x) is strictly increasing in x.
(iii) The laissez-faire equilibrium satisfies xLF < xB. If e∗ ≤ 1 then xW <
xLF < xB.
The proposition characterizes the economy’s Pareto frontier. Bankers prefer
more risk-taking than workers because the risky technology offers higher returns and
bankers capture all excess returns above e∗, whereas losses from a credit crunch are
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shared between bankers and workers. Any increase in risk-taking in [xW , xB] benefits
bankers and harms workers because it increases the incidence of binding financial
constraints, which redistribute from workers towards bankers, as emphasized in
Lemma 3. The laissez-faire equilibrium level of risk-taking xLF will always be lower
than xB, and will often lie on the Pareto frontier between xW and xB. A sufficient
condition for this is that e∗ ≤ 1 (or equivalently e0 ≥ e∗) so that the economy is
initially well-capitalized.
3.4.1 Market Incompleteness and the Distributive Conflict
To pinpoint why there is a distributive conflict over the level of risk-taking, it is
instructive to consider the consequences of removing one of the financial market
imperfections. First, suppose there is no financial constraint on bankers in period
1. In that case, the profits or losses of bankers do not affect how much capital can
be intermediated to the real economy and workers are indifferent about the level of
risk-taking – bank capital does not generate any pecuniary externalities. In such an
economy, Fisherian separation holds: financial risk-taking and financial intermedia-
tion are orthogonal activities and xW = xB = xFB = 1, i.e. the distributive conflict
disappears.
Alternatively, suppose that there is a complete insurance market in period 0
in which bankers and workers can share the risk associated with the technology Ã,
but there is still a financial constraint in period 1. In that case, workers will insure
bankers against any capital shortfalls so that bankers can invest in the risky tech-
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nology without imposing negative externalities on the real economy. By implication
all agents are happy to invest the first-best amount xW = xB = xFB = 1 in the
risky technology, and the distributive conflict again disappears. Introducing a risk
market in period 0 puts a formal price on risk. If both sets of agents can participate
in this market, this provides workers with a channel through which they can both
share risk and transmit their risk preferences to bankers.
Even if both financial market imperfections are present, the distributive con-
flict also disappears if the constraint always binds.13 In that case, bankers have
the same risk exposure as workers and do not enjoy any asymmetric benefit on the
upside since bank capital never exceeds the threshold where financial constraints are
loose.14 The distributive conflict is therefore generated by the combination of occa-
sionally binding financial constraints and the lack of risk-sharing between bankers
and workers. As argued in the introduction, both assumptions seem empirically
highly relevant.
3.4.2 Financial Regulation
We interpret financial regulation in our framework as policy measures that affect
risk-taking x. The unregulated equilibrium – in the absence of any other market
distortions – is the laissez-faire equilibrium xLF . If xLF ≥ xW , then xLF lies on the
13The constraint always binds if the initial endowment of bankers is insufficient to achieve the
first-best level of capital k∗, even with x = 1 and the best realization of Ã, i.e. Ãmaxe0 ≤ e∗.
14This is the case in many macro models that are linearized around a steady state with binding
constraints. Appendix D.1 provides an analytic exposition of this case.
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Pareto frontier, and financial regulation moves the economy along the frontier.15
The two simplest forms of financial regulation of risk-taking are:
1. Regulators may impose a ceiling on the risk-taking of individual bankers such
that xi ≤ x̄ for some x̄ < xLF . This type of regulation closely corresponds to
capital adequacy regulations as it limits the amount of risk-taking per dollar
of bank capital.
2. Regulators may impose a tax τx on risk-taking xi so as to modify the optimality
condition for the risk-return trade-off of bankers to E[π1 · (Ã − τx − 1)] = 0.
Such a tax can implement any level of risk-taking x ∈ [0, 1]. For simplicity,
assume that the tax revenue is rebated to bankers in lump-sum fashion.
Financial regulators can implement any risk allocation x̄ ≤ xLF by imposing
x̄ as a ceiling on risk-taking or by imposing an equivalent tax on risk-taking τx ≥ 0.
As emphasized in the discussion of Proposition 13, xLF ≥ xW holds for a wide
range of parameters, and always holds in the plausible case e∗ < 1, i.e. when the
economy is ex ante well-capitalized. For the remainder of this section, we assume
that xW < xLF . In this case the distributive implications are straightforward:
Corollary 1 (Redistributive Effects of Financial Regulation). Tightening regulation
15Observe that a financial regulator would not find it optimal to change the leverage parameter
φ in period 1 of our setup. The parameter cannot be increased because it stems from an underlying
moral hazard problem and banks would default or deviate from their optimal behavior. Similarly,
it is not optimal to decrease φ because this would tighten the constraint on financial intermediation
without any corresponding benefit.
175






Conversely, financial deregulation increases the ceiling x̄ and redistributes from
workers to bankers.
Scope for Pareto-Improving Deregulation. An interesting question is whether
there exists a mechanism for Pareto-improving deregulation given additional instru-
ments for policymakers other than the regulatory measures on x described in Corol-
lary 1. Such a mechanism would need to use some of the gains from deregulation
obtained by bankers to compensate workers for the losses they suffer during credit
crunches.
First, consider a planner who provides an uncontingent lump-sum transfer
from bankers to workers in period 1 to compensate workers for the losses from
deregulation. The marginal benefit to workers is 1 − E [w′ (e)], i.e. workers would
obtain a direct marginal benefit of 1 in all states of nature, but in constrained
states they would be hurt by a tightening of the financial constraint which reduces
their wages by w′ (e). The uncontingent transfer thus entails efficiency losses from
tightening the constraints on bankers. The planner needs to weigh the redistributive
benefit of any transfer against the cost of the distortion introduced. This creates
a constrained Pareto frontier along which the trade-off between the welfare of the
two agents is less favorable than the original Pareto frontier. Compensating workers
with an uncontingent payment without imposing these efficiency costs would require
that the planner have superior enforcement capabilities to extract payments from
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bankers in excess of the financial constraint (3.3), which are not available to private
markets.
Alternatively, consider a planner who provides compensatory transfers to work-
ers contingent on states of nature in which bankers are unconstrained, i.e. in states
in which they make high profits from the risky technology Ã. This would avoid effi-
ciency costs but would again require that the planner can engage in state-contingent
transactions that are not available via private markets. (It can be argued that this
type of transfer corresponds to proportional or progressive profit taxation.)
In short, the planner can only achieve a Pareto improvement if she is either
willing to provide transfers at the expense of reducing efficiency, or if she can get
around one of the two market imperfections in our framework, i.e. mitigate either
the financial constraint (3.3) or the incompleteness of risk markets.
3.5 Risk-Taking and Redistribution
We extend our baseline model to analyze the redistributive implications of four
factors that are commonly viewed as reasons for risk-taking in the financial sector:
agency problems, market power, financial innovation, and bailouts.
3.5.1 Asymmetric Compensation Schemes
It is frequently argued that asymmetric compensation schemes provide managers of
financial institutions with excessive risk-taking incentives and that this may have
played an important role in the build-up of risk before the financial crisis of 2008/09.
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To illustrate this mechanism, we consider a stylized model of an incentive problem
between bank owners and bank managers and analyze the distributive implications.
Assume that bank owners have to hire a new set of agents called bank man-
agers to conduct their business. Bank managers choose an unobservable level of
risk-taking x in period 0. Bank owners are able to observe the realization of profits
and bank capital e in period 1, but do not observe Ã and so cannot infer x. Bank
owners instruct managers to allocate any bank capital up to e∗ in financial interme-
diation, and to carry any excess capital max {0, e− e∗} in the storage technology.
Financial intermediation versus storage can be viewed as representative of lending to
real projects versus financial investments, or commercial banking versus investment
banking.
Suppose that bank managers do not have the ability to commit to exert effort
in period 1 and can threaten to withdraw their monitoring effort for both bank loans
and storage in period 1. If they do not monitor, the returns on intermediation and
storage (real projects and financial investments) are diminished by a fraction ε and
δε respectively, where δ > 1. In other words, the returns to financial investments
are more sensitive to managerial effort than real investments. An alternative inter-
pretation would be along the lines of Jensen (1986) that free cash provides managers
with greater scope to abuse resources.
Assuming that managers have all the bargaining power, and given a symmetric
equilibrium, the threat to withdraw their effort allows managers to negotiate an
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0, ei − e∗
}
(3.15)
The marginal benefit of bank capital for an individual manager is p1 (e, e) = επ1 (e, e)
for e < e∗ and p1 (e, e) = δεπ1 (e, e) = δε for e ≥ e∗. Since financial investments
deliver a greater incentive payment, the payoff of managers is more convex than the
payoff of banks π (e, e), and managers benefit disproportionately from high realiza-
tions of bank capital. Comparing this extension to our benchmark setup, Π (x) is
now the joint surplus of bank owners and managers, and the two functions Π (x)
and W (x) remain unchanged compared to our earlier framework – the only thing
that changes is the level of x that will be chosen by bank managers.
Managers internalize the asymmetric payoff profile when they choose the level
of risk-taking in period 0. They maximize E[p (ei, e)] where ei = Ãxi + 1− xi. It is
then straightforward to obtain the following result:
Proposition 14 (Agency Problems and Risk-Taking). (i) The optimal choice of
risk-taking of bank managers exceeds the optimal choice xLF in our benchmark
model if the payoff function of managers is asymmetric δ > 1.
(ii) If xW ≤ xLF , the expected welfare of workers is a declining function of δ.
3.5.2 Financial Institutions with Market Power
Assume that there is a finite number n of identical bankers in the economy who
each have mass 1
n
. Banker i internalizes that his risk-taking decision xi in period 0




e−i, where e−i captures the capital of
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the other bankers in the economy. For a given e, assume that bankers charge the
competitive market interest rate R (e) in period 1.16 Our results are summarized in
Proposition 15.
Proposition 15. The optimal risk allocation xn of bankers is a declining function
of the number n of banks in the market, and x1 = xB ≥ x∞ = xLF , with strict
inequality excepting corner solutions.
Intuitively, bankers with market power internalize that additional equity when
the economy is constrained reduces their lending spreads. This counteracts the
precautionary motive to carry extra capital into constrained states of nature. Our
example illustrates that socially excessive risk-taking is an important dimension of
non-competitive behavior by banks.
3.5.3 Financial Innovation
An important manifestation of financial innovation is to allow financial market play-
ers to access new investment opportunities, frequently projects that are character-
ized by both higher risk and higher expected returns. For example, financial inno-
vation may enable bankers to invest in new activities, as made possible by the 1999
repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, or to lend in new areas, to new sectors or to
16By contrast, if bankers interacted in Cournot-style competition in the period 1 market for















to increase their scarcity rents. We do not
consider this effect in order to focus our analysis on the period 0 risk-taking effects of market
power.
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new borrowers, as during the subprime boom of the 2000s.
Our setup can formally capture this type of financial innovation by expanding
the set of risky assets to which bankers have access in period 0. For a simple example,
assume an economy in which bankers can only access the safe investment project
in period 0 before financial innovation takes place, and that financial innovation
expands the set of investable projects to include the risky project with stochastic
return Ã. Furthermore, assume that e∗ < 1, i.e. the safe return in period 0 generates
sufficient period 1 equity for bankers to intermediate the first-best level of capital.
The pre-innovation equilibrium corresponds to x = 0 in our benchmark setup and
this maximizes worker welfare.
Example 1 (Distributive Effects of Financial Innovation). In the described econ-
omy, expanding the set of investment projects to include Ã increases banker welfare
but reduces worker welfare.
After financial innovation introduces the risky project, bankers allocate a
strictly positive fraction of their endowment xLF > 1 − e∗ to the risky project
and incur binding financial constraints in low states of nature. This is their opti-
mal choice because the expected return E[Ã] > 1 delivers a first-order benefit over
the safe return, but bankers perceive the cost of being marginally constrained as
second-order since π1 (e
i, e) is continuous at e∗. Worker welfare, on the other hand,
unambiguously declines as a result of the increased risk-taking.
This illustrates that financial innovation that increases the set of investable
projects so as to include more high-risk/high-return options may redistribute from
181
workers to bankers, akin to financial deregulation, even though total surplus may
be increased. The problem in the described economy is that workers would be
happy for bankers to increase risk-taking if they could participate in both the upside
and the downside via complete insurance markets. Restrictions on the risk-taking
activities of banks, e.g. via regulations such as the Volcker rule, may benefit workers
by acting as a second-best device to complete financial markets. In the example
described above this would be the case. Naturally, there are also some financial
innovations that may increase worker welfare. In our framework, this may be the
case for example for increases in φ, i.e. relaxations of the commitment problem of
bankers.
3.5.4 Bailouts
Bailouts have perhaps raised more redistributive concerns than any other form of
public financial intervention. This is presumably because they involve redistribu-
tions in the form of explicit transfers that are more transparent than other implicit
forms of redistribution.
However, the redistributive effects of bailouts are both more subtle and poten-
tially more pernicious than what is suggested by focusing on the direct fiscal cost.
Ex post, i.e. once bankers have suffered large losses and the economy experiences a
credit crunch, bailouts may actually lead to a Pareto improvement so that workers
are better off by providing a transfer. However, ex-ante, bailout expectations in-
crease risk-taking. This redistributes surplus from workers to the financial sector in
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a less explicit and therefore more subtle way, as emphasized throughout this paper.
Workers in our model find it ex-post collectively optimal to provide bailouts
to bankers during episodes of severe capital shortages since this mitigates the credit
crunch and its adverse effects on the real economy. Given an aggregate bank capital
position e in period 1, the following policy maximizes ex-post worker welfare:17
Lemma 4 (Optimal Bailout Policy). If aggregate bank capital in period 1 is below
a threshold 0 < ê < e∗, workers find it collectively optimal to provide lump-sum
transfer t = ê − e to bankers. The threshold ê is determined by the expression
w′ (ê) = 1 or
ê = (1− α) [1− (1− φ)α] α1−α e∗ (3.16)
The intuition stems from the pecuniary externalities of bank capital on wages:
increasing bank capital via lump-sum transfers relaxes the financial constraint of
bankers and enables them to intermediate more capital, which in turn expands
output and increases wages. As long as e < ê, the cost of a transfer to workers is
less than the collective benefit in the form of higher wages.
Bailouts constitute straight transfers from workers to bankers, but generate a
Pareto improvement for e < ê because they mitigate the market incompleteness that
is created by the financial constraint (3.3) and that prevents bankers from raising
deposit finance and intermediating capital to the productive sector. At the margin,
each additional unit of bailout generates a surplus Fk (e, 1)− 1, of which w′ (e)− 1
17This section focuses on bailouts in the form of lump-sum transfers. Appendix D.3 shows that
our results apply equally if bailouts are provided via emergency lending or equity injections on
subsidized terms.
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accrues to workers and π′ (e) to bankers. For the last marginal unit of the bailout,
the benefit to workers is w′(ê)− 1 = 0 – they are indifferent between providing the
last unit or not. However, the marginal benefit to bankers for the last unit is strictly
positive π′(ê) = (1−φ)α
1−α .
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Period 0 Risk-Taking. Optimal discretionary bailouts impose a ceiling on the
market interest rate RBL (e) ≤ R (ê) = 1
1−(1−φ)α since they ensure that aggregate
capital investment is at least k ≥ k(ê) at all times. This mitigates the precautionary
incentives of bankers and increases their risk-taking, corresponding to an “income
effect” of bailouts. This effect exists even if bailouts are provided in the form of lump-
sum transfers and do not distort the optimality conditions of bankers. The adverse
incentive effects of bailouts are aggravated if they are conditional on individual bank
capital ei, which distorts the risk-taking incentives of bankers, corresponding to a
“substitution effect” of bailouts.19 Denoting the amount of their endowment that
bankers allocate to the risky project by xBL:
Lemma 5 (Risk-Taking Effects of Bailouts). Introducing bailouts increases period
18For the remainder of our analysis of bailouts, we assume that the parameters α, φ and A are
such that ê < 1 (or, equivalently, e0 > ê). This is a mild assumption that guarantees that the
banking sector will not require a bailout if the period 0 endowment is invested in the safe project.
It also implies that bailouts are not desirable in states of nature in which the risky project yields
higher returns than the safe project. This is reasonable because typically bailouts occur only if
risky investments have gone bad.
19This effect is well-understood in the literature on bailouts and operates in the same direction
as the income effect. For details on this case, see Appendix D.4
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0 risk-taking, xBL > xLF .
Intuitively, bailouts reduce the tightness of constraints and therefore the re-
turns on capital π1 in low states of nature. This lowers the precautionary incentives
of bankers and induces them to take on more risk, even though the bailouts are
provided in a lump-sum fashion. Observe that this effect is similar to the effects of
any countercyclical policy or any improvement in risk-sharing via markets.20
Redistributive Effects. The welfare effects of introducing bailouts on bankers
and workers can be decomposed into two parts, the change in expected welfare
from introducing bailouts for a given level of risk-taking xBL, corresponding to the
market completion effect of bailouts, and the change in the level of risk-taking,





















Corollary 2 (Distributive Effects of Bailouts). (i) Bankers always benefit from
introducing bailouts.
(ii) Workers benefit from the market completion effect of bailouts, but are hurt
by the incentive effects of bailouts if xW < xLF .
20Our framework does not explicitly account for bankruptcy because Ã is bounded at 0; if period
0 investments could lead to bankruptcy, there may be an additional risk-taking incentive for banks.
21The first term for workers could be further separated into a negative term corresponding to
the transfers that they make, and a larger positive term corresponding to the resulting increase in
wages for given x.
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Although the market completion effect is positive for both sets of agents, the
increase in risk-taking benefits bankers at the expense of workers because W ′ (x) <
0. Bailouts increase banker welfare both directly because of the transfers received
from workers and indirectly as a result of the higher risk-taking. Haldane (2010)
emphasizes that the social cost of the 2008/09 credit crunch exceeded the fiscal cost
of bailouts by an order of magnitude. This suggests that the effects of bailouts on
risk-taking incentives may be far costlier to workers than the direct fiscal cost.
The introduction of bailouts is analogous to banker-biased technological change.
The market completion effect is an outward shift of the Pareto frontier of the econ-
omy, whereas the higher risk-taking due to the incentive effect is a movement along
the Pareto frontier towards bankers.
3.6 Conclusions
The central finding of our paper is that financial regulation has important redis-
tributive implications. The majority of the literature on financial regulation focuses
on the efficiency implications of financial regulation and disregards redistributive
effects. Welfare is typically determined by a planner who picks the most efficient
allocation under the assumption that the desired distribution of resources between
different agents can be implemented independently.
We find that deregulation benefits the financial sector by allowing for greater
risk-taking and higher expected profits. However, the downside is that greater risk-
taking leads to a greater incidence of losses that are sufficiently large to trigger
186
a credit crunch. If the financial sector is constrained in its intermediation activ-
ity, the real economy obtains less credit and invests less, lowering output and the
marginal product of labor, which imposes negative externalities on wage earners.
The degree of financial risk-taking and financial regulation therefore has first-order
redistributive implications.
There are a number of issues that we leave for future analysis: First, since risk-
taking is profitable, financial regulation generates large incentives for circumvention.
If the regulatory framework of a country covers only one part of its financial system,
the remaining parts will expand. In the US, for example, the shadow financial
system grew to the point where it constituted an essential part of the financial
sector, but it was largely unregulated and could engage in high levels of risk-taking.
This made the sector vulnerable to the losses experienced during the 2008 financial
crisis. And since the sector had become an essential part of the financial system, its
losses generated strong adverse effects on the real economy.
Second, our results shed light on what types of financial innovation and finan-
cial regulation are most likely to increase the welfare of both the financial sector and
the real economy in order to achieve a Pareto improvement. Our findings suggest
two promising directions that correspond to alleviating the two main market imper-
fections in our framework: (i) innovations or regulatory interventions that increase
risk-sharing between the two sectors on both the upside and the downside, such
as taxes on financial profits during booms. These reduce the distributive conflict
over risk-taking by allowing a more equitable sharing of the gains from financial
risk-taking. (ii) innovations or regulatory interventions that reduce the likelihood of
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hitting binding constraints, for example better capitalized banks. These reduce the
likelihood of credit crunches that have real implications, reducing the distributive
conflict by alleviating the negative externalities from the financial sector on the real
economy during such episodes.
Third, the paper mainly discusses the effects of financial risk-taking, but if the
financial sector designs innovative ways of financing risky investment opportunities
in the real economy and of sharing the associated risks so as to protect the economy
from credit crunches, it is likely that both sectors benefit. An example would be
innovations that increase the availability of venture capital. Thus it is important
for regulators to distinguish between financial risk-taking and intermediating risk
capital to the real economy.
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Appendix A: Computational Algorithm (Chapter 1)
I begin by solving for the steady state equilibrium. For given parameters, this
involves finding the job-finding rate p and borrowing constraint a such that the
stationary distribution of assets resulting from the household decision rules satisfies
A = 0.
A.1 Household problem
I solve the household problem for given (p, a) using value function iteration.1 For
given values of (V, U), we can define consumption using (1.4) and (1.5). The con-
sumption rules define saving rules by (1.1). If the implied saving rule violates the
boorrowing constraint, saving at a is set to zero.
Letting (Vn, Un) be the value function at step n of value function, we can define
the next step of the iteration (Vn+1, Un+1) by






+ s (Un+1 − Vn+1)






+ p (Vn+1 − Un+1)
where dt is the step size. Note that this is equivalent to iterating backward through
time, with dt equal to the time step. The system of equations above can be quickly
1For a detailed description of this algorithm, see Achdou et al. (2013).
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solved for the next step by inverting a single matrix. This process continues until
the process converges, which generally takes on the order of 20 iterations.2
A.2 Calculating the stationary distribution
Once we have calculated the decision rules of households, we can quickly solve for
the implied stationary distribution of assets. From (1.28) and (1.29), the stationary
asset distribution satisfies








To calculate the stationary distribution numerically we discretize the state
space to a set of points ai, and let ∆ = ai+1 − ai be the distance between adjacent





[max (mi−1ȧi−1, 0)−min (mi+1ȧi+1, 0)− |miȧi|]
This corresponds to taking the left difference when ȧi > 0, and the right difference
when ȧi < 0. When ȧi ≈ 0 so that ȧi−1 > 0 and ȧi+1 < 0, the expression corresponds
to computing the first difference in the direction in which m > 0. This is important
because meȧe may not be differentiable at a point where ȧ = 0, but the derivative
in one direction will exist. Moreover, since we are in a two-state case, we know that
m = 0 will hold in one direction when ȧ = 0. In particular, for employed households
mi+1 = 0, and for unemployed households mi−1 = 0.
2Convergence of the algorithm requires an “upwind” approximation of the derivative of the
value function dV/da, as described in Candler (2001).
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= 1−N . Note that in this case mi is the mass at point
i, rather than the pdf, which would equal mi/∆.







and v a vector with N in the nth position, and 1−N in the 2nth position, and oth-
erwise zero. (Here n is the number of grid points). T is a matrix with entries
in terms of p, s, and ȧi, that encodes the rate of transitions above, but with the














Then we simply invert the matrix T to find the stationary distribution m =
T−1v. This matrix is invertible because ȧ(a) is strictly decreasing, and so equals
zero at just one point.
A.3 Finding a transition path
Once we have the steady state, we can calculate the transition path following a shock
as follows. First we guess a path of hiring probabilities p(t) and initial employment
n(0). Given this path of hiring probabiltiies, we can iterate the household prob-
lem backward from the steady state using one step of the value function iteration
algorithm used to solve for the steady state. At every step we must also calculate
the borrowing constraint implied by the previously computed value function for
unemployed households U .
Once we have the sequence of decision rules, we can iterate the initial asset
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distribution and employment forward to compute the path of asset demand. We
then search for the path of hiring probabilities that makes asset demand zero at
every point in time.
Because changing the hiring probability at any point in time has nonlinear
effects on asset demand before and after this time, it is difficult to define a simple
rule for updating the path of p(t). Directly searching for the path of p that satisfied
A(t) = 0 at every t is prohibitively computationally expensive. I instead search for
values of p at several points, and interpolate the intermediate values, with more
points immediately following the shock to capture the more complicated dynamics
in this region. I confirmed that this method produces a very close approximation
to A = 0, and varying the number of gridpoints at the margin does not alter the
resulting dynamics.
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Appendix B: Proofs (Chapter 2)
B.1 Proofs from section 2.2




Ci + µ0 [A+H0 − C0 − I] + µ1 [H1 − C1 − pλLρLI − (1− p)λHρHI]




The first-order condition with respect to Ci is
µi = 1 + νi
which implies µi > 0, and so the period budget constraints hold with equality.
Substituting them directly into the objective function, we obtain the new problem
max
λL,λH ,I
{A+H0 +H1 +H2 + pλL (ρ1 − ρL) I + (1− p)λH (ρ1 − ρH) I − I} (B.1)
s.t. H ≥ I − A (B.2)
H ≥ pλLρLI + (1− p)λHρHI (B.3)
I ≥ 0
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where λs ∈ {0, 1} for s ∈ {L,H}. The constraints (B.2) and (B.3) are the non-
negativity constraints on C0 and C1 respectively. The Lagrangian of (B.1) is
L = A+H0 +H1 +H2 + pλL (ρ1 − ρL) I + (1− p)λH (ρ1 − ρH) I − I
+ µ1 [A+H − I] + µ2 [H − pλLρLI − (1− p)λHρHI] + µ3I (B.4)
The first-order condition of (B.4) with respect to I is
pλL (ρ1 − ρL) + (1− p)λH (ρ1 − ρH)− 1 = µ2 [pλLρL + (1− p)λHρH ] + µ1 − µ3
By assumption, there will always be sufficient funds in period 1 to meet liquidity
shocks, meaning H1 ≥ pλLρLI + (1 − p)λHρHI, and so we have µ2 = 0. Thus the
first-order condition reduces to
pλL (ρ1 − ρL) + (1− p)λH (ρ1 − ρH)− 1 = µ1 − µ3
The left-hand side pλL (ρ1 − ρL) + (1 − p)λH (ρ1 − ρH) − 1 is the net return on
investment. If the net return is positive, then µ1 > 0, the non-negativity constraint
on C0 binds, and the economy invests all available funds in period 0. If the net
return is negative, then µ3 > 0, the non-negativity constraint on I binds, and the
economy does not invest anything. We can express this investment rule as
I =

A+H0 pλL (ρ1 − ρL) + (1− p)λH (ρ1 − ρH) > 1
[0, A+H0] pλL (ρ1 − ρL) + (1− p)λH (ρ1 − ρH) = 1
0 pλL (ρ1 − ρL) + (1− p)λH (ρ1 − ρH) < 1
Now we just need to determine the optimal choices of λL and λH . Increasing λL
and λH from 0 to 1 results in increases in the objective function of pλL (ρ1 − ρL) I
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and (1− p)λH (ρ1 − ρH) I respectively. Given our assumption that ρ1 > ρH > ρL,
both of these terms are positive for I > 0. Therefore it is optimal to choose λL = 1
and λH = 1. Since the return from a project is greater than the additional cost of
bringing the project to completion after the liquidity shock is realized, the optimal
continuation policy is to continue in all cases.
We can now define the unconstrained optimum. The solution is {C0, C1, C2, I, λ}
with
C0 = A+H0 − I
C1 = H1 − pρLI − (1− p)ρHI





A+H0 R ≥ 0
0 R < 0
where R = p (ρ1 − ρL) + (1− p) (ρ1 − ρH)− 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. We need to show that it is always worthwhile to increase RIs in
order to increase I as long as the constraint on pledgeable income in the s state
does not bind. If this is true, then it follows that in any equilibrium with positive
external financing, limited pledgeability binds, meaning that firms receive exactly
the amount necessary for them to cooperate, and no more.
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The first step is to argue that the period 1 investors will be paid exactly the
funds necessary to finance meeting the liquidity shocks, and no more. This should
not be controversial, since there is no other benefit to increasing payments to period
1 investors. To show this, we take the Lagrangian of the problem
L = p
(
























λLρ0I + `−RIL −R1L
]
and differentiate with respect to R1L and R
1
H . This yields conditions
µ1 ≤ µ4 + p
µ2 ≤ µ5 + 1− p
which hold with equality if the corresponding R1s > 0. We also have R
1
L ≥ λLρLI
and R1H ≥ λHρHI, which indicates that if I > 0 and λs > 0, we have R1s > 0. So we
can conclude that in fact we have R1s = λsρsI, for s ∈ {L,H}. Substituting these
terms directly, we can rewrite the Lagrangian as
L = p
(
















λLρ0I + l −RIL − λLρLI
]
Now we derive conditions for optimal λs. From the Lagrangian, we find that
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the marginal values of increasing λL and λH are respectively
p (ρ1 − ρL) I + µ5 (ρ0 − ρL) I
(1− p) (ρ1 − ρH) I + µ5 (ρ0 − ρH) I
The optimal choice of λs is 1 if the marginal value is positive, and 0 if the marginal
value is negative. Since by assumption we have ρ1 > ρL and ρ0 > ρL, the first
condition is strictly positive, which means that we have λL = 1. The sign of the
second is ambiguous since ρ0 < ρH , and so the value of λH is not clear.
The next step is to observe that a pledgeability constraint will bind if (1) that
shock is met, and (2) the multiplier on investment is greater than 1, i.e. µ3 > 1.
This is logical because the direct cost of an increase in RIs is 1, so if the value of
increasing investment is greater than 1, the optimal solution will be to increase RIs
until some other constraint binds. This follows from the first-order conditions with
respect to RIL and R
I
H , which are respectively
µ5 ≥ p (µ3 − 1)
µ4 ≥ (1− p) (µ3 − 1)
These show that the pledgeability constraints bind if and only if µ3 > 1.
Now we need only show that µ3 > 1 to establish the claim. To show this, we
differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to I, which yield
µ3 ≤ [p (ρ1 − ρL) + µ5 (ρ0 − ρL)]λL + [(1− p) (ρ1 − ρH) + µ4 (ρ0 − ρH)]λH
which holds with equality when I > 0. Since we have λH = 0 whenever (1 −
p) (ρ1 − ρH) + µ4 (ρ0 − ρH) < 0, the term [(1− p) (ρ1 − ρH) + µ4 (ρ0 − ρH)]λH is
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non-negative. Since λL = 1 and since by assumption p (ρ1 − ρL) > 1, the term
[p (ρ1 − ρL) + µ5 (ρ0 − ρL)]λL > 1. Therefore we have µ3 > 1 as long as I > 0,
which implies µ4 > 0 and µ5 > 0 and establishes the claim.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first establish that the constraints
I ≤ A− (q − 1) `
1− p (ρ0 − ρL)− (1− p)λH (ρ0 − ρH)
and λH (ρH − ρ0) I ≤ ` hold with equality. Consider the Lagrangian
L = p (ρ1 − ρL) I + (1− p)λH (ρ1 − ρH) I + µ1 [`− λH (ρH − ρ0) I]
+ µ2 [A− (q − 1) `− [1− p (ρ0 − ρL)− (1− p)λH (ρ0 − ρH)] I]
The first-order condition with respect to ` yields
µ1 ≤ (q − 1)µ2
which holds with equality when ` > 0. Since we have ` ≥ λH (ρH − ρ0) I, as long as
we have λH = 1 and I > 0, we will have ` > 0. We proved in Lemma 1 that (2.11)
binds at the solution, so we have µ2 > 0, which implies that µ1 > 0 as long as we
have q − 1 > 0, λH = 1, and I > 0. If we have q − 1 = 0, then there is no cost of
holding unnecessary `, and so the optimal level of ` is undetermined. We assume
without loss of generality that ` = λH (ρH − ρ0) I holds with equality.
Now we substitute this expression for ` into the leverage constraint, and derive
an expression for I
I =
A
1− p (ρ0 − ρL)− λH (q − p) (ρ0 − ρH)
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which will hold for λH = 1. This same expression will also hold for λH = 0 and
` = 0 from the leverage constraint with ` = 0, so this will hold in either case.




q − 1 ≤ (1− p) [1− p (ρH − ρL)]
p (ρH − ρ0)
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) follows directly from Proposition 2.
For (ii), we simply look at the demand for outside assets ` at q = 1. If ` < ¯̀,
then we know from market clearing that equilibrium q = 0 because households
must hold some of ¯̀ in equilibrium. Substituting q = 1 into the expression for I
in Proposition 2, we find that I = A
1−ρ0+pρL+(1−p)ρH
. Since firms need to hold at
least ` = (ρH − ρ0) I in order to meet both shocks, we find that firm must hold at
least ` = (ρH−ρ0)A
1−ρ0+pρL+(1−p)ρH
, which is feasible if ¯̀≥ (ρH−ρ0)A
1−ρ0+pρL+(1−p)ρH
, thus proving the
statement.
For (iii), we want to find the range of ¯̀ for which all firms meet both shocks
and q > 0. Since q > 0, households do not hold any liquid assets, and so all ¯̀ are
held by firms. Since all firms meet both shocks and hold liquid assets, we have ` = ¯̀
by market clearing. Then we use I = A
1−p(ρ0−ρL)−(q−p)(ρ0−ρH)
and I = (ρH − ρ0) `
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from Proposition 2 to solve for implied q. This calculation yields
q − 1 = A¯̀ −
1− ρ0 + pρL + (1− p) ρH
ρH − ρ0
This will be the equilibrium as long as firms are willing to meet both shocks at this
level of q. By Proposition 2, firms are willing meet any shocks as long as
q − 1 ≤ (1− p) [1− p (ρH − ρL)]
p (ρH − ρ0)
Combined with the condition above, this yields the necessary level of ¯̀ for this to
be an equilibrium
¯̀≥ p (ρH − ρ0)A
1− p (ρ0 − ρL)
If ¯̀ is above this threshold, then ` = ¯̀, I =
¯̀
ρH−ρ0
, and λ1 = 1.
For (iv), if ¯̀ is below this threshold then there is insufficient liquidity for all
firms to meet all shocks. However, no firms meeting both shocks would not be an
equilibrium, because in this case the available outside liquidity ¯̀ would need to be
held by households or firms that do not need it, which they would only do if we had
q = 0. But if we have q = 0, then firms would prefer to buy outside liquidity at
this price and meet both shocks. Therefore in equilibrium we must have a fraction
of firms meeting both shocks, while the rest only meet the low shock. In order for
this to be an equilibrium the firms must be indifferent between these two strategies.
From Proposition 2, this will be true if
q − 1 = (1− p) [1− p (ρH − ρL)]
p (ρH − ρ0)
Substituting this q into the expression for I from Proposition 2, we obtain
I =
pA
1− p (ρ0 − ρL)
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The corresponding amount of outside liquidity held by each firm must satisfy ` =
(ρH − ρ0) I, so we have
` =
pA (ρH − ρ0)
1− p (ρ0 − ρL)
Let the fraction of firms that meet both shocks be ζ. Since q > 0, by market
clearing the firms that meet both shocks must hold total liquidity ¯̀. Therefore we





[1− p (ρ0 − ρL)] ¯̀
pA (ρH − ρ0)
The firms that meet only the low shock will follow the same strategy as when
p (ρH − ρL) > 1, earning the same profits as the firms that meet both shocks. This
proves the final statement.
B.2 Proofs from section 2.3
Proof of Lemma 2. Let the Lagrangian for the optimal contracting problem be
L = p
(




























pRBL + (1− p)RBH − λB(π + (1− p)M)
]
The first step is to show that (2.20) and (2.21) bind, meaning period 1 investors





µ1 ≤ p+ µ4
µ2 ≤ (1− p) + µ5
which hold with equality if R1L > 0 or R
1
H > 0 respectively.
From (2.20) we have R1L ≥ λLρLI, and so either R1L > 0, which implies µ1 =
p + µ4 > 0, or R
1
L = 0 in which case λLρLI = 0 (since λLρLI ≥ 0). In either case,
the constraint (2.20) holds with equality.
From (2.21) we have R1H + λBM ≥ λHρHI. Now we would like to argue as
above, but first we must rule out the possibility that we have R1H = 0 and λBM > 0,
so that (2.21) does not hold with equality. To show that this is not the case, we
differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to M , which yields
µ2λB ≤ µ6(1− p)M
which holds with equality if M > 0. From this we can conclude that either (1)
M = 0, or (2) µ2 > 0 and µ6 > 0, or (3) µ2 = 0 and µ6 = 0. If (1) or (2) then we
are finished then (2.21) holds with equality and we are finished, so all that remains
is to show that we cannot have µ2 = µ6 = 0 when λB = 1 and M > 0.
Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to RBL and R
B
H , we obtain
µ6 ≤ 1 +
µ4
p
µ6 ≤ 1 +
µ5
1− p
which hold with equality if RBL > 0 or R
B
H > 0 respectively. From this we conclude




H = 0. If the latter, then (2.19) would be π+(1−p)M =
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0, which is only possible if π = M = 0, contradicting our assumption that M > 0.
Therefore we have µ6 > 0, and so µ2 > 0.
Note that the above argument also establishes that (2.19) holds with equality,
since either RBL = R
B
H = 0 and so λB(π + (1 − p)M) = 0, or else one of RBL or RBH
is strictly positive, in which case µ6 > 0.
We have now established that (2.20) and (2.21) hold with equality, and so we
can directly substitute them into the Lagrangian to obtain
L = p
(




















pRBL + (1− p)RBH − λB(π + (1− p)M)
]
We next establish that λL = 1. Since λL, λH ∈ {0, 1}, we can differentiate
the Lagrangian with respect to each λ, and conclude that if this derivative is non-
negative then that λ = 1. The derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to λL and
λH are respectively
[p (ρ1 − ρL) + µ4 (ρ0 − ρL)] I
[(1− p) (ρ1 − ρH) + µ5 (ρ0 − ρH)] I
Since by assumption ρ1 > ρL and ρ0 > ρL, the first expression is positive for
I > 0, and so we have λL = 1. The second expression may not be positive because
ρ0 < ρH , so we conclude that λH = 1 if and only if [(1− p) (ρ1 − ρH) + µ5 (ρ0 − ρH)] I ≥
0.
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Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to RIL and R
I
H yields
µ4 ≥ p (µ3 − 1)
µ5 ≥ (1− p) (µ3 − 1)
which hold with equality when RIL > 0 or R
I
H > 0 respectively. Therefore (2.22)
and (2.23) hold with equality as long as µ3 > 1.
Now to finish proving the proposition, it is enough to establish that µ3 > 1,
since this would prove that (2.22), (2.23) and (2.18) hold with equality. Differenti-
ating the Lagrangian with respect to I, we obtain
µ3 ≥ p (ρ1 − ρL) + µ4 (ρ0 − ρL) + λH [(1− p) (ρ1 − ρH) + µ5 (ρ0 − ρH)]
By assumption, we have p (ρ1 − ρL) > 1, so we have
µ3 > 1 + µ4 (ρ0 − ρL) + λH [(1− p) (ρ1 − ρH) + µ5 (ρ0 − ρH)]
Since µ4 ≥ 0 and ρ0 > ρL, the term µ4 (ρ0 − ρL) ≥ 0. As we found above, either
λH = 0 or (1− p) (ρ1 − ρH)+µ5 (ρ0 − ρH) ≥ 0, so the term λH [(1− p) (ρ1 − ρH) + µ5 (ρ0 − ρH)] ≥
0. Therefore we have µ3 > 1, and therefore µ4 > 0 and µ5 > 0. This proves that
(2.22), (2.23) and (2.18) hold with equality.
Proof of Proposition 4. I solve this problem in two stages. In the first stage, I
suppose that λH = 1 and solve for the optimal way to finance investment. In the
second stage I check whether it is in fact optimal to meet both shocks.
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s.t. I ≤ A− (q − 1) `− λBπ
χ1
I ≤ `+ λBM
ρH − ρ0
where I, ` ≥ 0 and λB ∈ {0, 1}. The lagrangian of this problem is
L = I + λ
(










The first-order condition with respect to I is
λ+ µ ≥ 1
which holds with equality if I > 0. This implies that one of λ or µ is greater than
0.
The first-order condition with respect to ` is
µ
ρH − ρ0
≤ λ(q − 1)
χ1
which holds with equality if ` > 0. Since one of λ or µ is strictly positive, this
implies that λ > 0. Moreover, µ = 0 is only possible if either ` = 0 or q = 1.




and since π ≥ 0, this term attains its maximum at λB = 0. This level of investment
is feasible, and corresponds to ` = (ρH − ρ0)I.
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Next suppose that q > 1. Then µ > 0 unless ` = 0, which only occurs
when firms meet all liquidity shocks through bank financing. Differentiating the








Firms will only choose λB = 1 if ∂L/∂λB ≥ 0. But since λ > 0, this is only
possible if either µ > 0 or π = 0.
First suppose that π = 0. If ` = 0 also, then investment satisfies I = A/χ1,
and the liquidity constraint implies M ≥ (ρH − ρ0)A/χ1. Now we assumed that
M ≤ (ρH − ρ0)A/χ1, so then either M is exactly at this level, in which case this is
the solution, or else we have arrived at a contradiction and ` > 0.












[(q − 1)M − π]
which is positive when π/M ≤ q − 1. Moreover, µ > 0 implies that
(ρH − ρ0)I = `+ λBM
Combining this with the leverage constraint arising from pledgeability, we obtain
I =
A− λB [π − (q − 1)M ]
χ1 + (q − 1)(ρH − ρ0)
Further observe that this expression still holds for investment in the q = 1 and ` = 0
cases considered above.
206
Now it only remains to determine whether it is optimal to meet the high shock.
When the high shock is not met, firm expected profits are
pA
1− p(ρ0 − ρL)
and when both shocks are met expected profits are I as calculated above. The
expression given in the proposition is a comparison of these values.
Proof of Proposition 5. First consider the case D̃(q − 1) ≤ D̄(q − 1). We begin by
arguing that D̃(ϑ) is increasing in ϑ. Recall that D̃(ϑ) is implicitly defined by
ϑD̃ = C(D̃,K)




which is positive by our assumptions C(0, K) = 0, C1 > 0, and C11 > 0.
Now if any bank sets ϑ > q − 1, it sells no credit lines, whereas any bank
that sets ϑ ≤ q − 1 will sell some quantity of credit lines that cannot exceed D̃(ϑ),
since this is the quantity of D at which its agency costs are binding. Since D̃(ϑ) is
increasing in ϑ, total credit lines sold by all firms cannot exceed D̃(q − 1). Since
this quantity is by assumption no greater than total demand for credit lines D̄(ϑ),
any bank that sets ϑ ≤ q − 1 will sell up to its agency costs D̃(ϑ). Thus profits are
ϑD̃(ϑ) for ϑ ≤ q − 1, and 0 for ϑ > q − 1, and since D̃(ϑ) is increasing in ϑ, the
solution is ϑ = q − 1.
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Next consider the case D̃(q − 1) < D̄(q − 1). D̄(ϑ) = (ρH−ρ0)A
χ1+ϑ(ρH−ρ0)
is the
maximum demand for credit lines from firms given a price of liquidity equal to ϑ.
Clearly D̄(ϑ) is decreasing in ϑ.
Given some distribution Φ(·) of ϑ across banks, with Φ(q − 1) = 1, firms will
purchase credit lines from the banks with the lowest ϑ until agency costs bind for
those banks, and then move on to the next highest, and so on. Thus for a given ϑ,
the total share of firms that have purchased credit lines from banks at a price less







Firms purchase credit lines from banks up to a cutoff price ϑ̄. Since at ϑ the
share of firms that have purchased credit lines is 1, this cutoff is defined by
lim
ϑ→ϑ̄−
S(ϑ) ≤ 1 ≤ lim
ϑ→ϑ̄+
S(ϑ)
where both inequalities hold with equality if there is not a point mass of firms at ϑ̄.
If there is a point mass m̄ of banks at ϑ̄, then demand will be divided equally
among them. Each will sell credit lines to a share φ = [1 − limϑ→ϑ̄− S(ϑ)]/m̄, of
firms, and each firm purchases a credit line of size D̄(ϑ̄).
Since D̄(·) is decreasing in ϑ whereas D̃(·) is increasing, the term D̄(ϑ)
D̃(ϑ)
is
decreasing in ϑ. Moreover, because we are considering the case D̄(q−1) > D̃(q−1),
this fraction is strictly greater than 1 for all ϑ ≤ 1. Therefore any bank that sets
ϑ = q − 1 will receive a measure of customers that is strictly less than 1 (and may
be 0).
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Now consider the problem of a bank setting its price. Clearly the bank will
never choose ϑ > ϑ̄, since this yields no sales and no profits. If the bank chooses to
just undersell the cutoff, it receives profits of just under ϑ̄D̃(ϑ̄). Finally, if the bank
chooses ϑ = ϑ̄, it receives profits φϑ̄D̄(ϑ̄).
Since all banks face the same demand curve which implies a unique optimal
price, they will all choose the same ϑ. This point must satisfy D̃(ϑ̄) = φD̄(ϑ̄). Since
all banks choose the same price, φ = 1 and this expression becomes D̃(ϑ̄) = D̄(ϑ̄),
which implicitly defines the price level set by banks.
Proof of Proposition 6. Equilibrium is defined by firm behavior given by Propo-
sition 4, bank pricing given by Proposition 5, and the market clearing condition(
ζ`− ¯̀
)
(q − 1) = 0, together with ζ` ≤ ¯̀ and q ≥ 1. Market clearing requires that
when q > 1, firms must hold all available outside liquidity ¯̀, since households will
only hold ` if q = 1.
First suppose that q = 1. This immediately implies ζ = 1. From bank
behavior, we know that C(M,K)/M ≤ q − 1 = 0, which is only possible when
M = 0. Then from firm behavior we have I = I1(0) = A/χ1. By assumption,
I1(0) > pI0, so λH = 1 for all firms. Therefore firms meet all shocks by holding
outside liquidity, and so total holdings must satisfy ` = (ρH − ρ0)I1(0). This will be
the equilibrium as long as there is sufficient outside liquidity, i.e. ¯̀≥ (ρH−ρ0)I1(0).
Next suppose that ¯̀ < (ρH − ρ0)I1(0), so that q > 1 in equilibrium. This
implies that all outside liquidity is held by firms, and so ζ` = ¯̀. Now I claim that
banks set ϑ = q−1. First suppose that ¯̀> 0. From Proposition 5, either ϑ = q−1,
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or else ϑ < q−1 and M̄(ϑ) = M̃(ϑ). In the latter case, all firms finance their desired
liquidity holdings by holding credit lines, and so ` = 0. Since ¯̀> 0, we have ζ` < ¯̀,
which violates market clearing given q > 1. Now if ¯̀= 0, q may be set to any level
as long as ϑ ≤ q − 1, so we can set them equal without loss of generality.
Since ϑ = q−1, a firm that meets a high liquidity shock will choose investment
I = I1(q − 1) =
A
χ1 + (q − 1)(ρH − ρ0)
and will be indifferent between purchasing a credit line and financing liquidity shocks
entirely through holding outside liquidity. We assume without loss of generality that
each firm that meets the high shock holds a credit line of size M . Then M̃ = ζM are
total credit lines sold by banks. From Proposition 5, M̃ satisfies ϑM̃ = C(M̃,K).
Combined with ϑ = q − 1, this implies q − 1 = C(M̃,K)/M̃ .
Now we consider two cases. First suppose that ζ = 1, so that all firms meet
the high shock. Then M̃ = M and ` = ¯̀. Then from firm behavior
(ρH − ρ0)I1(C(M,K)/M) = M + ¯̀
This expression implicitly defines unique M = M1. To prove this, frist
note that by L’Hopital’s rule, limM→0C(M,K)/M = 0, since C(0, K) = 0 and
limM→0C1(M,K) = 0. Then as M → 0, the right-hand side converges to ` while
the left-hand side converges to (ρH − ρ0)I1(0). Since we are considering the case
that (ρH − ρ0)I1(0) > ¯̀, the left-hand side is greater than the right at M → 0.
Next we observe that since I1(q − 1) is strictly decreasing in q − 1, and since
C(M,K)/M is strictly increasing in M , the left-hand side is strictly decreasing in
M whereas the right-hand side is strictly decreasing. Therefore if an M that makes
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the equation holds, it is unique. Finally, by assumption limM→∞C(M,K) =∞ and
limM→∞C1(M,K) = ∞, so again by L’Hopital’s rule limM→∞C(M,K)/M = ∞.
Since limq→∞ I1(q−1) = 0, this implies that as M →∞ the left-hand side converges
to 0 while the right-hand side converges to ∞. Thus M1 exists.
The equilibrium will satisfy M = M1 as long as the implied I is at least as
large as pI0. This condition can be written as
I1(C(M1, K)/M1) ≥ pI0
Since C(M,K)/M is strictly increasing inM , and I1(q−1) is strictly decreasing
in q− 1, this expression is equivalent to the condition M1 ≤M2, where M2 satisfies
I1(C(M2, K)/M2) = pI0. Note that M2 is uniquely defined since by the arguments
above I1(C(M,K)/M) is strictly decreasing in M , goes to 0 as M → ∞, and goes
to I1(0) > pI0 as M → 0.
Suppose that instead M2 < M1. Then we have ζ < 1. Moreover, since M̃
satisfies C(M̃,K)/M̃ = q − 1 > 0, we have M̃ > 0, and since M̃ = ζM , we must
have ζ > 0. Thus ζ ∈ (0, 1), and so firms must be indifferent between meeting the
high shock or the low shock. Thus firms that meet the high shock choose I = pI0.
This implies that q − 1 must satisfy
I1(q − 1) = pI0
which uniquely defines a value of q > 1. Then M̃ is determined by q − 1 =
C(M̃,K)/M̃ , which is what we’re calling M2. Now we know that total liquidity
used satisfies L̃ = M2 + ¯̀, and liquidity used by each firm that meets a high shock
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B.3 Proofs from section 2.4
Proof of Proposition 7. At an interior equilibrium the supply of liquidity is
Ls(q − 1) = M s(q − 1) + `
where M s(q − 1) is implicitly defined by C(M,K)/M = q − 1, and demand for
liquidity is
Ld(q − 1) = (ρH − ρ0)A
χ1 + (q − 1)(ρH − ρ0)
Equilibrium q is defined implicitly by Ls(q − 1) = Ld(q − 1), and at the
equilibrium we have q − 1 = C(M,K)/M and Ls = Ld = M + ¯̀.















Now consider a marginal change in ¯̀. Totally differentiating Ls = Ld yields














The total change in L = M + ` is Lsqdq, since the demand curve is not affected

































Proof of Proposition 8. Equilibrium satisfies Ls(q−1) = Ld(q−1), where Ls and Ld
are as defined in the proof of Proposition 7. Then a marginal change in K produces






We can calculate LdK by applying the implicit function theorem to C(M,K) =




























and since I = (ρH − ρ0)−1(M + ¯̀), we have
dI
dK




B.4 Proofs from section 2.5
Proof of Proposition 9. Since firms prefer the unconstrained optimum (UO) to any
other allocation, it is sufficient to show that UO is feasible under the described set of
transfers. The UO requires firms to invest I = A+H0. Firms have an endowment of
A, and so given the transfer H0 from households, this level of investment is feasible.
The UO also requires meeting both shocks. Since firms have no debt from period
0, they have sufficient pledgeable funds to borrow up to ρ0I from households in
period 1. Since ρ0 > ρL, firms that experience the low shock are able to borrow
enough to meet the shock. Firms that receive the high shock receive a transfer
of (ρH − ρ0)I from households. Since these firms can borrow an additional ρ0I
from households, they are able to meet the high shock. Thus the unconstrained
optimum is feasible under the described transfers. The Planner may then transfer
H0 +(1−p)(ρH−ρ0)(A+H0) from firms to households in period 2 to effect a Pareto
improvement.
Proof of Proposition 10. We solve for the constrained optimal allocation in two
steps. First we fix the fraction ζ of firms that meet the high shock and define
welfare W (ζ). Then we solve for ζ that maximizes W (ζ).




p(ρ1 − ρL)Ii s.t. Ii ≤ A/ [1− p(ρ0 − ρL)]. This yields





where R0 = p(ρ1 − ρL)− 1 and χ0 = 1− p(ρ0 − ρL).
Next consider the problem of firms that choose λH = 1. The Lagrangian of































+ µ5 (q − 1)




= R1 − µi1 − µi2(ρH − ρ0) ≤ 0
∂L
∂Mi



















Now I establish several facts about the solution.
First I claim that µi1 > 0 for all i. I argue in two steps. First I show that at
least one of µi1, µ
i
2 > 0. This follows from the expression for ∂L/∂Ii since R1 > 0,




2 ≥ 0. Next I argue that µi1 > 0. If this were not true, then by the
previous claim µi2 > 0. Then from the expression for ∂L/∂Mi it follows that µ4 > 0,
and from the expression for ∂L/∂πi it follows that µ
i
1 > 0, which is a contradiction.
Next I show that q = 1. From the expression for ∂L/∂q either `i = 0 for all i,
or else µ5 > 0. The latter implies q = 1, and if the former the value of q does not
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enter into the problem apart from the restriction that q ≥ 1, and so we can choose
q = 1 without loss of generality.






Mi, K). This follows from the expression for
∂Li/∂πi. If πi > 0 for any i then µ4 > 0 and the claim follows. If πi = 0 for all i, then
the bank incentive compatability constraint becomes C(
∫
i




Mi, K) ≥ 0 from non-negativity of Mi, the claim follows. Moreover, this
argument together with the expression for ∂L/∂Mi implies that either µ
i
2 > 0, or
Mi, πi = 0 for all i.







R1, any feasible reallo-
cation of πi,Mi, `i across i will not affect total welfare. Thus we can WLOG restrict
attention to the symmetric case where Mi = M , πi = π, and `i = `.









≤ M + `
ρH − ρ0
ζ` ≤ ¯̀, M ≥ 0
Clearly if M = 0 is feasible, the solution is M = 0 and I = A/χ1. This will be




, which we can write as a threshold ¯̀≥ ζ(ρH − ρ0) Aχ1 .





max(ζ(ρH − ρ0)I − ¯̀, 0), K
)
ζ
and the welfare of firms that meet the high shock is Wλ=1(ζ) = R1Iλ=1(ζ).
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Now we turn to the determination of optimal ζ. We can now express total
welfare as
W (ζ) = ζWλ=1(ζ) + (1− ζ)Wλ=0
Marginal welfare satisfies












. Now we show that this expression is strictly positive under
our assumptions. Recall that we assumed it was always profitable to meet the high
shock in equilibrium when the liquidity premium was 0. This assumption can be

















[1− p (ρH − ρL)] > 0
Thus for ζ sufficiently low, Wζ > 0.
Now we show that Wζ is strictly decreasing in ζ for all ζ above this level.




C/ζ − (ρH − ρ0)C1I








In the expression, ζ only appears in the argument of C1 as ζI. As ζ increases,
the term ζI increases:
d (ζI)
dζ





ζ [(ρH − ρ0)C1 + χ1]
> 0
and as ζI increases, C1
(
ζ(ρH − ρ0)I − ¯̀, K
)
decreases, since we assumed C11 < 0.
Therefore Wζζ < 0.
Since for some ζ > 0 we have Wζ > 0, and since Wζ is strictly decreasing in









which will hold with equality unless ζ = 1. By setting ζ = 1 in this expression, we
can solve for the cutoff level ˆ̀ below which ζ < 1 will hold. Then this expression
with equality implicitly defines optimal ζ for ¯̀< ˆ̀.
B.5 Proofs from section 2.6
Proof of Proposition 11. In turn,
(i) Suppose not. Then RI − C(x) is maximized at x = 0. Let f(x) = RI|x.
Then since the function f(x)− C(x) achieves a maximum at x = 0, f and C must
satisfy
f(0)− C(0) ≥ f(h)− C(h)















which is just the definition of the derivatives of C and f at x = 0. Therefore we
have
C ′(0) ≥ f ′(0)




≤ 0. But from Proposi-
tion 7 we have dI
dx
> 0 for ¯̀> 0, so this is a contradiction.





which is a zero of the function
f (·) = RdI
dx
−D′(x) = 0























. Since this is a unique maximum of a





















(iii) If the point x∗ is an interior solution, then it must also be a local maximum.
At a local maximum of a global function, the function is locally concave, meaning
that the second derivative is negative. Here the function we are maximizing is
RI−D(x). Since this function is twice continuously differentiable, it will be concave
at the point x∗ iff the second derivative R ∂
2I
∂x2
−D′′(x) < 0, which immediately implies
the given condition.
(iv) Since we have R ∂
2I
∂x2
−D′′(x) < 0, the denominators in the expressions for
dx/d¯̀ and dx/dK are negative. Therefore each expression will be positive iff the
numerator is positive. Therefore we obtain the given statement.
Proof of Proposition 12. To prove (i), we can simply observe that x∗ is implicitly
defined by RφLx = Dx, and that Lx = (1 + η/ε)
−1. Therefore a higher value of η/ε
at every value of x implies a higher Lx at every level of x. Thus at the old x
∗ we
have Lx > Dx, and so it is optimal to increase x from that point, implying a higher
value of x∗. Note that any lower value of x will not be the optimum, because at
the old value of η/ε these points had lower cumulative welfare. This implies that
integrating RIx − Dx between that earlier point and the old x∗ yielded a positive
number, and since we have now strictly increased Ix this integral has increased, and
thus must still be positive. Thus the cumulative net benefit of raising x to at least
x∗ must be greater than before.
For (ii), we again use Lz = (1 + η/ε)
−1. Let ψ = η/ε be the ratio of elasticities.




























(1 + ψ)L− z
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For (iii), first observe that if bank liquidity supply is isoelastic, then ηM is
constant, and so d
dM
ηM = 0. Then since L (ε+ η) > 0, for Lzz < 0 we need
ηM + 2ε > 1. Since ε = ϑL/A, and at an interior solution we have ϑ > 0, it follows
that ε > 0, and so ηM ≥ 1 implies that Lzz < 0.



























Then since ϑM > 0 and ϑK < 0, the term − ϑKϑM is positive. Since Lz > 0, we find










(1− Lz) > 0
which is equivalent to the given expression.
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Appendix C: Proofs (Chapter 3)
Proof of Lemma 3. We take the left-sided limit of the derivative of the payoff func-
tions of bankers and workers π (e∗ − ε) + ε and w (e∗ − ε) as ε→ 0 to find
lim
e→e∗−
−π′(e) + 1 = lim
e→e∗−






− (1− α) k′(e) = − 1− α
1− αφ
The marginal effect on total surplus is the sum of the two, 1− s′ = 1− π′−w′, and
is zero at a first-order approximation.
Proof of Proposition 13. We first show that the marginal functions Π′(x), Π1(x
i, x),


























Note that if it is indeed the case that xW < xB, then part (ii) of the proof follows
immediately from this fact.
Next we show that xLF < xB at an interior solution. At the point xLF we
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have Π1 = 0. Then we find
Π′(xLF ) = Π′(xLF )− Π1(xLF , xLF ) = −
∫ A∗
0
(1− α) (1− φ)(Ã− 1)Fk
(1− φαFk) (1− φFk)
dG(Ã)
Observe that the term Fk
(1−φαFk)(1−φFk)
is strictly increasing in Fk. Now we define R̄
as follows. If A∗ ≤ 1, so that the term (Ã − 1) < 0 over the entire interval, we let
R̄ be the value of Fk when Ã = A
∗. If instead we have A∗ > 1, then let R̄ be the




(1− α) (1− φ)(Ã− 1)Fk

























dG(Ã) < 0. Thus
we have









Thus we have xLF < xB. If e∗ ≤ 1 then xW = 1 − e∗ because workers prefer
avoiding any constraints whereas xLF > 1 − e∗ because individual bankers would
like to expose themselves to at least some constraints; therefore xW < xLF .











Since at an interior solution we have W ′(xW ) = 0, this implies Π′(xW ) > 0, and so
xB > xW .
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Proof of Proposition 14. For (i), observe that we can write





where Iei≥e∗ is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 when ei ≥ e∗ and 0 otherwise.





0. We can write this as








is the owner’s first-order condition. The second







Ã− 1|ei ≥ e∗
]
Pr(ei ≥ e∗)
Since ei is strictly increasing in Ã, E[Ã − 1|ei ≥ e∗] is the expected value of the
upper portion of a random variable, and so is strictly greater than E[Ã− 1], which
by assumption is strictly positive. Therefore we have Π1(x
LF ) > 0, and so xA > xLF .
To prove (ii), we begin by showing that xA is strictly increasing in δ. Differen-




, which is strictly positive.
At the old preferred level of x, we now have P1(x) > 0, and so x
A will increase. Now
we observe that increasing x for x > xW will always make workers worse off. Then
since xW < xLF < xA, increasing δ will make workers worse off.









π′ (e) + n−1
n
πi1 (e
i, e) for e < e∗,n
1 for e ≥ e∗,n
225
This falls in between the marginal value of bank capital for the sector as a whole
and for a competitive banker, i.e. π′ < πi,n1 < π
i
1.
Since we have πi,n1 (e
i, e) = πi1 +
1
n
(π′ − πi1), we can write the optimality con-
dition for one of n large firms as
Πi,n1 = Π1(x) +
1
n
(Π′ − Π1) = 0
We immediately see that for n = 1, this reduces to Π′ = 0, which has solution xB,
and for n→∞ this reduces to Π1 = 0, which has solution xLF < xB.




. At xn, we differen-







Since Π1 and Π
′ are both strictly decreasing in x, and since they are zero at xLF
and xB > xLF respectively, in the interval (xLF , xB) we have Π1 < Π
′. Therefore
for higher n we have d
dn
Πi,n1 < 0, and so x
n is decreasing in n.











ei + t (e) , e+ t (e)
)]
where ei = 1− xi + Ãxi and e = 1− x + Ãx (ei = e in equilibrium). Let Â be the
level of Ã that achieves the bailout threshold ê. The first partial derivative of the
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Now we show why this inequality holds. First note that the second terms are









is positive, we are done. Suppose it is negative, which implies
E[Ã− 1|A ≤ Â] < 0. Then we need to show that∫ Â
0




We can write this expression as
∫ Â
0
(Ã− 1)(π1(ê, ê)− π1)dG(Ã) > 0, which is equiv-
alent to E[(Ã− 1)(π1(ê, ê)−π1)|Ã ≤ Â] > 0. This is the expectation of the product
of two random variables, which equals
E
[








Ã− 1, π1(ê, ê)− π1|Ã ≤ Â
)
Since Ã− 1 and π1(ê, ê)− π1(e, e) are both strictly increasing in Ã over the interval
[0, Â), their covariance is strictly positive. Then since both E[π1(ê, ê) − π1|Ã ≤
Â] < 0 and E[Ã − 1|A ≤ Â] < 0, this term is positive, and ΠBL1 (xLF , xLF ) > 0.
Therefore individual bankers will choose to increase xBL > xLF if there is a positive
probability of bailouts.
Proof of Lemma 4. The welfare of workers who collectively provide a transfer t ≥ 0
to bankers is given by w(e+ t)− t. An interior optimum satisfies w′(e+ t) = 1. We
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define the resulting equity level as ê = e+t, which satisfies equation (3.16). Observe
that w′ (e) is strictly declining from w′ (0) = 1/φ > 1 to w′ (e∗) = 1−α
1−φα < 1 over
the interval [0, e∗] so that ê is uniquely defined. If aggregate bank capital is below
this threshold e < ê, workers find it collectively optimal to transfer the shortfall. If
e is above this threshold, it does not pay off for workers to provide a transfer since
w′ < 1 and the optimal transfer is given by the minimum t = 0.
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Appendix D: Variants of Baseline Model (Chapter 3)
D.1 Always Constrained Case
An interesting special case in which financial markets in period 0 are effectively
complete is a two sector framework in which bankers own all the capital and workers
own all the labor in the economy (i.e. there are no deposits d = 0 and no storage).
By implication, bankers invest all their equity into real capital k = e. Given a Cobb-
Douglas production technology, the two sectors earn constant fractions of aggregate
output so that π (e) = αF (e, 1) and w (e) = (1− α)F (e, 1) for e = Ãx + (1− x).
As long as the two sectors have preferences with identical relative risk aversion (in
our benchmark model both have zero risk-aversion), the optimal level of risk-taking
for bankers simultaneously maximizes total surplus and worker welfare:
arg max
x
E [π (e)] = arg max
x
E [F (e, 1)] = arg max
x
E [w (e)]
Bank capital still imposes pecuniary externalities on wages in this setting, but the
pecuniary externalities under a Cobb-Douglas technology guarantee that both sets
of agents obtain constant fractions of output, replicating the allocation under perfect
risk-sharing. (Analytically, the constant capital and labor shares drop out of the
optimization problem.) There is no distributive conflict.
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D.2 Period 0 Production Function
This appendix generalizes our setup to a Cobb-Douglas production function that is
symmetric across periods t = 1 and 2 of the form
[
Ãtxt + 1− xt
]
F (kt, `t)
This allows us to account for the notion that the higher returns from risk-taking in
the initial period are shared between workers and bankers.
We continue to assume that bankers choose the fraction xt allocated to risky
projects and firms choose the amount of capital invested kt before the productivity
shock Ãt is realized, i.e. in period t− 1.
In period 0, bankers supply their initial equity e0 to firms for physical capital
investment so that k0 = e0. In period 1, the productivity shock Ã1 is realized and
firms hire ` = 1 units of labor to produce output Ã1F (e0, 1). Bankers and workers
share the productive output according to their factor shares,
e1 = α
[
Ã1x1 + 1− x1
]
F (e0, 1) (D.1)
w1 = (1− α)
[
Ã1x1 + 1− x1
]
F (e0, 1)
where equation (D.1) represents the law-of-motion of bank capital from period 0
to period 1. Given the period 1 bank capital e1, the economy behaves as we have
analyzed in Section 3.3.1 in the main body of the paper, i.e. bankers and workers
obtain profits and wages of π(e1) and w(e1). Observe that all agents are risk-averse
with respect to period 2 consumption; therefore the optimal x2 ≡ 1 and we can
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solve for all allocations as if the productivity parameter in period 2 was the constant
A2 = E[Ã2], as in our earlier analysis.
We express aggregate welfare of bankers and workers as a function of period
0 risk-taking x1 as
Π(x1) = E {π(e1)}
W (x1) = E {w1 + w(e1)}
where e1 and w1 are determined by risk-taking and the output shock, as given by
equation (D.1).
Observe that in addition to the effects of risk-taking on period 2 wages w(e1)
that we investigated earlier, period 1 wages now depend positively on risk-taking
x1 because wages are a constant fraction (1 − α) of output and greater risk leads
to higher period 1 output since E[Ã1] > 1. Bankers do not internalize either of the
two externalities on period 1 and period 2 wages.
Assuming an interior solution for x1 and noting that π
′(e1) − 1 = (αFk −
1)k′(e1), the optimal level of risk-taking for the banking sector x
B
1 satisfies

















(αFk − 1) k′(e1)dG(Ã1) = 0




















where we subtracted the expression (1 − α)F (e0, 1) Π′(xB1 ) = 0 in the second line,
which is zero by the optimality condition of bankers.
Let us impose two weak assumptions that allow us to sign this expression.
First, assume φ > α, i.e. leverage is above a minimum level that is typically sat-
isfied in all modern financial systems (1.5 for the standard value of α = 1/3), and
secondly, that Â < 1, i.e. only low realizations of the productivity shock lead to
credit crunches. Note that these two assumptions are sufficient but not necessary
conditions.
Now observe that the first term under the integral, w′(e), is always positive.
To sign the second term, notice that Fk(k, 1) ≤ Fk(k(0), 1) = 1/φ ∀ e ≥ 0 and
so the assumption φ > α implies that αFk − 1 < 0. Furthermore, by the second
assumption, the term (Ã−1) is negative since the integral is over the interval [0, Â].
As a result, the two conditions are sufficient to ensure that the expression is always
negative and that workers continue to prefer less risk-taking than the banking sector.
Intuitively, our distributive results continue to hold when we account for
production and wage earnings in both time periods because the distributive con-
flict stems from the asymmetric effects of credit crunches on bankers and workers,
which are still present: workers are hurt by credit crunches but do not benefit from
higher bank dividends in good times. Therefore workers prefer less risk-taking than
bankers.
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D.3 Different Forms of Bailouts
This appendix considers bailouts that come in the form of emergency lending and
equity injections and shows that both matter only to the extent that they provide
a subsidy (outright transfer in expected value) to constrained bankers that relaxes
their financial constraint.1
Emergency Lending A loan dBL that a policymaker provides to constrained bankers
on behalf of workers at an interest rate rBL that is frequently subsidized, i.e.
below the market interest rate rBL ≤ 1. Such lending constitutes a transfer of(
rBL − 1
)
dBL in net present value terms.2 Assuming that such interventions can-
not relax the commitment problem of bankers that we described in Section 3.2.2,
they are subject to the constraint
rd+ rBLdBL ≤ φRk (D.2)
Equity Injections provide constrained bankers with additional bank capital/equity
q in exchange for a dividend distribution D, which is frequently expressed as a
fraction of bank earnings. The equity injection constitutes a transfer of q−D from
workers to bankers in net present value terms. Assuming that the dividend payment
is subject to the commitment problem of bankers that we assumed earlier, it has to
1For a more comprehensive analysis of bank recapitalizations see e.g. Sandri and Valencia (2013).
For a detailed analysis of the resulting incentives for rent extraction see Korinek (2013).
2In our framework, we assumed that default probabilities are zero in equilibrium. In practice,
the interest rate subsidy typically involves not charging for expected default risk.
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obey the constraint
rd+D ≤ φRk (D.3)
Given our assumptions, both types of bailouts are isomorphic to a lump-sum
transfer t from workers to bankers.3
In the following lemma, we will first focus on an optimal lump-sum transfer
and then show that the resulting allocations can be implemented either directly or
via an optimal package of emergency lending or equity injection.
Lemma 6 (Variants of Bailouts). Both workers and bankers are indifferent between




dBL = t or
via subsidized equity injections such that q−D = t. Conversely, emergency lending
and/or equity injections that do not represent a transfer in net present value terms
are ineffective in our model.
Proof. Let us first focus on an emergency loan package described by a pair (rBL, dBL)
that is provided to bankers by a policymaker on behalf of workers. Since the op-
portunity cost of lending is the storage technology, the direct cost of such a loan to
workers is (1− rBL)dBL. Bankers intermediate k = e+ d+ dBL where we substitute




















for bankers, workers and firms. For an equity injection that is described by a pair
(q,D), an identical argument can be applied.
3Since labor supply is constant, a tax on labor would be isomorphic to a lump sum transfer.
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These observations directly imply the second part of the lemma. More specif-
ically, constraint (D.2) implies that an emergency loan of dBL at an unsubsidized
interest rate rBL = 1 reduces private deposits by an identical amount ∆d = −dBL
and therefore does not affect real capital investment k. Similarly, constraint (D.3)
implies that an equity injection which satisfies q = D reduces private deposits by
∆d = −D and crowds out an identical amount of private deposits.
This captures an equivalence result between the two categories of bailouts –
what matters for constrained bankers is that they obtain a transfer in net present
value terms, but it is irrelevant how this transfer is provided. From the perspective
of bankers who are subject to constraint (3.3), a one dollar repayment on emergency
loans or dividends is no different from a one dollar repayment to depositors, and
all three forms of repayment tighten the financial constraint of bankers in the same
manner. An emergency loan or an equity injection at preferential rates that amounts
to a one dollar transfer allows bankers to raise an additional φR
1−φR dollars of deposits
and expand intermediation by 1
1−φR dollars in total.
Emergency loans or equity injections that are provided at ‘fair’ market rates,
i.e. that do not constitute a transfer in net present value terms, will therefore not
increase financial intermediation. We assumed that the commitment problem of
bankers requires that they obtain at least a fraction (1− φ) of their gross revenue.
If government does not have a superior enforcement technology to relax this con-
straint, any repayments on emergency lending or dividend payments on public equity
injections reduce the share obtained by bankers in precisely the same fashion as re-
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paying bank depositors. Such repayment obligations therefore decrease the amount
of deposits that bankers can obtain by an equal amount and do not expand capital
intermediation.
Conversely, if government had superior enforcement capabilities to extract re-
payments or dividends, then those special capabilities would represent an additional
reason for government intervention in the instrument(s) that relax the constraint
most.
D.4 Bailouts Conditional on Individual Bank Capital
The adverse incentive effects of bailouts are aggravated if bailouts are conditional
on individual bank capital ei. Such bailouts provide bankers with an additional
incentive to increase risk-taking in order to raise the expected bailout rents received.
To capture this notion, suppose that the bailout received by an individual







0 if e ≥ ê
ê− (1− γ) e− γei if e < ê
where γ ∈ [0, 1] captures the extent to which the bailout depends on individual
bank equity. This specification nests our baseline model in which bailouts are en-
tirely conditional on aggregate bank capital (γ = 0), but now also includes bailouts
that are partially or wholly contingent on individual bank capital (γ > 0). Alter-
natively, if banks are non-atomistic and bailouts are conditional only on aggregate
bank capital e, we can interpret the parameter γ as the market share of individual
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banks, since each bank will internalize that its bank equity makes up a fraction γ
of aggregate bank equity.
We denote the amount of their endowment that bankers allocate to the risky
project in period 0 by xBL (γ), and we find that bailouts have the following effects:
Proposition 16 (Risk-Taking Effects of Bailouts). (i) Introducing bailout transfers
increases period 0 risk-taking xBL (γ) > xLF for any γ ≥ 0.
(ii) Risk-taking xBL (γ) is an increasing function of γ.
Proof. Since we proved in Proposition 5 that xBL(γ) > xLF holds for γ = 0, (ii)
implies (i). To prove (ii), observe that the welfare maximization problem of bankers















, e+ t (e)
)]
where ei = 1 − xi + Ãxi = e in equilibrium. Let us define Â as the level of Ã that











(Ã− 1)π1dG(Ã) = 0






(Ã− 1)dG(Ã) > 0
where the inequality holds since we assumed Â < 1.
Point (ii) captures that the risk-taking incentives of bankers rise further be-
cause they internalize that one more dollar in losses will increase their bailout by
γ dollars. This captures the standard notion of moral hazard, i.e. that bailouts
targeted at individual losses increase risk-taking.
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Redistributive Effects Corollary 2 showed that Bankers benefit by the introduction
of bailouts, while workers benefit from the market-completion effect and are hurt by
the incentive effect of bailouts. Since the market-completion effect does not depend
on γ, higher γ acts as a pure incentive effect that raises risk-taking, and benefits
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